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1 Introduction
”The history of modern macroeconomics starts in 1936, with the publication of
Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money” [Blanchard (2008, p.
576)]. Thereafter, many new ideas and solution concepts for macroeconomic prob-
lems emerged, disappeared, and were combined in order to appropriately describe
macroeconomic phenomena.1 Nowadays, New Keynesian frameworks are the work-
horse models for monetary macroeconomics. These models combine elements of the
Real Business Cycle literature such as rational expectations, microfoundations, and
the concept of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (henceforth: DSGE) with
Keynesian elements such as nominal price rigidities and market imperfections. How-
ever, we claim that New Keynesian models still have some weaknesses. Therefore,
this thesis contributes to the literature by providing – to our mind – important
extensions of the baseline New Keynesian model and by analyzing new aspects of
monetary and fiscal policy. In particular, we identify the following four weaknesses.
First, the baseline New Keynesian model does not incorporate a frictional financial
sector. However, empirical studies as for instance Aliaga-Dı´az and Olivero (2010) or
Santos and Winton (2008) show that in particular banks and their non-stationary
price-cost margins are of great interest for business cycle dynamics. In line with
this finding, Jermann and Quadrini (2009) show that the introduction of a financial
sector leads to an important propagation of macroeconomic volatility.
Second, a simplifying assumption of the baseline New Keynesian model is that the
mass of firms is constant (and normalized to one). However, there is empirical evi-
dence for instance provided by Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996) that the num-
ber of operating firms significantly co-moves with GDP. Moreover, amongst others
Campbell (1998) shows that firm entries and in particular firm exits significantly
contribute to business cycle dynamics. The recent literature however neglects simul-
taneous endogenous firm entry and exit.
Third, monetary policy follows a simple instrument rule of Taylor (1993) type in
the baseline New Keynesian model. In reality, central banks however do not strictly
rely on commitment strategies. Instead, they deviate from their rules for instance in
the presence of large shocks. The topic of policy switching regimes and the resulting
consequences for the credibility of central banks are already discussed in the famous
study of Barro and Gordon (1983a,b). However, the authors do not consider any
1See amongst others Woodford (2009), Blanchard (2008), and Gal´ı and Gertler (2007) for an overview of the
history of modern macroeconomics.
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demand side effects of the economy in their approach. Moreover, the authors assume
for the sake of simplicity that the central bank can directly (and perfectly) control
the inflation rate.
Fourth, traditional New Keynesian approaches analyze the impacts of fiscal stimuli
on standard measures of economic activity such as GDP, employment, and capital
investment [see amongst others Linnemann and Schabert (2003)] but neglect their
impact on the extensive margin, i.e. the mass of firms operating in the market.
However, a recent literature highlights the role of an endogenous mass of firms as
an important propagation and amplification mechanism for business cycle fluctua-
tions [see Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008)]. In
particular, this amplification effect potentially gives rise to larger fiscal multipliers.
This thesis is structured as follows. In Section 1.1, we shortly present the baseline
New Keynesian model including the basic assumptions. The resulting problems, po-
tential solutions, and the contribution of this thesis to the macroeconomics literature
are discussed in Section 1.2.
The main part of this thesis is divided into two parts. In Part One consisting of
Chapter 2 and 3, we contribute to the literature by providing – to our mind –
important new extensions of the baseline New Keynesian model. In particular, we
develop a New Keynesian model incorporating an oligopolistic banking sector with
endogenous bank entry in Chapter 2. Within this framework, we conduct an im-
pulse response analysis and evaluate the model by comparing the generated second
moments with the data. In Chapter 3, we develop a New Keynesian model incor-
porating an endogenous mass of firms allowing for simultaneous entry and exit of
heterogeneous firms. This chapter includes the investigation of the resulting impulse
responses, a second moment analysis, and an empirical part concerning a Phillips
curve estimation.
In Part Two consisting of Chapter 4 and 5, we contribute to the literature by
providing new aspects of monetary and fiscal policy. More precisely, the aim of
Chapter 4 is to solve the inconsistency problem a` la Barro and Gordon within a
standard New Keynesian model and to derive time-consistent interest rate rules of
Taylor-type. In Chapter 5, we estimate a DSGE model with capital in production
and endogenous firm entry using Bayesian techniques. Within this framework, we
investigate the macroeconomic effects of different fiscal interventions.
The last chapter (Chapter 6) concludes and provides an outlook for future research.
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1.1 The Baseline New Keynesian Model
The baseline New Keynesian model2 represents a closed economy framework. Beside
the central bank, the model consists of three types of agents: households, intermedi-
ate good producers (or: firms), and final good producers (or: retailers). Within each
type of economic actors, agents are homogeneous.
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Figure 1.1: Model structure of the baseline New Keynesian model
Households invest in interest bearing bonds, consume a bundle of goods, and supply
labor to firms. Labor markets are complete. Each firm produces a differentiated good
using labor.3 Firms act under monopolistic competition. This assumption ensures
that firms act as price setters as opposed to price takers. Firms sell their differen-
tiated goods to the retailers being faced with a sticky price setting mechanism as
introduced by Calvo (1983).4 The generated profits are transferred to the house-
holds. Retailers simply bundle the intermediate goods to a final good and sell it
under perfectly competitive conditions to the households. The monetary authority
2For an excellent introduction to New Keynesian Macroeconomics see amongst others Gal´ı (2008) and Wohlt-
mann and Winkler (2008, 2009).
3Though capital accumulation is a key element of the RBC literature, it is absent in the baseline New
Keynesian model. However, it can easily be extended by capital in production.
4When neglecting trend inflation and real wage rigidities, the results do not change when alternatively intro-
ducing quadratic price adjustment costs in the spirit of Rotemberg (1982) to the model. However, Ascari
and Merkl (2009) show that when incorporating these features the resulting adjustment dynamics under
Calvo and Rotemberg pricing significantly diverge in a non-linear framework [see also Ascari and Rossi
(forthcoming)].
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does not directly control for inflation but for the nominal interest rate by following
an instrument rule of Taylor (1993) type. Figure 1.1 depicts the model structure of
the baseline New Keynesian model.
1.2 Problems and Potential Solutions
After having described the baseline New Keynesian model, we will now show up
some weaknesses of New Keynesian models and potential solutions. Thereby, we
will sketch the outline of this thesis and emphasize its contribution to the New Key-
nesian literature.
Financial Frictions
The baseline New Keynesian model does not incorporate a frictional financial sector.
However, as Gertler (1988) highlights, there already exists a long-standing tradition
in macroeconomic theory that emphasizes a central role to financial markets in the
propagation of cyclical movements. Seminal work reaches back to Fisher (1933) and
Keynes (1936). In the last two decades a body of literature moreover highlights
the role of financial frictions for explaining the development of key macroeconomic
variables [see amongst others Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999), Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), or Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009)].5
Additionally, the financial crisis 2007-2009 again sheds light on the importance of
implementing financial frictions into macroeconomic models. Empirical studies as
for instance Santos and Winton (2008) show that in particular banks and their
non-stationary price-cost margins are of great interest for business cycle dynamics.
Further empirical support for non-stationary price-cost margins of banks is for in-
stance given by Aliaga-Dı´az and Olivero (2010) who highlight the counter-cyclical
nature of mark-ups in the banking sector via VAR forecast error-based methodology
for US data. Moreover, Olivero (2010) provides further empirical support for OECD
data.
In the recent literature, the counter-cyclical nature of mark-ups in loan markets is
commonly implemented by assuming an information asymmetry between borrowers
and lenders as for instance in the famous financial accelerator model of Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). In this study, the authors integrate the Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) approach into a New Keynesian model. Hence, they
build up an overlapping generations model where firms need physical capital and
labor for production. The acquisition of capital is financed either by borrowing or by
entrepreneurial net wealth. Competitive financial intermediaries ask for an external
finance premium (or: mark-up) over their marginal costs for financing capital. This
5See Arend (2010) for an insightful overview of newer contributions. See moreover Gertler (1988) for an
excellent overview of ”traditional” approaches incorporating financial frictions.
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mark-up is not caused by an imperfectly competitive environment of financial in-
stitutions but by the assumption of information asymmetries across borrowers and
lenders. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) moreover assume that the external
finance premium inversely depends on borrowers’ net wealth. Therefore, an enhance-
ment in wealth of borrowers in boom phases leads to a decline in mark-ups in the
loan market. This in turn increases the net wealth of borrowers and consequently
introduces an amplification effect, the famous financial accelerator.
In Chapter 2 and in contrast to that, we do not emphasize mark-up movements from
the demand side of credits.6 Instead, our new financial accelerator nests from the
supply side of credits. More precisely, we extend the baseline New Keynesian model
by assuming that firms have to pre-finance their wage-bill. Banks provide loans under
oligopolistic competition using deposits and money market credits.7 Moreover, the
number of oligopolistic banks is non-stationary and endogenously determined. This
combination enables us to draw the endogenous causality that an increasing number
of banks causes the market share of the single financial intermediary and thus the
resulting mark-up to decline. In Chapter 2, we show that the latter relation in turn
finds support in the data. We moreover show that bank mark-ups are negatively
correlated with the number of banks and that the number of banks in turn co-moves
with GDP in the US economy.
The analysis of the resulting impulse responses shows that our framework can indeed
depict both the empirically observed pro-cyclical nature of the number of banks as
well as the counter-cyclical nature of mark-up movements. Thereby, the endogenous
mark-up movements resulting from oligopolistic competition generate large ampli-
fication and persistence effects. In particular, we obtain significantly higher accel-
erating effects than those generated by the famous financial accelerator model of
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Notably, we obtain the largest accelerating
effect in the case of a shock to the nominal interest rate.
Our financial accelerator works as follows. Due to increasing profit opportunities for
banks in economic upturns, the number of banks increases in response to expan-
sionary shocks. The market share of the single bank consequently decreases. As a
result, banks have to decrease their mark-ups. Since firms have to pre-finance their
wage-bill, a decreasing bank mark-up has in turn a positive effect on the marginal
costs of firms leading to a further increase in production and thus in loan demand.
Consequently, the endogenous mark-up movements resulting from oligopolistic com-
petition8 induces a multiplier (or: amplification) effect, the new financial accelerator.
6In the following, we will use the expressions ”credit” and ”loan” synonymously.
7Following amongst others Henzel et al. (2009) and Hu¨lsewig, Meyer, and Wollmersha¨user (2009), we assume
deposits and money market credits to be perfect substitutes. Consequently, the deposit rate and the money
market rate – the instrument of the central bank – have to coincide [see also Freixas and Rochet (1997)].
8Remark: In the case of monopolistic competition, the mark-up of a competitor tends to zero. As a result,
the mark-ups are constant in such an environment.
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As the famous financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999),
our framework thus represents a further step to solve the puzzle how relatively small
shocks can result in large and persistent effects for the real economy [see amongst
others Mankiw (2001), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999), and Fuhrer and Moore (1995)].
Thereby, our framework provides a new transmission channel for monetary policy
via bank creation which works as follows. A contractionary shock to the instrument
of the central bank, the nominal interest rate, results in four expansionary effects.
(i) Consumption is shifted into the present leading to a higher loan demand. (ii)
The marginal costs of banks decrease. (iii) Bank entry costs decline, too.9 (iv) The
value of a bank which is defined as the discounted sum of future profits increases due
to the lower discount rate. The first two effects result in higher bank profits while
the latter two effects have moreover an expansionary impact on the profitability of
bank start-ups which result in an increase in investment in new banks. All in all, the
resulting expansionary reaction of the number of operating banks leads to a lower
market share of a single bank. Hence, the declining mark-up on the loan market
introduces the new financial accelerator.10
As standard in the macroeconomics literature, we finally evaluate our model by
comparing the second moments11 of the generated series with those observed in US
data. The analysis shows that the model performs remarkable well with respect to
this dimension. In particular, it does not only depict the properties of key macro-
economic variables appropriately but also those of financial variables. Moreover, we
analyze the macroeconomic implications of a financial activity tax and a financial
transaction tax. Our analysis points out that these two taxes are indeed an appro-
priate tool to stabilize financial markets12 and thus to dampen the volatility of key
macroeconomic variables. We find that the financial activity tax where banks have
to pay a tax on each transaction is significantly more effective in extenuating macro-
economic volatility than the financial transaction tax where the tax base is simply
per period profits.13
9Remark: We assume that deposits are needed to build up new banks.
10By contrast, the transmission channel for monetary policy in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) works
as follows. An easing of monetary policy increases the return on capital resulting in an increase in the net
wealth of firms. This in turn causes a decrease in firm leverage leading to a reduction of the external finance
premium and thus to a further rise in capital demand. This in turn leads to an additional expansionary
effect for the production sector.
11These evaluations typically include an analysis of the generated variances – in absolute and relative terms –
autocorrelations, and/or cross-correlations.
12This result is in line with the findings of the partial analyses of Tobin (1978) taxes in amongst others Dieci
and Westerhoff (2004).
13This result is also obtained by Lengnick and Wohltmann (2010) who extend a simplified framework a` la
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) by a high-frequency asset market as in Dieci and Westerhoff (2004).
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The Extensive Margin of Production
In the baseline New Keynesian framework, the mass of firms is assumed to be con-
stant over time. However, there is empirical support that the number of producing
firms varies over time and significantly co-moves with GDP [see amongst others De-
vereux, Head, and Lapham (1996) or Bergin and Corsetti (2008)]. In line with this
finding, there already exists a small but growing strand of literature dealing with en-
dogenous firm entry initiated by the trade models of Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and
Melitz (2003). Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) and Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz
(2007b) respectively extend this framework to an RBC and a New Keynesian model.
These studies have become the workhorse models for analyzing the macroeconomic
effects resulting from an endogenous mass of firms. For the sake of simplicity, the
authors however assume that firms are homogeneous and that only firm entry is
endogenously determined. By contrast, the death rate of firms is constant over time.
More precisely, they assume that with a given (constant) probability firms are hit
with a death shock at the very end of each period. However, the empirical study of
Campbell (1998) shows that, although the entry rate of new firms is significantly
correlated with GDP, the co-movement between the business cycle and firms’ failures
is even larger. In Chapter 3, we present a similar finding. This result is moreover
confirmed by Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) who find negative and highly signif-
icant correlations between GDP and firms’ failures based on industry level data.
Therefore, the aim of Chapter 3 is to contribute to the literature by providing a
New Keynesian model with an alternative mechanism which allows for simultaneous
endogenous firm entry and exit.
More precisely, we develop an approach which only differs from the baseline New
Keynesian model presented in Section 1.1 via the production sector. We assume
the firms to be heterogeneous with respect to their individual productivity. They
thus produce with different technologies.14 Moreover, we do no longer stick to the
assumption of a constant mass of firms. In particular, both the entry and exit de-
cisions of firms are based on present value criteria. More precisely, if on the one
hand an existing firm expects a non-positive net present value of current and future
production, it will consequently leave the market.15 On the other hand, a new firm
will enter, if its entry is profitable, i.e. if the present value of production exceeds the
entry costs. Of course, the entry and exit decisions crucially depend on the respective
individual productivity level in our model. This implies that good (i.e. productive)
firms will thus stay in the market or will enter it, while bad firms will leave. Beside
that the derived model is standard.
Our framework has several advantages when compared to the workhorse model of
14We assume that the individual productivity levels are Pareto distributed which captures industry level data
quite well [cf. Ghironi and Melitz (2005).]
15Remark: The present value of production is defined as the discounted sum of all current and future profits.
The net present value is then defined as the present value of production minus entering/exiting costs.
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Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b). Especially in the case of monetary and fiscal
interventions our model is more conclusive in some important economic aspects.
More precisely, the model of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007b) generates a decrease
in the mass of producers in the case of an expansionary shock to monetary policy.
This however conflicts with the empirical insights of Bergin and Corsetti (2008).
Their VAR analysis shows that a decrease in the interest rate encourages firm entry.
In line with this finding, our framework generates the suggested increase in the mass
of products16 even in a simplified specification of the model where exits are assumed
to be exogenous. The economic rationale is that due to heterogeneity – also across
potential firms – there will always exists a firm with an individual productivity level
that is only slightly too low for a profitable entry.17 As a consequence, also small
expansionary shocks can result in an increase in the mass of firms. When assuming
homogeneity across firms as in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b), this does not
have to hold.
A further problem of the models of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b) is that
they do not perform better than standard RBC models with respect to the generated
second moments [see Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b)]. By contrast, our model
performs better since it solves two problems of standard New Keynesian and RBC
models. First, in our approach total hours worked and consumption do not react too
smooth relative to output.18 Second, all variables do not behave too pro-cyclical.19
When assuming firm exits to be exogenous the results become worse. Hence, an
endogenous tendency of firms to leave the market should not be neglected.
In addition, our model can contribute to the debate in the RBC literature initiated
by Gal´ı (1999), whether an overall productivity shock leads to an expansionary or
a contractionary reaction of total hours worked. In the empirical literature, there is
a widespread agreement that there exists a negative correlation between total hours
worked and GDP [see amongst others Francis and Ramey (2004, 2005), Gal´ı and
Rabanal (2004), and Gal´ı (1999)]. However, standard RBC models generate a pos-
itive co-movement.20 By making prices totally flexible and considering capital, the
resulting RBC core of our model can depict both possibilities when the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is varied within an empirically plausible range. The
16Remark: As standard in the macroeconomics literature, there is a one-to-one identification between a firm
and a product. We will thus use the latter expressions synonymously.
17Note that this result would also hold for other distributions of the individual productivity level, e.g. a Normal
or Student’s t-distribution.
18This implies that the generated standard deviations of total hours worked and consumption in our framework
are not too small in relation to the standard deviation of GDP as in standard RBC and New Keynesian
models [cf. King and Rebelo (1999)].
19This implies that the generated autocorrelations in our model are not too large when compared to the
empirically observed ones as in standard RBC and New Keynesian models [cf. King and Rebelo (1999)].
20Remark: Within a classical monetary model, i.e. an RBC framework without capital in production, the sign
of the reaction of hours worked crucially depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution [cf. Gal´ı
(2008, Ch.2)]. However, when considering capital in the model, hours worked always react expansionary [cf.
Gal´ı (1999)].
1.2 Problems and Potential Solutions 9
underlying driving force is the development of the mass of producing firms.
As producer price index (PPI) inflation and consumer price index (CPI) inflation
do not coincide in general in our approach, we derive two specifications of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve. We show that in our model PPI inflation is only affected
by expected future inflation and the labor share as in the baseline Phillips curve.
This result moreover finds support in US economy data as there does not exist a
significant correlation between PPI inflation and the extensive margin.21 In the case
of CPI inflation, there however exists a variety effect22 in our theoretical framework
since the CPI Phillips curve is also a function of the change in the mass of producers.
This result finds support in US economy data, too, since we find that CPI inflation is
significantly correlated with the change in the number of producers. We estimate the
latter specification of the Phillips curve using the generalized method of moments.
We show that the impact of the change in the extensive margin on CPI inflation
is highly significant in the reduced form as well as in the structural estimation. In
comparison with the baseline New Keynesian Phillips curve, our CPI Phillips curve
becomes flatter in an inflation/labor share-space. This implies that the introduction
of an endogenous mass of producers causes the impact of the labor share on inflation
to decrease as there occur additional effects from changes in the mass of firms.
The Stabilization and Inflation Bias
In the baseline New Keynesian model, the monetary authority follows an instrument
rule of Taylor (1993) type. In reality, central banks however do not strictly rely on
a commitment strategy. Instead, they deviate from their rules for instance in the
presence of large shocks. The topic of policy switching regimes and the resulting
consequences for the credibility of central banks are already discussed in the famous
studies of Barro and Gordon (1983a,b). However, the authors do not consider any
demand side effects of the economy in their approach. Moreover, the authors assume
for the sake of simplicity that the central bank can directly control for the inflation
rate.
There already exists a couple of studies which show that the crucial assumption
made by Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) namely, that the central bank aims at an
output gap target larger than zero,23 leads to an inflation bias in a New Keynesian
framework, too [see amongst others Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999)]. However, an
explicit derivation and the analysis of the resulting welfare consequences of optimal
monetary policy, including purely discretionary and inconsistent monetary policy as
well as time-(in)consistent Taylor rules, are neglected in the literature. This will be
21In the following, we will use the expressions ”mass of firms” and ”extensive margin” synonymously.
22Remark: The variety effect implies that an increase in the mass of firms leads ceteris paribus to an increase
in output and the price of goods [see Benassy (1996) or Bergin and Corsetti (2008)].
23An economic rationale for this assumption is that for instance monopolistic distortions or taxes keep potential
output below its efficient level [cf. Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999)].
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the aim of Chapter 4.
In particular, Chapter 4 offers an approach which enables us to discuss both the
debate in the New Keynesian literature about the optimality of commitment vs.
discretion and the time-inconsistency problem a` la Barro and Gordon (1983a,b)
within a unified framework. By assuming that the central bank aims at an output
gap target larger than zero as in Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), we can solve the
inconsistency problem and derive time-consistent (or: stable) interest rate rules of
Taylor-type within the standard New Keynesian model. Thereby, this framework
enables us to consider the demand side of the economy and to deviate from the
assumption that the central bank can directly control for the inflation rate. Instead,
the mechanism in New Keynesian models is as follows. (i) The central bank commits
itself to follow an interest rate rule of Taylor-type. (ii) Private agents form inflation
expectations. (iii) The central bank sets the interest rate and the households adjust
their consumption expenditures according to the Euler consumption equation. (iv)
Inflation is then determined by expected future inflation and the output realization
via the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Our main findings are as follows. Under a completely standard calibration includ-
ing a time preference rate of the monetary authority equal to the long-run interest
rate, the standard Taylor rule is time-consistent (or: stable) in the presence of a
cost-push shock. The central bank thus does not have an incentive to deviate from
the announced rule and to switch over to the inconsistent policy regime. However,
there exists a multiplicity of stable Taylor rules which are superior to the standard
one. In contrast to the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach, implementing a
monetary rule such that the cost and benefit resulting from inconsistent policy coin-
cide – which implies a net gain of inconsistent policy behavior equal to zero – is not
optimal. Instead, the solution can be enhanced by moving into the time-consistent
area where the net gain of inconsistent monetary policy is negative. Moreover, there
does not exist a stable monetary policy rule maximizing the welfare when consider-
ing monetary policy of Taylor-type rules. The continuum of stable rules furthermore
becomes larger when assuming an additional term in the social loss function con-
cerning interest rate stability. This implies that the reputation of the central bank
naturally improves if the policy maker is also concerned about stabilizing the interest
rate. Our results remain robust with respect to the analysis of simultaneous supply
and demand shocks.
A New Dimension for Evaluating Fiscal Policy
In order to fight the recessionary impacts of the recent financial crisis, governments
throughout the globe have passed large fiscal packages and thereby triggered a debate
about the effectiveness of government spending in stimulating economic activity.
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In this context, Cogan et al. (2010) employ an empirically estimated New Keynesian
model for the US economy24 [Smets and Wouters (2007)] also incorporating rule-of-
thumb consumers and report a multiplier less than one.25 Faia, Lechthaler, and Merkl
(2010b) and Campolmi, Faia, and Winkler (2010) demonstrate that a pure demand
stimulus leads to very small (or even negative) multipliers in models with frictional
labor markets. Moreover, both studies emphasize that other forms of fiscal stimuli
such as hiring subsidies or income tax cuts are much more effective in boosting
output and employment. The implications of a fiscal demand shock in the baseline
New Keynesian model are investigated in Linnemann and Schabert (2003).
All these contributions analyze the impacts of fiscal stimuli on standard measures of
economic activity (GDP, employment, investment) but neglect their impact on the
extensive margin, i.e. the mass of existing firms in the economy. However, a recent
literature highlights the role of an endogenous mass of firms as an important propa-
gation and amplification mechanism for business cycle fluctuations [see amongst oth-
ers Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008)]. Bilbiie,
Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008) respectively demon-
strate that technological innovations and shocks to monetary policy are amplified
by endogenizing the extensive margin. With respect to fiscal interventions, a sub-
stantial pro-cyclical behavior of the mass of firms may help to explain how fiscal
stimuli generate large and persistent business cycle fluctuations. In particular, this
amplification effect potentially gives rise to larger fiscal multipliers.26
The aim of Chapter 5 is thus twofold. First, we explore the impacts of different
fiscal stimuli on firm entry applying a variant of the workhorse firm entry model of
Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) with capital in production which we estimate
for the US using Bayesian techniques.27 Second, we calculate fiscal multipliers for
both the model with an endogenous mass of firms and the standard RBC model with
a constant mass of firms. This enables us to investigate whether a changing mass
of firms alters the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli. Moreover, our framework allows
for a closer examination of investment decisions – and correspondingly crowding-
out/in effects of fiscal interventions – since we can distinguish between investments
in physical capital and those in new products. Beside an increase in government
spending28 financed by lump-sum taxation, we moreover consider other forms of
24Cwik and Wieland (2009) report a similar finding for the Euro area.
25Note that this finding is equivalent to the well-known Haavelmo (1945) theorem. It implies that for instance
in the IS/LM framework, an increase in fiscal expenditure financed by taxes leads to a multiplier less than
one and to a reduction of private consumption [see also Wohltmann (2007)].
26Other well-known mechanisms to generate larger fiscal multipliers are for instance the introduction of sticky
prices [cf. Linnemann and Schabert (2003)], rule-of-thumb consumers [cf. Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle`s
(2007)] or backward indexation of prices [cf. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009)]. We however want to
analyze the pure effects of firm entry on fiscal multipliers.
27In contrast to Faia, Lechthaler, and Merkl (2010b) and Campolmi, Faia, and Winkler (2010), we follow
Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b) by assuming labor markets to be complete as in the baseline New
Keynesian and RBC model.
28As standard in the literature, we assume that the government only purchases consumption goods [see amongst
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fiscal stimuli. More precisely, we analyze the effects in response to cuts in the labor
income tax, the capital income tax, the dividend income tax, and the consumption
tax. Note however that the aim of Chapter 5 is not to provide a thorough quantitative
evaluation of fiscal packages since we do not apply a large scale DSGE model with
several nominal and real frictions as for instance in Cogan et al. (2010) or Cwik
and Wieland (2009). Instead, we apply a rather simple framework to focus on the
qualitative and quantitative differences to the standard RBC model resulting from
endogenous firm entry.
Our main findings are as follows. We demonstrate that the extensive margin can in-
deed act as an accelerator for the impacts of fiscal stimuli. However, we find that the
qualitative reaction of the mass of firms – in particular, the sign of the corresponding
reaction – crucially depends on the form of a fiscal stimulus. Moreover, we find that
if in response to a fiscal intervention the mass of firms increases, fiscal multipliers29
– in the long-run and in the short-run – are amplified. In this case, two expansionary
effects arise. First, an increasing extensive margin has a positive impact on goods
production via the ’love of variety effect’ [see Benassy (1996) and Bergin and Corsetti
(2008)]. This effect directly follows from the aggregation of intermediate goods and
implies that an increase in the mass of firms has ceteris paribus a positive impact on
aggregate production. Second, households have to invest in start-ups to create new
firms. Additional investments in turn boost GDP.30 When compared to the baseline
model – with a constant extensive margin – the multipliers are significantly larger.
If, by contrast, the mass of firms decreases in response to a fiscal intervention,31
the extensive margin dampens the impacts of fiscal stimuli on economic activity.
The drop in new firm investment then results in an additional crowding-out effect.
In comparison with the standard RBC model, the resulting multipliers are then
significantly smaller.
Our impulse response analysis based on the estimated mean of the parameters shows
that investment in new firms decreases in response to an increase in government
consumption. This additional crowding-out effect pushes the multiplier below that
others Smets and Wouters (2007, 2003), Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle`s (2007) or Linnemann and Schabert
(2003)]. Therefore, we will use the expressions ”government spending” and ”government consumption” syn-
onymously. Alternatively, Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2010) consider government investment or Cavallo
(2005), Gomes (2009) or Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2010) assume that governments employ workers to
produce goods used for government consumption or government investment. However, these approaches do
not generate larger multiplier. Instead, they often generate negative short-run multipliers before they turn
positive in the longer-run.
29We calculate the dynamic fiscal multiplier as proposed by Uhlig (2010). Moreover, we define the short-run
multiplier as the discounted change in GDP in the first year divided by the discounted costs of a fiscal
stimulus during the first year. The long-run multiplier is defined as the discounted overall changes in output
divided by the discounted overall costs.
30The latter effect is analogous to our financial accelerator model of Chapter 2 since in both models GDP
includes investment in new start-ups.
31In particular, this is the case in response to a temporary drop in the capital tax since we find a substitution
relation between investment in new firms and investment in physical capital. The mass of firms also decreases
in response to an increase in government spending financed not only by lump-sum but distortionary taxes.
1.2 Problems and Potential Solutions 13
of the benchmark model with a constant mass of firms. A similar result is found for
the case of a demand stimulus through a cut in consumption taxes. However, we show
that the reaction of the extensive margin in response to an increase in government
consumption or a cut in consumption taxes turns out to be ambiguous. In line with
this finding, Lewis (2009b) points out that the mass of firms only reacts expansionary
if the fiscal demand shock is sufficiently persistent. The economic rationale is that
only under highly persistent shocks potential firms expect future profit opportunities
which cover the entry cost and consequently enter the market.
We extend this analysis by demonstrating that the ambiguous impact of government
consumption shocks on the mass of firms is not only driven by the shock persistence
in isolation but by the combination of the latter with the labor supply elasticity. The
economic intuition why the reaction of the mass of product varieties may turn neg-
ative when the labor supply elasticity is low is as follows. Suppose labor is the only
input in production and is supplied totally inelastic. In an RBC model with a fixed
mass of producers, an increase in government consumption consequently causes a
complete crowding-out of private consumption. In the entry model, however, house-
holds can reallocate their labor force between working in the manufacturing sector
and creating new products.32 Households are then able to dampen the drop in pri-
vate consumption by increasing hours worked in the manufacturing sector and de-
creasing hours worked for product creation. The mass of firms consequently declines
when labor supply is sufficiently inelastic. Furthermore, we show that the source of
government financing such as distortionary income taxes is a crucial dimension, too.
Due to the fact that fiscal demand stimuli may cause a crowding-out not only of
investment in physical capital and consumption but also of investment in new firms,
we show that these interventions lead to small fiscal multipliers in the applied frame-
work.33 By contrast, the multipliers of labor and dividend tax cuts are significantly
larger.34 The reason is that in these cases we find a crowding-in of private consump-
32Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b) assume that labor is needed to create new firms.
33Note that we apply an RBC framework. A corresponding ”traditional” approach would be the famous
AD/AS-model with flexible prices and wages of a closed economy [neoclassical variant, see amongst others
Wohltmann (2007, Ch. 6)]. In this framework, an increase in government spending has no effects on output,
at all, since it does not affect the supply side of production. By contrast, an increase in government spending
financed by lump-sum taxation leads to an increase in labor supply in an RBC framework caused by the
negative wealth effect [cf. Baxter and King (1993)]. The wealth effect works as follows. Since the increase in
government spending is financed by lump-sum taxation, it represents a negative effect on the total income of
households. The households consequently decrease their consumption expenditures and increase their labor
supply to compensate for the additional tax expenditures. This increase in labor supply in turn leads to an
expansionary reaction of production. In contrast to traditional approaches, this wealth effect is thus not a
direct but an indirect effect.
34This is not a very surprising result since these taxes are distortionary and have a direct impact on the
supply side of the economy. Moreover, the cuts in these tax rates are financed by lump-sum taxation which
additionally lead to an expansionary reaction of production via the negative wealth effect. The result that
tax cuts which affect the supply of production lead to larger multipliers than an increase in government
spending is already known from the neoclassical variant of the AD/AS-model, too. This is for instance the
case when analyzing a cut in ancillary labor costs. This tax cut has positive effects on GDP while – as already
mentioned – an increase in government spending has no effects in such an environment [cf. Wohltmann (2007,
Ch. 6)].
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tion, of investment in existing capital, and of investment in product creation. The
latter effect in turn leads to an increasing mass of firms. Although the multiplier
of a cut in capital taxes is also close to one, this policy comes at the cost of a
crowding-out in new firm investment and thus of a decrease in the mass of firms.
Moreover, we contribute to the literature by conducting a Bayesian estimation of
a DSGE model with firm entry incorporating several structural shocks. In a com-
plementary study, Lewis and Poilly (2010) estimate a DSGE model with firm entry
by using a VAR minimum distance approach. They apply a framework with several
nominal and real frictions but focus on a single shock to monetary policy.
Part One: Extensions of the
baseline New Keynesian Model
15
2 Banks, Oligopolistic Competition,
and the Business Cycle: A New
Financial Accelerator Approach
2.1 Introduction
As Gertler (1988) states, there already exists a long-standing tradition in macroeco-
nomic theory that emphasizes a central role to financial markets in the propagation
of cyclical movements. Seminal work reaches back to Fisher (1933) and Keynes
(1936). In the last two decades a body of literature moreover highlights the role of
financial frictions for explaining the development of key macroeconomic variables
[see amongst others Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999), Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), or Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009)].1 Addi-
tionally, the financial crisis 2007-2009 again sheds light on the importance of imple-
menting financial frictions into macro models. In this chapter,2 we contribute to the
literature by simultaneously explaining two empirical observations. First, mark-ups
on the loan market react counter-cyclical. Second, the number of banks operating
in the economy significantly co-moves with GDP.
Figure 2.1 depicts these observations for US data including the corresponding cross-
correlations. As a measure for the mark-up of a commercial bank we choose the
spread between the average majority prime rate charged by banks on short-term
loans to business and the FED’s funds rate.3 The data is logged and de-trended
by application of the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Figure 2.1 shows that the number of
banks significantly co-moves with GDP. The corresponding cross-correlation is 0.49.
Moreover, bank mark-ups react counter-cyclical. The corresponding cross-correlation
is -0.88. Further empirical support for non-stationary price-cost margins of banks
is for instance given by Aliaga-Dı´az and Olivero (2010) who highlight the counter-
cyclical nature of mark-ups in the banking sector via VAR forecast error-based
methodology for US data [see also Santos and Winton (2008)]. Moreover, Olivero
(2010) provides further empirical support for OECD data.
1See Arend (2010) for an insightful overview of newer contributions. See moreover Gertler (1988) for an
excellent overview of ”traditional” approaches incorporating financial frictions.
2For a different version of this chapter see ”Banks, Oligopolistic Competition, and the Business Cycle: A New
Financial Accelerator Approach”, Economics Working Paper 2011-02, Department of Economics, Christian-
Albrechts-Universita¨t zu Kiel.
3The data for the loan rate and the number of banks is provided by http://www.federalreserve.gov.
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Figure 2.1: On the counter-cyclical nature of the number of banks and banks’ mark-up [US data in
logs and HP-filtered]
In the recent literature, the counter-cyclical nature of mark-ups in loan markets is
commonly implemented by assuming an information asymmetry between borrowers
and lenders as for instance in the famous financial accelerator model of Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). In this study, the authors integrate the Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) approach into a New Keynesian model. Hence, they
build up an overlapping generations model where firms need physical capital and
labor for production. The acquisition of capital is financed either by borrowing or by
entrepreneurial net wealth. Competitive financial intermediaries ask for an external
finance premium (or: mark-up) over their marginal costs for financing capital. This
mark-up is not caused by an imperfectly competitive environment of financial in-
stitutions but by the assumption of information asymmetries across borrowers and
lenders. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) moreover assume that the external
finance premium inversely depends on borrowers net wealth. Therefore, an enhance-
ment in wealth of borrowers in boom phases leads to a decline in mark-ups in the
loan market. This in turn increases the net wealth of borrowers and consequently
introduces an amplification effect, the famous financial accelerator.
By contrast, we do not emphasize mark-up movements from the demand side of
credits.4 Instead, our new financial accelerator nests from the supply side of credits.
More precisely, we develop a New Keynesian model which incorporates an oligopolis-
4In the following, we will use the expressions ”credit” and ”loan” synonymously.
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tic banking sector with endogenous bank entry. This combination enables us to draw
the endogenous causality that an increasing mass of banks causes the market share
of the single bank and thus the resulting mark-up to decline. As Figure 2.2 depicts
that the latter relation in turn finds support in the data since we found a significant
negative correlation (-0.43) between bank mark-ups and the number of operating
banks, too.
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Figure 2.2: The number of banks and their mark-ups
We follow Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) by assuming that firms have to
pre-finance their wage-bill. Therefore, banks provide loans under oligopolistic com-
petition using deposits and money market credits. Thereby, our model generates a
financial accelerator which works as follows. Due to increasing profit opportunities
for banks in economic upturns, the mass of banks increases in response to expan-
sionary shocks. The market share of the single bank consequently decreases. As a
result, banks have to decrease their mark-ups. Since firms have to pre-finance their
wage-bill, a decreasing bank mark-up has in turn a positive effect on the marginal
costs of firms leading to a further increase in production and thus in loan demand.
Consequently, the endogenous mark-up movements resulting from oligopolistic com-
petition5 induces a multiplier (or: amplification) effect, the new financial accelerator.
Thereby, our framework provides a new transmission channel for monetary policy
via bank creation which works as follows. A contractionary shock to the instrument
of the central bank, the nominal interest rate, results in four expansionary effects.
(i) Consumption is shifted into the present leading to a higher loan demand. (ii)
The marginal costs of banks decrease. (iii) Bank entry costs decline, too.6 (iv) The
value of a bank which is defined as the discounted sum of future profits increases due
to the lower discount rate. The first two effects result in higher bank profits while
the latter two effects have moreover an expansionary impact on the profitability of
5Remark: In the case of monopolistic competition, the mark-up of a competitor tends to zero. As a result,
the mark-ups are constant in such an environment.
6Remark: We assume that deposits are needed to build up new banks.
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bank start-ups which result in an increase in investment in new banks. All in all,
the resulting expansionary reaction of the mass of operating banks leads to a lower
market share of a single bank and introduces the new financial accelerator.7
The analysis of the resulting impulse responses shows that our framework can indeed
depict both the pro-cyclicality of the mass of financial intermediaries as well as the
counter-cyclical nature of mark-up movements. Thereby, the resulting endogenous
bank entry generates large amplification and persistence effects. In particular, we
obtain significantly higher accelerating effects than those generated by the probably
most famous study of BGG. It is moreover worth mentioning that in contrast with
for instance Meh and Moran (2010) where amplification effects are stronger for sup-
ply shocks, we also generate significant amplification effects from demand shocks.8
Notably, we obtain the largest accelerating effect in the case of a monetary policy
shock.
Financial crises have taught us that banks do not only propagate shocks but can also
be the source of financial disturbances which have important implications for the real
economy. In this context, we investigate the implications of a contractionary shock
to bank value. Our analysis shows that the financial shock results in stagflationary
effects. The rationale is that the non-stationary bank mark-up acts as an endogenous
cost-push shock for the real economy. Note however that the aim of this chapter is not
to explain the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Our framework is naturally too simple to
depict such a complex event. As the famous financial accelerator model of BGG, our
framework, instead, represents a further step to solve the puzzle how relatively small
shocks can result in large and persistent effects for the real economy [see amongst
other Mankiw (2001), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), and Fuhrer and Moore
(1995)].
As standard in macroeconomics literature, we finally evaluate our model by com-
paring the second moments of the generated series with those observed in US data.
The analysis shows that the model performs remarkable well with respect to this di-
mension. In particular, it does not only depict the properties of key macroeconomic
variables appropriately but also those of financial variables including the mass of
banks, the amount of aggregate loans, and the amount of loans per banks. More-
over, we analyze the macroeconomic implications of a financial activity tax and a
financial transaction tax.9 Our analysis points out that these two taxes are indeed an
7By contrast, the transmission channel for monetary policy in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) works
as follows. An easing of monetary policy increases the return on capital resulting in an increase in the net
wealth of firms. This in turn causes a decrease in firm leverage leading to a reduction of the external finance
premium and thus to a further rise in capital demand. This in turn leads to an additional expansionary
effect for the production sector.
8Meh and Moran (2010) build up a DSGE model in which bank capital mitigates an agency problem between
banks and their creditors. In their approach, the resulting propagation effect results from the bank capital
channel.
9For the partial analysis of Tobin (1978) taxes see amongst others Dieci and Westerhoff (2004). See moreover
Lengnick and Wohltmann (2010) who extend a simplified framework a` la BGG for a high frequent asset
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appropriate tool to stabilize the financial markets and thus to dampen the volatility
of key macroeconomic variables. We find that the financial activity tax where banks
have to pay a tax on each transaction is significantly more effective than the financial
transaction tax where the tax base is simply per period profits. The rationale is that
the financial transaction tax does not only affect the profitability of bank start-ups
but also affects the marginal costs of banks. By contrast, the financial activity tax
has not any impact on the marginal costs of banks.
The remainder is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we develop the New Keynesian
model incorporating an oligopolistic banking sector with endogenous bank entry.
Moreover, we present a benchmark model and the calibration. In Section 2.3, we
discuss the impulse responses to a shock to total factor productivity under different
assumptions concerning the loan rate stickiness and the survival probability of new
banks. We moreover present the new transmission mechanism of monetary policy
when considering a shock to the interest rate. Furthermore, we analyze the impulse
responses to a fiscal demand stimulus and to a contractionary shock to bank value.
The evaluation of the bank entry model is presented in Section 2.4 by comparing
the generated second moments with the data. The last section concludes.
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Figure 2.3: Model structure
Beside the central bank, the model consists of four types of agents, namely house-
market in the spirit of the latter study. They show that this extension leads to significantly more persistent
dynamics.
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holds, intermediate good producers (or: firms), retailers, and banks. We assume that
firms have to pre-finance their wage bill [see amongst others Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005)]. Beside that, firms are totally standard. They produce using labor
and sell their differentiated intermediate goods under monopolistic competition to
the retailers.
Banks provide loans to firms under oligopolistic competition using deposits and
money market credits. Thereby, the mark-up of a single bank endogenously depends
on the degree of competition, i.e. on the mass of banks operating in the loan market.
Caused by endogenous bank entry and exit, the mass of banks is non-stationary. In
our analysis, we will discuss flexible and sticky loan rates.
Households can invest in interest bearing deposits with a duration of one period at
a bank. They moreover supply their working force to firms. The retailers bundle
the differentiated intermediate goods to a final good and sell it under perfectly
competitive conditions to the households. Monetary policy is simply represented by
a standard Taylor rule. The complete model structure is depicted in Figure 2.3.
2.2.1 Households
The representative household maximizes its life-time utility value
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
1
1− σ
C1−σt −
χ
1 + η
L1+ηt
)
(2.1)
subjected to its period-by-period budget constraint
Bt
Pt
+ Ct = wtLt +R
B
t−1
Bt−1
Pt
+ τt (2.2)
where σ > 0 and η > 0 are the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, respectively. χ > 0 is a scaling parameter.
β ∈ (0, 1) represents the private discount factor. According to (2.2), the household
uses its net income for consumption, Ct, and investment in deposits, Bt. Lt is labor
supply. τt, wt, R
B
t , and Pt denote transfers, the real wage, the gross nominal deposit
rate, and the price index, respectively. E denotes the rational expectations operator.
The household’s optimization results in the standard Euler consumption equation
and the labor supply equation which are respectively given by
C−σt = βEt
{
C−σt+1
RBt
πt+1
}
(2.3)
wt = χC
σ
t L
η
t (2.4)
where πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate.
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2.2.2 Retailers
The retailer bundles the intermediate goods, yj,t, according to the following CES
technology
Yt ≡
[∫ 1
0
y
θ−1
θ
j,t dj
] θ
θ−1
(2.5)
where Yt denotes the final good. θ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods.10
Equation (2.5) implies the price index, Pt, to follow
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
p1−θj,t dj
] 1
1−θ
(2.6)
where pj,t is the price of the intermediate good j.
Cost minimization delivers the optimal goods demand given by
yj,t =
[
pj,t
Pt
]−θ
Yt (2.7)
2.2.3 Firm Sector
As in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), we assume that firms have to
pre-finance their wage bill [see also Henzel et al. (2009), Hu¨lsewig, Meyer, and
Wollmersha¨user (2009), and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)]. Beside this
assumption, firms are totally standard. For production, they need only labor. Firms
act under monopolistic competition and sell their differentiated intermediate good
to the retailers being faced with a sticky price setting mechanism.
The production function of a firm j is given by
yj,t = Atlj,t (2.8)
where lj,t denotes the labor demand of firm j. At is a technology shock which follows
an AR(1) process: At/A = (At−1/A)
ρa exp{εat } where ε
a
t is white noise.
By cost minimization, we obtain the marginal costs, mcj,t, of firm j
mcj,t =
RLt wt
At
(2.9)
where RLt and wt are the gross nominal loan rate and the real wage, respectively.
Equation (2.9) implies symmetry across firms, i.e. mcj,t = mct, since the right-hand
side of (2.9) does not include any firm specific variables depending on j.
10Remark: We follow the recent literature by assuming that the mass of firms is normalized to one. This implies
that in contrast to the banking sector, the mass of firms is assumed to be constant. See Bilbiie, Ghironi, and
Melitz (2007a,b) for a macro model with endogenous firm entry.
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We moreover assume firms to be faced with quadratic price adjustment costs in the
spirit of Rotemberg (1982). Their pricing decision problem is given by
max
pj,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
∆0,t
{
pj,t
Pt
yj,t −mcj,tyj,t −
κf
2
(
pj,t
pj,t−1
− 1
)2
Yt
}
(2.10)
subjected to the optimal goods demand of the retailer given by equation (2.7). ∆0,t
denotes the stochastic real discount factor.11 κf can for instance be interpreted as
menu costs. E denotes the rational expectations operator.
The optimization yields a standard Phillips curve12
θ − 1 = θmct − κ
f
[
(πt − 1)πt − βEt
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(πt+1 − 1)πt+1
Yt+1
Yt
}]
(2.11)
where πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate and the ratio Et∆0,t+1/∆0,t =
β(EtCt+1/Ct)
−σ follows from the Euler consumption equation (2.3).
As will be shown later, the aggregate loan rate – which is a component of the mar-
ginal costs according to (2.9) – is a function of the central bank’s instrument, the
money market rate. As a result, the combination of (2.9) and (2.11) indicates that
the assumption that firms have to pre-finance their wage bill results in a cost channel.
There is empirical support that the direct cost effects of short-run nominal inter-
est rates significantly contribute to inflation dynamics. In particular, Chowdhury,
Hoffmann, and Schabert (2006) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006) respectively show
the existence of a significant impact of the interest rate on the marginal costs via
Phillips curve GMM estimations for the majority of the G7 countries and the US
economy. Other studies as for instance Henzel et al. (2009), Hu¨lsewig, Meyer, and
Wollmersha¨user (2009), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) also sup-
port the existence of a cost channel by methods of indirect inference for the Euro
Area and the US economy. In addition Barth and Ramey (2001) show that based
on industry level data the interest rate has a significant effect on the marginal costs
of firms.13
11The stochastic discount factor is defined as ∆0,t ≡ βtUC,t/UC,0 where UC,t = C
−σ
t denotes the derivative of
the household’s utility function with respect to consumption at time t. According to the Euler consumption
equation (2.3), the stochastic discount factor can also be written as a product of short term real interest
rates
∆0,t = β
t UC,t
UC,0
= β
UC,1
UC,0
| {z }
( eRB
0
)−1
· β
UC,2
UC,1
| {z }
( eRB
1
)−1
· . . . · β
UC,t
UC,t−1
| {z }
( eRB
t−1
)−1
= Πt−1i=0(
eRBi )
−1
where eRBt ≡ R
B
t Pt/EtPt+1 is the gross one-period real interest rate.
12Log-linearizing equation (2.11), results in the familiar expression: bpit = βEtbpit+1+eκmct where eκ ≡ (θ−1)/κf .
The hat indicates the log-deviation from the corresponding steady state.
13Remark: The empirical evidence that the cost channel does not seem to be present is restricted to the
Bayesian estimation of Rabanal (2007) for US data.
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2.2.4 Banking Sector
Banks – indexed with i – supply loans to firms under oligopolistic competition using
deposits and money market credits.14
The real loans, Ot, are aggregated by the following Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
Ot ≡
[∫ Nt
0
o
ζ−1
ζ
i,t di
] ζ
ζ−1
(2.12)
where oi,t denotes the real loan supply of bank i and ζ > 1 is the intratemporal
elasticity between loans. Nt > 1 is the non-stationary mass of banks operating in
the economy.
Equation (2.12) implies an aggregate gross loan rate given by
RLt =
[∫ Nt
0
(
rLi,t
)1−ζ
di
] 1
1−ζ
(2.13)
where rLi,t represents the gross loan rate set by bank i.
In a first step, we assume the loan rate to be flexible. Per period profit of a bank i
is then given by
di,t = r
L
i,toi,t −R
B
t bi,t −R
M
t mi,t (2.14)
where mi,t is the net position on the money market. R
M
t is the gross money market
rate which represents the central bank’s tool for monetary policy interventions. bi,t is
the real amount of deposits used for loan supply by bank i and RBt represents the cor-
responding nominal gross deposit rate. Following Henzel et al. (2009) and Hu¨lsewig,
Meyer, and Wollmersha¨user (2009), we assume deposits and money market credits
to be perfect substitutes. Consequently, the corresponding rates have to coincide,
RMt = R
B
t [see also Freixas and Rochet (1997)]. This assumption implies that banks
act under oligopolistic competition on the loan market while they price deposits
competitively. A similar assumption can also be found in amongst others Henzel et
al. (2009) and Hu¨lsewig, Meyer, and Wollmersha¨user (2009) and finds support in the
empirical literature since there exists a vast body of studies providing evidence for
market power in the loan market [see amongst others Matthews, Murinde, and Zhao
(2007), Claessens and Laeven (2004), DeBandt and Davis (2000), and Molyneux,
Lloyd-Williams, and Thornton (1994)]. By contrast and as already pointed out by
Olivero (2010), the empirical evidence for the deposit side is very restricted.
The bank maximizes its profit (2.14) subjected to the loan demand function:
oi,t =
[
rLi,t
RLt
]−ζ
Ot (2.15)
14See Henzel et al. (2009) or Hu¨lsewig, Meyer, and Wollmersha¨user (2009) for a corresponding approach with
monopolistic competition and a constant mass of banks.
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which results from (2.12) and (2.13). Moreover, the bank is faced with the balance
sheet constraint:
bi,t +mi,t ≥ oi,t (2.16)
implying that the amount of loans is restricted by the amount of deposits and money
market credits.15 In the optimum equation (2.16) holds with equality.16 Inserting this
expression and RMt = R
B
t in (2.14) yields
di,t = r
L
i,toi,t −R
B
t oi,t (2.17)
Maximizing profits (2.17) subjected to (2.15) with respect to rLi,t yields
∂di,t
∂rLi,t
= oi,t + r
L
i,t
∂oi,t
∂rLi,t
−RBt
∂oi,t
∂rLi,t
= 0 (2.18)
where
∂oi,t
∂rLi,t
= −ζ
(rLi,t)
−ζ−1
(RLt )
−ζ
Ot + ζ
(rLi,t)
−ζ
(RLt )
−ζ+1
Ot
∂RLt
∂rLi,t
(2.19)
In contrast to the case of monopolistic competition, the individual loan rate, rLi,t, has
in turn a direct impact on the aggregate loan rate, RLt , and thus on loan demand
under oligopolistic competition:17
∂RLt
∂rlt
=
(
rLi,t
RLt
)−ζ
=
oi,t
Ot
(2.20)
Inserting this expression in (2.19) yields
∂oi,t
∂rLi,t
= ζ
oi,t
rLi,t
(λi,t − 1) (2.21)
where we define the market share, λi,t, as
λi,t ≡
rLi,toi,t
RLt Ot
(2.22)
Inserting (2.21) in (2.18) yields
rLi,t =
(1− λi,t)ζ
(1− λi,t)ζ − 1
RBt = µi,tR
B
t (2.23)
15In order to keep the model simple, we abstract from an interbanking market. See for instance Goodfriend
and McCallum (2007) for a New Keynesian model incorporating a banking sector with interbank lending.
16We abstract from risky credits. As a result, banks do not hold reserves.
17Remark: Monopolistic competition was introduced by Chamberlin (1933). The point of monopolistic compe-
tition is not to study strategic aspects between competitors such as price competition but to abstract from
these issues to simplify the analysis [see also Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)]. By contrast, these aspects are
considered under oligopolistic competition.
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where the mark-up is given by
µi,t =
(1− λi,t)ζ
(1− λi,t)ζ − 1
=
ζ
ζ − 11−λi,t
(2.24)
Equation (2.24) implies that if the market share of the single bank tends to zero, we
end up with the special case of monopolistic competition where the mark-up, µi,t, is
constant since ∂RLt /∂r
L
i,t → 0 ⇔ λi,t → 0.
18 Due to the assumption of oligopolistic
competition it however follows that even in the case of completely flexible loan rates
the mark-up of a bank i is non-stationary.
Empirical studies have however shown that the loan rate is rigid [see amongst others
Henzel et al. (2009) or Gerali et al. (2010)]. We thus extend our framework by
assuming quadratic loan rate adjustment costs, LACt, in the spirit of Rotemberg
(1982) which are given by:
LACt ≡
κb
2
(
rLi,t
rLi,t−1
− 1
)2
Ot (2.25)
where κb can for instance be interpreted as menu costs.19
The intertemporal optimization of a bank’s profit with respect to the loan rate, rLi,t,
under sticky loan rates then results in20
rLi,t =
(1− λi,t)ζ
(1− λi,t)ζ − 1
RBt −
κb
(1− λi,t)ζ − 1
ψi,t (2.26)
where
ψi,t ≡
[
rLi,t
rLi,t−1
− 1
]
rLi,t
rLi,t−1
Ot
oi,t
− βEt
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ[rLi,t+1
rLi,t
− 1
]
rLi,t+1
rLi,t
Ot+1
oi,t
}
(2.27)
By setting κb = 0, we would end up with (2.23).
2.2.5 Bank Creation
For modelling bank entry and exit, we apply a mechanism which is analogous to
the firm entry model of Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz
(2007a,b).21
By assumption, there exists an unbounded mass of potential banks which want to
enter the market if their entry is profitable. Before entry, entrants have to pay a
18The mark-up would then be given by ζ/(ζ − 1) = const.
19Naturally, these costs are rather small in the banking sector. Gerali et al. (2010) estimate the menu costs of
firms to be more than three times larger than those in the loan markets.
20See the Appendix for a proof
21See amongst others Colciago and Etro (2010a,b) and Faia (2009) for firm entry models with oligopolistic
competition in the goods market.
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sunk cost. These costs are assumed to be proportional to the real marginal costs, i.e.
the real interest rate, R˜Bt ≡ R
B
t /Etπt+1.
22 This implies that new banks are created
by using deposits. We further assume a time-to-build lag in new bank creation.
This assumption finds support in the data since the correlation between the mass of
banks in t + 1 and GDP in t is even larger [0.51] than the contemporaneous cross-
correlation. This finding is totally analogous to firm entry data [see amongst others
Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996) or Totzek (2010)].
The following zero-profit condition determines the mass of entrants by aligning bank
value, vt, with the entry cost, fE :
vt = fER˜
B
t (2.28)
where the value of a bank is given by the present value of future profits, i.e. the
discounted sum of future profits:
vt = Et
{
∞∑
s=t+1
∆t,s(1− δ)
s−tds
}
(2.29)
or equivalently23
vt = (1− δ)βEt
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(vt+1 + dt+1)
}
exp{uvt } (2.30)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the death probability of a bank.
Due to the assumption of a time-to-build lag, banks only consider future profits in
their entry decision. In order to analyze exogenous changes in the value of banks, we
add an autoregressive shock process, uvt , to (2.30) which follows: u
v
t = ρ
vuvt−1 + ε
v
t
where εvt is white noise.
As in the firm entry model of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b), we assume the
recursive law of motion of the mass of banks to be given by
Nt+1 = (1− δ)(Nt +NE,t) (2.31)
22In Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b) firms have to pay entry costs proportional to the effective real wage,
i.e. their marginal costs.
23Equation (5.15) is the forward solution of (2.30):
vt = (1− δ)Et {∆t,t+1(vt+1 + dt+1)}
= (1− δ)Et {∆t,t+1([(1− δ)∆t+1,t+2(vt+2 + dt+2)] + dt+1)}
= (1− δ)Et {∆t,t+1dt+1}+ (1− δ)
2Et {∆t,t+2(vt+2 + dt+2)}
= (1− δ)Et {∆t,t+1dt+1}+ (1− δ)
2Et {∆t,t+2dt+2}+ (1− δ)
3Et {∆t,t+3dt+3}+ . . .
= Et
8
<
:
∞
X
s=t+1
∆t,s(1− δ)
s−tds
9
=
;
where ∆t,t+1 · ∆t+1,t+2 = β
UC,t+1
UC,t
· β
UC,t+2
UC,t+1
= β2
UC,t+2
UC,t
= ∆t,t+2, ∆t,t+3 = ∆t,t+2 · ∆t+2,t+3, and
EtUC,t+i = EtC
−σ
t+i.
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where NE,t denotes the mass of new banks. Equation (2.31) states that a fraction,
δ, of incumbent and new banks is hit by an exogenous death shock at the very end
of each period.24
2.2.6 Aggregation
Symmetry across banks implies oi,t = ot and r
L
i,t = r
L
t . According to (2.12) and
(2.13) we then obtain
Ot = N
ζ
ζ−1
t ot (2.32)
RLt = N
1
1−ζ
t r
L
t (2.33)
An increasing mass of banks ceteris paribus results in a rise in aggregate loans and
in a decline in the loan rate.
Inserting (2.32) and (2.33) in equation (2.22) yields
λi,t = λt =
1
Nt
(2.34)
implying that the market share of the single bank declines if the mass of banks
increases. This in turn implies that the mark-up of a bank – also under flexible loan
rates – decreases if the mass of banks rises. Since µi,t = µt and
µt =
(Nt − 1)ζ
(Nt − 1)ζ −Nt
(2.35)
we obtain25
∂µt
∂Nt
= −
ζ
[(N − 1)ζ −N ]2
< 0 (2.36)
Our model thus draws an endogenous causality between the mass of operating banks
and their mark-up which captures the corresponding negative correlation that we
observed in the data [cf. Figure 2.2].
The real marginal costs of firms are given by equation (2.9). Inserting (2.23), (2.33),
and (2.35) yields
mct = N
1
1−ζ
t
(Nt − 1)ζ
(Nt − 1)ζ −Nt
RBt wt
At
(2.37)
24Naturally, the assumption of a constant exit rate is a simplification. However, we show in Chapter 3 in a
model with simultaneous firm entry and exit that the qualitative results do not change when endogenizing
the firm exit rate. Instead, he points out that the assumption of simultaneous endogenous entries and
exits just results in a marginal amplification effect when compared to the case of endogenous entries but
exogenous exits. Further note that we relax the assumption of a constant death rate of banks by introducing
an endogenous survival probability of new banks to the model in Section 2.3.1.
25Note that the mark-up, µt, is larger than one if Nt > ζ/(ζ − 1). We calibrate ζ to 6 implying that Nt > 1.2.
The numerically computed steady state value of Nt is 1.4.
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implying that beside the pure cost channel, i.e. the direct influence of the nominal
interest rate, there exists an endogenous cost-push shock resulting from endogenous
bank entry and exit of oligopolistic competitors and their non-stationary mark-ups.
Consequently, an expansionary reaction of the mass of operating banks leads to a
decline in the firms’ marginal costs since
∂mct
∂Nt
=
[
1
1− ζ
N
1
1−ζ
−1
t
(Nt − 1)ζ
(Nt − 1)ζ −Nt
−N
1
1−ζ
t
ζ
[(N − 1)ζ −N ]2
]
RBt wt
At
= −N
1
1−ζ
t
[(
1
ζ − 1
Nt − 1
Nt
+
1
(Nt − 1)ζ −Nt
)
ζ
(Nt − 1)ζ −Nt
]
RBt wt
At
< 0 (2.38)
since Nt > ζ/(ζ − 1) > 1⇔ (Nt − 1)ζ −Nt > 0.
Aggregate production is given by26
Yt = Ct +Gt +
κf
2
(πt − 1)
2Yt (2.39)
Gt is government spending following an AR(1) process given by: Gt/G = (Gt−1/G)
ρg
exp{εgt } where ε
g
t is white noise. We moreover define GDP as aggregate production
plus investment
Y GDPt ≡ Yt +NE,tvt (2.40)
where NE,tvt is interpreted as investment in new banks.
27
The loan market clearing condition follows
Ot = wtLt +Nt
κb
2
[
rLt
rLt−1
− 1
]2
Ot (2.41)
The model is closed by a monetary policy rule of Taylor type
RMt
RM
=
(πt
π
)λpi (Yt
Y
)λy
exp {umt } (2.42)
where umt is a shock to monetary policy which follows an AR(1) process: u
m
t =
ρmumt−1 + ε
m
t where ε
m
t is white noise.
The complete New Keynesian model with endogenous entry of oligopolistic banks
can be found in Table 2.1.
2.2.7 Calibration
As standard in the literature, we set the private discount factor, β, to 0.99 implying
a steady state of the annual nominal interest rate of about 4%. We calibrate both the
26The term κ
f
2
(pit − 1)2Yt results from the assumption of quadratic price adjustment costs which are paid in
terms of the consumption good.
27An equivalent definition can be found in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b).
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θ − 1 = θmct − κ
fEt
{
(πt − 1)πt − β
C−σt+1
C−σt
(πt+1 − 1)πt+1
Yt+1
Yt
}
mct = R
L
t
wt
At
C−σt = βEt
{
C−σt+1
RBt
πt+1
}
wt = χC
σ
t L
η
t
Yt = AtLt
Yt = Ct +Gt +
κf
2
(πt − 1)
2Yt
Y GDPt = Yt +NE,tvt
RMt
RM
=
(πt
π
)λpi (Yt
Y
)λy
exp{urt}
vt = fEEt
{
RBt
πt+1
}
Nt = (1− δ)(Nt−1 +NE,t−1)
Ot = N
ζ
ζ−1
t ot
RLt = N
1
1−ζ
t r
L
t
rLt =
(1− λt)ζ
(1− λt)ζ − 1
RBt −
κb
(1− λt)ζ − 1
ψt
ψt =
[
rLt
rLt−1
− 1
]
rLt
rLt−1
Ot
ot
− βEt
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)
−σ[rLt+1
rLt
− 1
]
rLt+1
rLt
Ot+1
ot
}
µt =
(Nt − 1)ζ
(Nt − 1)ζ −Nt
Ot = wtLt +Nt
κb
2
[
rLt
rLt−1
− 1
]2
Ot
vt = (1− δ)βEt
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)
−σ
(vt+1 + dt+1)
}
dt = (r
L
t −R
B
t )ot
RMt = R
B
t
λt = 1/Nt
Table 2.1: The complete New Keynesian model with endogenous entry of oligopolistic banks
intertemporal elasticity and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply to one which is also
standard. In particular, this implies that log consumption enters the utility function.
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), we set the steady state government spending/GDP
ratio to 18% which is moreover the value calculated by Trabandt and Uhlig (2009)
for the US economy. The intratemporal elasticity between intermediate goods, θ, is
set to 11 implying a steady state mark-up of 10% in the goods market. The price
stickiness parameter, κf , is assumed to be 77 as estimated in Ireland (2001). We
moreover abstract from trend inflation, i.e. π = 1.
The elasticity between the loans, ζ, is calibrated to 6 in order to obtain an equivalent
ζ/θ-ratio as in Gerali et al. (2010). When assuming the loan rates to be sticky, we
moreover set the loan rate stickiness parameter, κb, to 22.43 in order to obtain the
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same slope of the loan rate equation, (ζ−1)/κb, as estimated in Gerali et al. (2010).
When assuming loan rates to be flexible, κb is zero. We calibrate the bank death rate,
δ, to the empirically observed value, 0.013.28 To match the data appropriately, we
set the entry costs, fE , to 6. The scaling parameter, χ, is endogenously determined
by the steady state system to ensure that in steady state total hours worked is 1/3.
We moreover apply a standard Taylor rule, with λpi = 1.5 and λy = 0.125.
Finally, we calibrate the shock processes to the estimated values of Smets and
Wouters (2007), i.e. we respectively set the persistence of the shock to technol-
ogy, to government spending, and to the interest rate to 0.95, 0.97, and 0.15. The
corresponding standard errors are 0.45, 0.53, and 0.24, respectively. Without loss of
generality, we assume the shock to bank value to occur with a shock persistence of
0.95. The corresponding standard error is normalized to 0.01.
2.2.8 The Benchmark New Keynesian Model
In order to obtain an appropriate benchmark for our analysis, we apply a standard
New Keynesian model with a cost channel. The model is characterized by a com-
pletely competitive banking sector whose mass is constant and normalized to one.
As a result, the banks do not ask for a mark-up such that RLt = R
B
t . The complete
benchmark model can be found in Table 2.2. For the sake of comparability, we apply
the same calibration as for the bank entry model.
θ − 1 = θmct − κ
fEt
{
(πt − 1)πt − β
C−σt+1
C−σt
(πt+1 − 1)πt+1
Yt+1
Yt
}
mct = R
B
t
wt
At
C−σt = βEt
{
C−σt+1
RBt
πt+1
}
wt = χC
σ
t L
η
t
Yt = AtLt
Yt = Ct +Gt +
κf
2
(πt − 1)
2Yt
RMt
RM
=
(πt
π
)λpi (Yt
Y
)λy
exp{urt}
RBt = R
M
t
Table 2.2: The complete benchmark New Keynesian model
2.2.9 Stability Analysis
Surico (2008) provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for determinacy for
our benchmark model, the New Keynesian model with a cost channel and a standard
Taylor rule. Llosa and Tuesta (2009) and Bru¨ckner and Schabert (2003) moreover
28The data is provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
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Figure 2.4: Regions of determinacy
study how different monetary policy rules may affect determinacy. The studies high-
light that in contrast to the standard New Keynesian model, there exists an upper
bound to the output reaction in the monetary policy rule if the cost channel is
existent.
Figure 2.4 shows the regions of determinacy for the bank entry model. In comparison
with the findings of Surico (2008), the figure indicates that the region of determi-
nacy remains approximately unaffected. In particular, this implies that also in our
framework, there exists an upper bound to λy which increases if λpi ≥ 1 is increased.
2.3 Impulse Responses
2.3.1 The Technology Shock
In this section, we will investigate the impulse responses to an expansionary tech-
nology shock. Thereby, we will analyze the impact of the loan rate rigidity and the
survival probability of new banks. In the following, we will refer to the model speci-
fication with flexible loan rates and exogenous exits as the baseline bank entry model.
The Baseline Bank Entry Model
Figure 2.5 shows the impulse responses to an aggregate technology shock of the
baseline bank entry model.29
In line with empirical evidence of amongst others Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007),
29We simulate the model in non-linear form using Dynare V.4. The corresponding steady state system is
numerically computed by an own Matlab file. They are shown in the Appendix. The number of years are on
the abscissa. However, we interpret periods as quarters. On the ordinate we plot the percentage deviation
of a variable from the corresponding steady state value, i.e. xt = (Xt −X)/X, where X is the steady state
value.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse responses to an expansionary technology shock
the innovation causes inflation to decrease while output increases. Since firms have
to pre-finance their wage-bill, the demand for loans reacts expansionary, too. The
drop in the nominal interest rate moreover leads to a decline in the marginal costs of
banks. All in all, the profit opportunities of banks increase which cause new banks
to enter the market and consequently induces a boom in investment in new banks.
The latter effect is moreover amplified by the decline in the nominal interest rate
which leads to lower entry costs. In Section 3.2, we come to this point into more
detail.
The expansionary reaction of the mass of operating banks leads to a drop in the
market share of the single banks [cf. equation (2.34)]. Consequently, banks decrease
their mark-ups. As already mentioned, the mark-up of banks acts as an endogenous
cost-push shock [cf. equation (2.37)] which reacts expansionary in this case. The
declining mark-up thus results in a drop in firms’ marginal costs which leads to a
further increase in production and consequently in loan demand. As a result, the
endogenous bank mark-up introduces a multiplier effect, the new financial accelera-
tor.
In order to measure the quantitative size of our financial accelerator, Figure 2.6
shows the impulse responses to an aggregate technology shock of the baseline bank
entry model (dashed lines) in comparison with the benchmark New Keynesian model
(solid lines).
When comparing the quantitative effects of both models, it turns out that the new
financial accelerator leads to a significant propagation in the reaction of output. This
effect is even more pronounced in the case of GDP since investment in new banks
additionally increases [cf. Figure 2.5].
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses of the baseline bank entry model (BEM) to an expansionary tech-
nology shock in comparison with the benchmark New Keynesian model (NKM)
The financial accelerator in our model is driven by two effects. First, due to the
declining mark-up the contractionary reaction of the loan rate is more pronounced
in the bank entry model leading to lower marginal costs for firms. Second, investment
in new banks is a component of GDP. All in all, endogenizing the mass of oligopolistic
banks leads a significant amplification effect. Moreover, Figure 2.6 shows that the
reactions in the bank entry model turn out to be more persistent, too. Our framework
is thus a further step to solve the puzzle how relatively small shocks can result in
large and persistent effects for the real economy [see amongst others Mankiw (2001),
Chari et al. (2000), and Fuhrer and Moore (1995)].
When comparing the quantitative accelerating effects with BGG, it turns out that
our model generates even higher amplification effects than the famous financial accel-
erator model. BGG conclude that their financial accelerator model generates about
50% amplification of the initial reaction of GDP.30 Figure 2.6 however indicates that
the assumption of an endogenous mass of oligopolistic banks results in an initial am-
plification effect of about 100%.
All in all, our model is able to capture the empirical findings that (i) bank mark-ups
react counter-cyclical and (ii) the positive co-movement of the mass of banks with
GDP and to generate significant amplification and persistence effects.
The Bank Entry Model with Sticky Loan Rates
Up to now, we have assumed that loan rates are flexible. However, there exists
empirical evidence that loan rates are rigid [see amongst others Henzel et al. (2009)
or Gerali et al. (2010)]. Figure 2.7 shows the impulse responses to an aggregate
technology shock under flexible (solid lines) and under sticky loan rates (dashed
lines).
The figure indicates that the introduction of sticky loan rates as a further nominal
rigidity does not make much difference for the resulting dynamics. The reaction of
30Note however that Christensen and Dib (2008) estimate a New Keynesian model incorporating the BGG
framework for the US. They show that the presence of a financial accelerator mechanism a` la BGG sig-
nificantly amplifies the impact of demand-side shocks but dampens the rise of investment to a shock to
technology.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses to an expansionary technology shock with sticky loan rates in com-
parison with the baseline model with flexible loan rates
the loan rate becomes naturally somewhat smoother. However, when compared to
the case of flexible loan rates the resulting dynamics of the mass of banks and GDP
do not differ significantly. The reactions are just slightly less expansionary.
The Bank Entry Model with an Endogenous Survival Probability of New Banks
For the sake of simplicity, we have assumed exits to be exogenous as in the firm entry
models of amongst others Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b).31 For the following
exercise, we want to abstract from this assumption and alternatively assume that
the survival probability for new banks depends negatively on the mass of new start
ups.32 Applying this assumption on the mass of banks in the market, results in:
Nt+1 = (1− δ)(Nt + F (NE,t/NE,t−1)) (2.43)
with F (NE,t/NE,t−1) ≡ [1−S(NE,t/NE,t−1)]NE,t where S(·) has the following prop-
erties: S(1) = S′(1) = 0 and S′′(1) is constant and strictly positive.33 Technically,
this mechanism is similar to investment adjustment costs as for instance assumed in
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
31See Totzek (2010) or Chapter 3 for a model with a microfounded incentive-based mechanism of simultaneous
endogenous firm entry and exit.
32An equivalent mechanism can be found in the extended firm entry model a` la Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz
(2007a,b) outlined in Lewis (2009b).
33When setting S(·) = 0 ⇔ F (·) = NE,t, we end up with our baseline model.
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We further assume S′′(1) = 2.48 which is the value that Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005) estimate for capital investment adjustment costs. A function which
fulfills these properties is given by
F (NE,t, NE,t−1) =
[
1− 1.24
(
NE,t
NE,t−1
− 1
)2]
NE,t (2.44)
The impulse responses to an expansionary technology shock are shown in Figure
2.8 in comparison with the baseline bank entry model and the benchmark New
Keynesian model. We assume the loan rate to be flexible again.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse responses to an expansionary technology shock with an endogenous survival
probalitity (ESP) in comparison with the baseline bank entry model (BEM) and the benchmark New
Keynesian Model (NKM)
Figure 2.8 indicates that the assumption of an endogenous survival probability of
new banks has quantitative and qualitative effects for the resulting dynamics. The
endogenous survival probability of new banks which increases in the mass of start-
ups naturally dampens the expansionary reaction of the mass of banks. Moreover,
we can now generate a hump-shaped adjustment pattern in GDP which naturally
comes at the costs of a lower impact reaction and thus of a smaller initial financial
accelerator. Note however that the model still generates a significant amplification
and persistence effect in GDP and output when compared to the benchmark New
Keynesian model.
2.3.2 The Interest Rate Shock: A New Transmission Channel
for Monetary Policy
In this section, we will describe our new transmission channel for monetary policy. In
order to differentiate this concept from that of the traditional financial accelerator
model, we start by illustrating the transmission channel in BGG.
BGG integrate the Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) approach into a New
Keynesian model. Hence, they build up an overlapping generations model where
firms need physical capital and labor for production. The acquisition of capital is
financed either by borrowing or by entrepreneurial net wealth. Financial intermedi-
aries ask for an external finance premium (or: mark-up) over their marginal costs
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for providing capital. This mark-up is not caused by an imperfectly competitive
environment of financial institutions but by the assumption of information asymme-
tries across borrowers and lenders. BGG moreover assume that the external finance
premium inversely depends on borrowers net wealth. The transmission channel for
monetary policy in BGG now works as follows. An easing of monetary policy in-
creases the return on capital resulting in an increase in the net wealth of firms. This
in turn causes a decrease in firm leverage leading to a reduction of the external
finance premium and thus to a further rise in capital demand.
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Figure 2.9: Impulse responses to an expansionary shock to the interest rate
In contrast to BGG, we do not emphasize the mark-up movements from the demand
side of credit. Instead, our financial accelerator nests from the supply side. A decrease
in the nominal interest rate results in four expansionary effects. (i) consumption is
shifted to the present leading to a higher loan demand. (ii) the marginal costs of
banks decrease.34 (iii) bank entry costs decline, too. (iv) the decrease in the real
stochastic discount factor causes the value of a bank to increase. The first two
effects result in higher bank profits while the latter two effects have moreover an
expansionary impact on the profitability of bank start-ups. This in turn results in
an increase in investment in new banks. The resulting expansionary reaction of the
mass of operating banks then leads to a declining mark-up in the loan market.35
Since firms have to pre-finance their wage-bill, a decreasing mark-up has a positive
effect on their marginal costs leading to a further increase in production and thus in
loan demand.36 This in turn induces the new financial accelerator. Figure 2.9 shows
the corresponding impulse responses.
34The marginal costs of banks are simply given by the nominal deposit rate, RBt = R
M
t .
35Note that the latter effect is absent when assuming monopolistic competition since then the bank mark-up
would not decrease when new banks enter the market.
36Remark: Under monopolistic competition the bank mark-up would be constant such that this expansionary
effect would not occur.
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Figure 2.10: Impulse responses of the baseline bank entry model (BEM) to an expansionary shock
to monetary policy in comparison with the benchmark New Keynesian model (NKM)
Figure 2.10 shows that the endogenous bank entry mechanism leads to a significant
amplification effect when compared to the benchmark New Keynesian model. The
effect is again larger than that generated by the financial accelerator in BGG. BGG
only generate an amplification effect of about 50%. By contrast, the shock results in
much larger propagation effects with respect to output and GDP in our framework.
As Figure 2.9 depicts, the easing in monetary policy results in a massive increase in
investment in new banks. This in turn amplifies the boom in GDP. Moreover, our
bank entry model again generates significantly more persistent dynamics.
2.3.3 The Shock to Government Spending
In this section, we will analyze a shock to government spending. For this exercise,
we deviate from our baseline calibration and assume that the monetary authority
follows a Taylor rule with the original coefficients of Taylor (1993), i.e. λpi = 1.5 and
λy = 0.5. Figure 2.11 shows the corresponding impulse responses. At the end of this
section, we will investigate how monetary policy affects the results.
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Figure 2.11: Impulse responses to an expansionary shock to government spending
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Figure 2.11 shows that output and loan demand increase. The drop in the nominal
interest rate lowers the marginal costs of banks. Consequently, the shock generates
additional profit opportunities for existing and potential banks. This in turn leads to
higher investments and thus to an increasing mass of banks. In comparison with the
shock to monetary policy and to total factor productivity, the expansionary reaction
of the mass of operating banks is however about ten times smaller.
In comparison with the benchmark model, Figure 2.12 shows that the bank entry
model generates only small amplification effects with respect to output and GDP.
The rationale is the comparatively small expansionary reaction of the mass of banks
and consequently that the drop in bank mark-ups turns out to be rather small [cf.
Figure 2.11]. The amplification of output and GDP respectively amount to 36% and
46%. The latter approximately corresponds with the amplification effect in BGG.
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Figure 2.12: Impulse responses of the baseline bank entry model (BEM) to an expansionary shock
to government spending in comparison with the benchmark New Keynesian model (NKM)
Figure 2.11 shows that the fiscal demand stimulus leads to a decline in inflation
which is ad odds with the empirical evidence of amongst others Smets and Wouters
(2007, 2003). However, Linnemann and Schabert (2003) show within the baseline
New Keynesian model that the qualitative reaction of inflation crucially depends
on the design of monetary policy. In particular, the Taylor rule coefficient λy is the
decisive factor. Linnemann and Schabert (2003) show that inflation only increases
if λy = 0.
Figure 2.13 indicates that we obtain exactly the same result in our framework. As in
the baseline New Keynesian model without a cost channel, inflation and the nominal
interest rate only increase if λy = 0. However and in contrast to the standard New
Keynesian model, the cost channel leads to a more expansionary reaction of output if
the monetary authority reacts to output, too, i.e. if λy > 0. The rationale is that the
reaction of the nominal interest rate causes the marginal costs of firms to decrease.
Consequently, λy > 0 has a positive impact on production via the cost channel.
This result holds in both the bank entry model and the benchmark New Keynesian
model.
In the bank entry model, a drop in the interest rate moreover leads to a downward
pressure on the entry costs. Inversely, an increase in the interest rate leads to an
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Figure 2.13: On the impact of monetary policy
increase in the entry costs. This is the case for λy = 0 and for λy = 0.125 in the
longer-run. As Figure 2.13 depicts, the reaction of output moreover turns negative
in the longer-run if λy ∈ {0, 0.125}. This naturally dampens the profit opportunities
of incumbent and new banks. The development of the mass of banks consequently
indicates that the additional profit opportunities only cover the entry costs, if λy ≥
0.5. Otherwise, the mass of banks declines.37
2.3.4 The Shock to Bank Value
As a consequence of the subprime bust in 2007, banks around the globe lost in value.
Since we apply a rather simple model, we exogenously add such a value shock to
equation (2.30). Figure 2.14 shows the corresponding impulse responses. In contrast
to the previously analyzed shocks, the shock to bank value does not directly affect
the real economy, i.e. the goods market. Instead, it only has a direct impact on the
entry decision of new banks. The spill-over to the real economy consequently occurs
only via mark-up movements in the banking sector, i.e. the endogenous cost push
shock.
As entering the market becomes less profitable for new banks, investment in new
banks decreases. Since the mass of banks reacts contractionary, the mark-up of
banks increases [cf. equation (2.38)] leading to higher marginal costs for firms. The
resulting endogenous cost-push shock consequently reacts contractionary in this case
[cf. equation (2.36)]. The shock to bank value thus leads to stagflation.
Figure 2.14 however shows that inflation initially declines before the reaction turns
37This result is in line with the findings of Totzek and Winkler (2010) who show within an estimated firm
entry model that the reaction of the mass of firms is ambiguous in the case of a fiscal demand shock whereas
it is unambiguous for other shocks, as for instance a technology shock [see also Chapter 5].
2.4 Second Moments 41
0 10 20 30 40
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
OUTPUT, INFLATION
 
 
Y
pi
0 10 20 30 40
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
MASS OF BANKS
 
 
N
0 10 20 30 40
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
LOANS
 
 
O
o
0 10 20 30 40
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
INTEREST RATES
 
 
RL
RB
0 10 20 30 40
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
INVESTMENT, DIVIDENDS
 
 
N
E
v
Nd
0 10 20 30 40
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
MARK−UP
 
 
µ
Figure 2.14: Impulse responses to a contractionary shock to bank value
positive. However, this result is driven by monetary policy. As the mass of banks
decreases, the declining mark-up leads to an upward-pressure on the loan rate and
thus on inflation. By contrast, the expansionary monetary policy reaction decreases
the marginal costs of banks leading to a downward-pressure on inflation.
All in all, this exercise shows that in line with the observation in the financial crisis
2007-2009 (and previous financial crisis, too) banks do not only propagate shocks
but can also be the source of macroeconomic disturbances.
2.4 Second Moments
Business cycle models are traditionally evaluated by comparing the second moments
of the generated series with those observed in the data [see amongst others King and
Rebelo (1999)]. In this section, we thus want to report, how the presented model
performs along this dimension. Moreover, we analyze the impact of the introduction
of a financial transaction tax and a financial activity tax on the generated financial
and macroeconomic volatility.
2.4.1 The Baseline Bank Entry Model
For this exercise, we simulate the reaction of the baseline bank entry model to the
aggregate productivity shock 500 times for 500 quarters. We then discard the first
411 quarters to obtain the same sample size as in the data set.38 We use the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 105. It is worth mentioning that we
38The data set is described below.
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do not deviate from our baseline calibration in this exercise.39
Table 2.3 reports the resulting moments of the baseline bank entry model40 (normal
numbers) and the resulting moments of the benchmark New Keynesian model (italic
numbers in parenthesis). Moreover, Table 2.3 shows the values calculated from US
data (bold numbers). The data range is 1988:Q1-2010:Q1 due to the restricted avail-
ability of the number of banks data. As a measure for loans and for the mark-up of
a commercial bank, we respectively choose total loans and investments at all com-
mercial banks and the spread between the average majority prime rate charged by
banks on short-term loans to business and the FED’s funds rate. The data for the
remaining macroeconomic variables is standard.41
Standard deviation Relative standard First-order autocor-
σX deviation σX/σGDP relation Et(Xt,Xt−1)
GDP 1.23 1.25 (0.83) 1.00 1.00 (1.00) 0.89 0.84 (0.82)
C 1.04 1.01 (0.82) 0.85 0.81 (0.98) 0.87 0.86 (0.82)
I 5.01 2.36 (n.a.) 4.08 1.89 (n.a.) 0.93 0.83 (n.a.)
w 1.02 1.43 (1.01) 0.83 1.14 (1.22) 0.79 0.89 (0.82)
O 1.89 1.88 (n.a.) 1.54 1.51 (n.a.) 0.82 0.90 (n.a.)
o 1.71 1.71 (n.a.) 1.39 1.37 (n.a.) 0.78 0.91 (n.a.)
N 0.45 0.25 (n.a.) 0.37 0.20 (n.a.) 0.83 0.96 (n.a.)
µ 0.33 0.85 (n.a.) 0.27 0.67 (n.a.) 0.87 0.96 (n.a.)
Table 2.3: Business cycle statistics [data, bank entry model, (benchmark New Keynesian model)]
Table 2.342 shows that the introduction of our financial accelerator leads to a sig-
nificant amplification of the generated standard deviations. This result is in line
with Jermann and Quadrini (2009) who show that the introduction of a financial
sector leads to an important propagation of macroeconomic volatility.43 Moreover,
the generated standard deviations in both absolute and relative terms are very close
to the empirically observed ones. By contrast, the benchmark New Keynesian model
does not generate enough volatility in output and consumption.
Naturally, a further advantage of the bank entry model is that we can addition-
ally analyze the moments of financial variables. Table 2.3 reports that the model
39As standard in the literature, we compute the first-order autocorrelations and standard deviation in absolute
and relative terms. The latter is defined as the standard deviation of a variable divided by the standard
deviation of GDP.
40In line with the impulse response analysis of Section 2.3.1, the introduction of loan rate stickiness does not
significantly alters the generated second moments. In particular, they are virtually indistinguishable.
41The data for loans, the loan rate, and the number of banks is provided by the Board of the Governors
of the Federal Reserve System. The data for the standard macroeconomic variables is taken from the US
department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and the US Department of Labor.
42Remark: The benchmark New Keynesian model does neither include financial variables such as Ot, ot, Nt,
or µt nor investment in new banks, It. Consequently, we cannot calculate the corresponding second moments
of these variables. In Table 2.3 we thus state n.a. (not available).
43Remark: Jermann and Quadrini (2009) develop a model with explicit roles for debt and equity financing
and analyze shocks that affect the firms’ capacity to borrow. They moreover show that the additional
introduction of financial shocks lead to a further amplification effect. This also holds true in our framework
when for instance considering a shock to loan demand.
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performs surprisingly well with respect to this dimension, too. The model does not
only generate an appropriate volatility of aggregate loans and loans per bank but
also depicts the comparatively low volatilities of the mass of operating banks. The
generated price-cost margin is however too volatile. With respect to the first-order
autocorrelation, the bank entry model even generates too much endogenous persis-
tence of the financial variables under consideration. The generated autocorrelations
of GDP, consumption, and the real wage are slightly larger when compared to the
benchmark New Keynesian model.
2.4.2 The Financial Activity Tax and the Financial
Transaction Tax
As Table 2.3 depicts, the existence of the financial sector leads to higher volatilities
for key macroeconomic variables. In order to extenuate the additional source of eco-
nomic instability, we will now investigate the effects resulting from the introduction
of two financial taxes.44 The most prominent taxes being discussed by politicians
in this context – especially in the Euro Area – are the so-called ’financial activity
tax’ and the ’financial transaction tax’. The respective tax bases are profits and
transactions.
In the case of a financial activity tax, the bank has to pay a tax, τdt , on profits. In
our framework this implies according to (2.17):
di,t = (1− τ
d
t )(r
L
i,t −R
B
t )oi,t (2.45)
The financial activity tax does not affect the optimal loan rate decision. Since the
tax however dampens per period profits, it has a negative effect on bank value and
thus on bank entry.
An alternative tax which is especially proposed by German policy makers is the
financial transaction tax (or: Tobin (1978) tax) where a bank has to pay a tax,
τ˜dt , on each transaction. In our simple banking model, a bank makes only a single
transaction each period by providing an amount of loans oi,t to firms. The profit of
a bank is then given by
di,t = (r
L
i,t −R
B
t )oi,t − τ˜
d
t oi,t (2.46)
In contrast to the financial activity tax, the financial transaction tax has an effect
on the optimal loan rate decision since it affects the marginal costs of banks. The
optimal loan rate is now given by
rLi,t =
(1− λi,t)ζ
(1− λi,t)ζ − 1
(RBt + τ˜
d
t ) (2.47)
44Remark: In standard DSGE macro models, profit taxation is lump-sum, i.e. such tax changes do not affect the
resulting dynamics, at all. By contrast, taxes on profits are not lump-sum when considering an endogenous
mass of oligopolistic banks.
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Since new banks have to pay entry costs proportional to their marginal costs, the
free entry condition must also be modified correspondingly.
As a consequence, the financial transaction tax results in two negative effects on bank
entry and thus on the new financial accelerator. First, it dampens per period profits
of banks via additional tax costs. Second, the tax raises the marginal costs of banks
and consequently entry costs. This implies that in line with the findings of Lengnick
and Wohltmann (2010) the financial transaction tax seems to be more effective in
decreasing the volatilities on financial markets and the resulting accelerator effects
for the real economy.
In order to extenuate the additional source of economic instability, we now want to
find the specific level of the financial activity tax rate and the financial transaction
tax rate which decreases the macroeconomic volatility to that of our benchmark
model where our financial accelerator is not existent. For the sake of comparability,
we assume that both tax increases occur with the same degree of persistence as the
technology shock.
Figure 2.15 reports the standard deviation of GDP for different tax levels. The
dashed black lines indicate the standard deviation of GDP which the benchmark
New Keynesian model generates, 0.83.
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Figure 2.15: The impact of the financial activity tax and the financial transaction tax on the
standard deviation of GDP
Figure 2.15 shows that both financial taxes perform qualitatively equivalent. Small
increases in the tax level lead to a decline in macroeconomic volatility, whereas in-
creases above a certain threshold lead to a rise in macroeconomic volatility. This
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result is in line with Lengnick and Wohltmann (2010).45 Figure 2.15 moreover indi-
cates that the financial transaction tax has significantly larger effects. In the case of
the financial activity tax, a tax level of 1.15% is needed to achieve the same volatility
level as in the benchmark model without bank entry and oligopolistic competition.
By contrast, there is only need for a financial transaction tax of about 0.41% to gen-
erate the same volatility of GDP. This implies that the additional effect of the latter
tax on banks’ marginal costs leads to a three times larger impact on the volatility
of GDP.46
Table 2.4 reports the second moments of the baseline bank entry model without a
financial tax (bold numbers) in comparison with the case of a financial activity tax
[1.15%] (normal number) and a financial transaction tax [0.41%] (italic number in
parenthesis).
Standard deviation Relative standard First-order autocor-
σX deviation σX/σGDP relation Et(Xt,Xt−1)
GDP 1.25 0.83 (0.83) 1.00 1.00 (1.00) 0.84 0.82 (0.82)
C 1.01 0.85 (0.83) 0.81 1.02 (1.00) 0.86 0.83 (0.81)
I 2.36 0.75 (0.85) 1.89 0.90 (1.02) 0.83 0.82 (0.82)
w 1.43 1.09 (1.02) 1.14 1.31 (1.22) 0.89 0.83 (0.82)
O 1.88 1.15 (1.04) 1.51 1.39 (1.25) 0.90 0.84 (0.82)
o 1.71 1.12 (1.03) 1.37 1.35 (1.24) 0.91 0.83 (0.82)
N 0.25 0.07 (0.02) 0.20 0.08 (0.02) 0.96 0.96 (0.96)
µ 0.85 0.26 (0.05) 0.67 0.31 (0.06) 0.96 0.96 (0.96)
Table 2.4: Business cycle statistics of the baseline bank entry model, the bank entry model
with financial activity tax [1.15%], (the bank entry model with financial transaction tax [0.41%])
Table 2.4 indicates that both taxes are not only able to reduce the volatility of GDP
to the benchmark level but also the volatilities of the other variables under consider-
ation. In fact, the generated moments of the benchmark New Keynesian model and
that of the bank entry model with financial taxes are very close to each other. Table
2.4 moreover shows that both financial taxes are appropriate to dampen the volatil-
ities in the financial markets, too. In particular, the standard deviation of the mass
of operating banks significantly declines. This effect is especially pronounced in case
of the financial transaction tax where the mass of operating banks and consequently
the bank mark-up turns out to be approximately constant.47
45Lengnick and Wohltmann (2010) moreover show that the u-shaped impact of both taxes also holds when
considering other measures of volatility.
46Note however that these values seem to be rather large. For instance the Swedish government introduces a
financial transaction taxes between 0.003% and 0.5% in the 1980s.
47When assuming lower taxes, the mark-up naturally becomes more volatile again.
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2.5 Conclusion
In order to capture the empirical findings that the number of banks significantly
co-moves with GDP and that bank mark-ups react counter-cyclical, we develop a
New Keynesian macro model which incorporates an oligopolistic banking sector with
endogenous bank entry.
We find that the resulting model generates counter-cyclical mark-up movements in
the banking sector and large amplification and persistence effects. More precisely, we
obtain accelerating effects which are significantly larger than those generated by the
famous study of BGG. In particular, we obtain very large accelerating effects in the
case of a monetary policy shock. These results are robust with different assumptions
concerning the loan rate rigidity and the death rate of new banks.
Moreover, we show that banks do not only propagate shocks but can also be the
source of financial disturbances which have important implications for the real econ-
omy. Therefore, we analyze the implications of a contractionary shock to bank value
which leads to stagflationary effects for the real economy.
We finally evaluate our model by comparing the second moments of the generated
series with those observed in US data. The analysis shows that the bank entry
model performs remarkable well. More precisely, the model does not only depict
the properties of key macroeconomic variables appropriately but also of financial
variables including the mass of banks, the amount of aggregate loans, and the amount
of loans per banks.
Moreover, we analyze the macroeconomic implications of a financial activity tax
and a financial transaction tax. Our analysis points out that these two taxes are
indeed an appropriate tool to stabilize the financial markets and thus to dampen
the volatility of key macroeconomic variables. We find that the financial activity
tax where banks have to pay a tax on each transaction is about three times more
effective than the financial transaction tax where the tax base is simply per period
profits.
Future work should concern about simultaneous bank and firm entry. This give rise
to further amplifications and interesting results with respect to the interdependency
between financial and real markets. Moreover, we show that our model generates an
endogenous cost-push shock resulting from oligopolistic competition. This implies a
non-trivial role for monetary policy also in the case of a technology shock or a shock
to the interest rate that – in contrast to a(n exogenous) cost-push shock – do not
generate a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and output in the standard New
Keynesian model. Future work could thus concern about optimal monetary policy
in such an environment.
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Appendix
Derivation of (2.26):
Under sticky loan rate the maximization problem of a bank is given by
max
rLi,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
∆0,t
(rLi,t −RBt )oi,t − κb2
(
rLi,t
rLi,t−1
− 1
)2
Ot
 (A.2.1)
s.t. oi,t =
(
rLi,t
RLt
)−ζ
Ot (A.2.2)
The maximization yields
∆0,t
{
oi,t + (r
L
i,t −R
B
t )
[
(−ζ)
(rLi,t)
−ζ−1
(RLt )
−ζ
Ot + ζ
(rLi,t)
−ζ
(RLt )
−ζ+1
Ot
oi,t
Ot
]
−κb
(
rLi,t
rLi,t−1
− 1
)
Ot
1
rLi,t−1
}
+ κbEt
{
∆0,t+1
(
rLi,t+1
rLi,t
− 1
)
Ot+1
rLi,t+1
(rLi,t)
2
}
= 0
⇔ ∆0,t
{
oi,t + (r
L
i,t −R
B
t )
[
(−ζ)
oi,t
rLi,t
+ ζ
oi,t
RLt
oi,t
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]
−κb
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− 1
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1
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}
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(
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(rLi,t)
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}
= 0
(A.2.3)
Multiplying by rLi,t/(∆0,toi,t) yields
rLi,t + (r
L
i,t −R
B
t )
[
(−ζ) + ζ
rLi,toi,t
RLt Ot
]
− κb
(
rLi,t
rLi,t−1
− 1
)
Ot
oi,t
rLi,t
rLi,t−1
+κbEt
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∆0,t+1
∆0,t
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rLi,t+1
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− 1
)
Ot+1
oi,t
rLi,t+1
rLi,t
}
= 0
⇔ rLi,t[1− ζ(1− λt)]−R
B
t ζ[λi,t − 1]− κ
b
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ζ[λi,t − 1]
1− ζ(1− λi,t)
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⇔ rLi,t =
ζ[1− λi,t]
ζ(1− λi,t)− 1
RBt
−
κb
ζ(1− λi,t)− 1
{(
rLi,t
rLi,t−1
− 1
)
Ot
oi,t
rLi,t
rLi,t−1
− Et
{
∆0,t+1
∆0,t
(
rLi,t+1
rLi,t
− 1
)
Ot+1
oi,t
rLi,t+1
rLi,t
}}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψi,t
(A.2.4)
where λi,t =
rLi,to
L
i,t
RLt O
L
t
and ∆0,t+1∆0,t = β
(
EtCt+1
Ct
)−σ
.
Steady State Values
N 1.40 C 0.27 G 0.06 L 0.33 NE 0.02 R
M 1.01
RD 1.01 RL 2.24 GDP 0.45 Y 0.33 A 1.00 mc 0.91
o 0.10 π 1.00 rL 2.41 d 0.14 O 0.13 µ 2.39
Table 2.5: Numerically computed steady state values
3 Firms’ Heterogeneity, Endogenous
Entry and Exit Decisions
3.1 Introduction
The number of producing firms varies over time and significantly co-moves with GDP
[see amongst others Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996) or Bergin and Corsetti
(2008)]. Moreover, the empirical study of Campbell (1998) shows that, although
the entry rate of new firms is significantly correlated with GDP, the co-movement
between the business cycle and firms’ failures is even larger.1 This result is confirmed
by Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) who also find negative and highly significant
correlations between GDP and firms’ failures based on industry level data. However,
in the recent theoretical macroeconomic literature an endogenous tendency for firms
to leave the market has been neglected, yet. The substantial cyclical behavior of
firms’ failures implies that a closer examination of this topic may help to explain
how shocks to the economy generate large and persistent business cycle fluctuations.
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Figure 3.1: Firm birth rate and GDP in the US (Hodrick-Prescott filtered data in logs)
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 depict new incorporations and firm failures in compari-
son with GDP for the US economy based on quarterly data (1953Q1:1992Q4 and
1953Q1:1998Q4), respectively.2 The data is represented in logs and de-trended by
application of the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 indicate that
1Campbell (1998) finds a correlation between the exit (entry) rate and GDP growth of 0.51 (0.28) for the US
economy (1972Q2-1988Q4).
2The data of new incorporations and firms’ failures is provided by the ”Survey of Current Business” and the
”Economic Report of the President” by the Council of Economic Advisors.
3.1 Introduction 50
there exists a positive (negative) co-movement of firm creations (failures) with GDP.
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Figure 3.2: Firm failures and GDP in the US (Hodrick-Prescott filtered data in logs)
Figure 3.3 depicts the corresponding cross-correlations between GDP and firm fail-
ures as well as between GDP and new incorporations for different leads and lags. It
shows that although firm creation is strongly correlated with GDP (0.41), an even
stronger (negative) correlation exists between GDP and firm failures (-0.57). This
result is consistent with the findings of Campbell (1998) and is moreover analogous
to labor market data where job destruction turns out to be more cyclical than job
creation [see Blanchard and Diamond (1990) or Davis and Haltiwanger (1992)]. It is
additionally worthwhile to mention that in line with the results of Devereux, Head,
and Lapham (1996), entries take place slightly prior to an increase in GDP while
exits take place contemporaneously.
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Figure 3.3: Cyclical properties of firm entry and exit
There exists a small but growing strand of literature dealing with endogenous firm
entries initiated by Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Melitz (2003) to which Jaimovich
and Floetotto (2008), Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) [henceforth: BGMa],
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Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti (2007), and Beaudry, Collard, and Portier (2006) have
contributed some interesting aspects on business cycle movements and the exten-
sive margin of production.3 By introducing nominal rigidities to the framework of
BGMa, the study of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007b) [henceforth: BGMb] has
become the workhorse New Keynesian model for analyzing monetary policy issues
in a framework with endogenous firm entry [see e.g. Faia (2009), Bergin and Corsetti
(2008), Lewis (2009a,b), and Elkhoury and Mancini-Griffoli (2006)]. However, the
authors mentioned above assume that the firms’ death rate is constant over time.
More precisely, they assume that with a given (constant) probability firms are hit
with a death shock at the very end of each period. By contrast, Lewis (2009b)
extends the model of BGMb by assuming an endogenous but ad hoc survival proba-
bility of new firms. She shows that this extension has important implications for the
resulting dynamics in response to a monetary policy shock. Lewis (2009b) claims
that rethinking the way how firm entries and exits are modelled is thus of great
interest.
The purpose of this chapter4 is therefore to provide an alternative microfounded
firm entry and exit mechanism within a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous
firms. We assume the firms to be heterogeneous with respect to their individual
productivity. They thus produce with different technologies. Thereby, both the entry
and exit decisions of firms are based on present value criteria. More precisely, if on the
one hand an existing firm expects a non-positive present value of current and future
production, it will consequently leave the market. On the other hand, a new firm
will enter, if its entry is profitable, i.e. if the present value of production exceeds the
entry costs. Of course, the entry and exit decisions crucially depend on the respective
individual productivity level in our model. This implies that similar to Hopenhayn
(1992), good (i.e. productive) firms will thus stay in the market or will enter it, while
bad firms will leave.
Our framework has several advantages in comparison with BGMa and BGMb. Espe-
cially in the case of monetary and fiscal interventions our model is more conclusive
in some important economic aspects. More precisely, the model of BGMb generates
a decrease in the mass of producers in the case of an expansionary shock to mone-
tary policy. This however conflicts with the empirical insights of Bergin and Corsetti
(2008). Their VAR analysis shows that a decrease in the interest rate encourages
firm entry. In line with this finding, our framework generates the suggested increase
in the mass of products even in a simplified specification of the model where exits
are assumed to be exogenous. The economic intuition is that due to heterogeneity
– also across potential firms – there will always exist a firm with an individual pro-
3In the following, the use the expression ”extensive margin” and ”mass of firms” synonymously.
4For a different version of this chapter see ”Firms’ Heterogeneity, Endogenous Entry, and Exit Decisions”,
Dec. 2009, Economics Working Paper 2009-11, Department of Economics, Christian-Albrechts-Universita¨t
Kiel.
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ductivity level that is only slightly too low for a profitable entry. As a consequence,
also small expansionary shocks can result in an increase in the extensive margin.
When assuming homogeneity across firms as in BGMa and BGMb, this result does
not have to hold.
Moreover and as respectively shown by Lewis (2009b) and Totzek and Winkler
(2010), the frameworks of BGMb and BGMa do not deliver an unambiguous reac-
tion of the mass of producers in the case of an expansionary fiscal shock. Instead, the
qualitative reaction of the mass of firms is very sensitive to the autocorrelation of the
shock process and the labor supply elasticity of the households. Varying these para-
meters within an empirically plausible range can cause the mass of firms to decline
leaving other variables qualitatively unchanged. However, the empirical analysis of
Lewis (2009b) indicates that fiscal demand shocks unambiguously stimulate firm en-
try. Our framework turns out to be more robust with respect to this aspect since it
generates an unambiguous increase in the mass of producers for plausibly assumed
labor supply elasticities and it generates an increase in the mass of producers for a
larger range of degree of shock persistence.
A further advantage of our framework is that it can capture the empirically observed
counter-cyclicality of firm exits [cf. Figure 3.2]. Moreover, the framework can easily
be extended by capital in production and in product creation under a standard
calibration.5
A further problem of the models of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b) is that
they do not perform better than standard RBC models with respect to the generated
second moments [see Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b)]. By contrast, our model
performs better since it solves two problems of standard New Keynesian and RBC
models. First, in our approach total hours worked and consumption do not react too
smooth relative to output.6 Second, all variables do not behave too pro-cyclical.7
When assuming firm exits to be exogenous or prices to be completely flexible, results
become worse. Hence, an endogenous tendency of firms to leave the market should
not be neglected.
In addition, our model can contribute to the debate in the RBC literature initiated
by Gal´ı (1999), whether an overall productivity shock leads to an expansionary or
contractionary reaction of aggregate labor. In the empirical literature, there is a
widespread agreement that there exists a negative correlation between total hours
worked and GDP [see amongst others Francis and Ramey (2004, 2005), Gal´ı and
5As already mentioned by BGMa, their framework delivers implausible and oscillating impulse responses if
the depreciation rate is below 50% which is at odds with the data.
6Remark: In standard New Keynesian and RBC models the ratio of the generated standard deviation of
hours worked and GDP is too low when compared to the empirically observed value. The same holds true
for consumption [cf. King and Rebelo (1999)].
7Remark: In standard New Keynesian and RBC models the generated autocorrelation coefficients are too
large when compared to the empirically observed ones [cf. King and Rebelo (1999)].
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Rabanal (2004), and Gal´ı (1999)]. However, standard RBC models generate a pos-
itive co-movement. By making prices totally flexible and considering capital, the
resulting RBC core of our model can depict both possibilities when the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is varied within an empirically plausible range.8 The
underlying driving force is the development of the extensive margin, i.e. the mass of
producing firms.
As producer price index (PPI) and consumer price index (CPI) inflation do not
coincide in general in our approach, we derive two specifications of the Phillips
curve. We show that PPI inflation is only affected by expected future inflation and
the labor share as in the baseline Phillips curve. This result is moreover supported
by US economy data as there does not exist a significant correlation between PPI
inflation and the extensive margin. In the case of CPI inflation, there however exists
a variety effect in our theoretical framework since the CPI Phillips curve is also
a function of the change in the mass of producers. This is moreover supported by
US economy data since we find that CPI inflation is significantly correlated with
the change in the mass of producers.9 We estimate the latter specification of the
Phillips curve using the generalized method of moments (GMM). We show that the
impact of the change in the extensive margin on CPI inflation is highly significant
in the reduced form as well as in the structural estimation. In comparison with the
baseline New Keynesian Phillips curve our CPI Phillips curve becomes flatter in
an inflation/labor share-space. This implies that the introduction of an endogenous
mass of producers causes the impact of the labor share on inflation to decrease since
there occur additional effects from changes in the mass of firms.
The remaining chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we develop the to-
tally microfounded New Keynesian model with endogenous firms’ entries and exits.
Section 3.3 provides our baseline calibration. The resulting impulse responses to
persistent shocks to aggregate technology, to the interest rate, and to government
spending are discussed in section 3.4. In section 3.5, we compare the generated sec-
ond moments of our model with those of BGMa and with the data. The GMM
estimations of the resulting Phillips curves are done in section 3.6. The last section
concludes.
8Remark: Within a classical monetary model, i.e. in an RBC framework without capital in production, the
sign of the reaction of hours worked crucially depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution [cf. Gal´ı
(2008, Ch.2)]. However, when considering capital in the model, hours worked always react expansionary [cf.
Gal´ı (1999)].
9The corresponding correlation is −0.13 at a 95% significance level.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Producers
Following amongst others Christoffel, Kuester, and Linzert (2009), Faia, Lechthaler,
and Merkl (2010a), and Lechthaler, Merkl, and Snower (2010), we assume three
sectors of production in order to separate the pricing decision under nominal rigidi-
ties from the input factor demand. We will distinguish between intermediate good
producers, firms in the wholesale sector, and retailers.
The intermediate good producers (or: firms) differ in their individual productivity
level. They are thus heterogeneous. Due to firm entries and exits the mass of inter-
mediate goods (or: products) is variable over time.10 The mass of producing firms
in t is denoted with Nt. The intermediate good is sold to the wholesale sector under
flexible prices.
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Figure 3.4: Model structure
Firms in the wholesale sector differentiate the intermediate goods using a CES tech-
nology and sell them to the retail sector under monopolistic competition.11 They are
moreover faced with quadratic adjustment costs in the spirit of Rotemberg (1982).
Eventually, the final good producers (or: retailers) bundle the differentiated whole-
sale goods and sell them to the households under perfectly competitive conditions.
The model structure is depicted in Figure 3.4.
10For the sake of simplicity, we assume a one-to-one identification between a product and a firm. As standard
in the macroeconomic theory, we thus do not model multi-product firms.
11Technically, the wholesale sector is needed to simplify the aggregation.
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Retail Sector
The retailer bundles the wholesale goods, ywj,t, according to the CES technology
function given by
Yt ≡
(∫ 1
0
(ywj,t)
ζ−1
ζ dj
) ζ
ζ−1
(3.1)
where ζ > 1 denotes the elasticity between the wholesale goods. By cost minimiza-
tion, we obtain the standard price index, Pt:
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
(Pwj,t)
1−ζdj
) 1
1−ζ
(3.2)
Wholesale Sector
The firms in the wholesale sector – indexed with j ∈ (0, 1) – differentiate the inter-
mediate goods, yi,t. The wholesale good is thus a bundle of mass Nt of intermediate
goods, indexed with i. The corresponding CES technology of a wholesale firm is
given by
ywj,t ≡
[∫ Nt
0
y
ζ−1
ζ
i,t di
] ζ
ζ−1
(3.3)
which implies a price level given by
Pwj,t =
[∫ Nt
0
P 1−ζi,t di
] 1
1−ζ
(3.4)
For the sake of simplicity, we assume the same elasticity between intermediate and
wholesale goods as well as between wholesale and final goods.
Being faced with quadratic adjustment costs in the spirit of Rotemberg (1982), the
wholesale goods are sold to the retailers under monopolistic competition. The real
profit of a wholesale firm j is then given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
∆0,t
Pwj,tPt ywj,t −mcwj,tywj,t − θ
c
2
(
Pwj,t
Pwj,t−1
− πj
)2
ywj,t
 (3.5)
where ∆0,t and πj represent the stochastic real discount factor and the steady state
value of producer price changes, respectively. mcwj,t are the marginal costs. θ
c is
interpreted as the menu costs resulting from relative price changes. E denotes the
rational expectations operator.
Optimizing (3.5) subjected to the demand for the wholesale good, ywj,t =
(
Pwj,t
Pt
)−ζ
Yt,
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yields the Phillips curve in non-aggregated terms12
ρj,t =
ζ
ζ − 1
mcwj,t−
θc
ζ − 1
[
(πj,t − πj)πj,t − Et
{
∆0,t+1
∆0,t
(πj,t+1 − πj)πj,t+1
ywj,t+1
ywj,t
}]
+
ζ
ζ − 1
θc
2
(πj,t − πj)
2 (3.6)
where ρj,t ≡
Pwj,t
Pt
and πj,t ≡
Pwj,t
Pwj,t−1
.
Intermediate good producers
The intermediate good producers are heterogeneous. Following Ghironi and Melitz
(2005), we assume that these firms differ in their individual productivity denoted
with zi. They thus produce with different technologies. In contrast to Ghironi and
Melitz (2005), we do not assume that firms are identical upon entry.13 Instead,
each firm has an individual productivity level independently whether it is actually
producing or not.14
For production firms need labor. The production function of a firm i is given by
yi,t = Atzili,t (3.7)
where li,t represents the labor demand of firm i, respectively. At is an overall pro-
ductivity shock. The individual productivity level, zi, is assumed to be Pareto dis-
tributed across firms which fits firm level data quite well [see Ghironi and Melitz
(2005)]. The probability distribution function (PDF) and the cumulative distribu-
tion function (CDF) of zi then follow k
z−k−1i
z−k
min
and 1−
(
zi
zmin
)−k
, respectively, where
k and zmin are scaling parameters.
15
Productivity differences across firms translate into differences in real marginal costs.
mci,t =
wt
Atzi
(3.8)
The intermediate good is sold to the wholesale sector under completely flexible prices
and under monopolistic competition.
After observing the shocks, a non-producing firm will enter the market, if the market
12See the Appendix for a proof.
13Ghironi and Melitz (2005) assume that firms are homogeneous before entry. Upon entry, firms draw their
individual productivity level in order to determine which producing firm will become an exporter. However,
the assumption of heterogeneity across (producing) firms is not important for the entry mechanism in their
approach.
14Naturally, this productivity is only potential if a firm is currently not producing. This productivity level
holds when entering the market.
15zmin > 0 moreover represents the minimal individual productivity level.
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entry costs do not exceed the expected generated present value of production, i.e.16
Ψi,t = (ρi,t −mci,t) yi,t +
Et {∆0,t+1}
∆0,t
Et
{
Ψi,t+1| [zi > δ
out
t+1]
}
≥ fEmci,t (3.9)
where fE denotes the proportionality constant of market entry costs which are as-
sumed to be proportional to the marginal costs.17 Et
{
Ψi,t+1| [zi > δ
out
t+1]
}
is the
expected next period profit conditional on being existent in the market. The pro-
ductivity threshold, δoutt , denotes the specific individual productivity level, zi, where
a producing firm is indifferent between leaving the market or continuing production.
Equivalently, there exists a productivity threshold, δint , where a non-producing firm
is indifferent between entering the market and staying out. For zi = δ
in
t inequality
(3.9) holds with equality. This implies that only a firm with a sufficiently high in-
dividual productivity level (zi ≥ δ
in
t ) will generate positive profits which cover the
entry costs and will thus enter the market.
After observing the shocks, an intermediate good producer which is currently exis-
tent in the market decides whether to stay or to leave the market before he actually
starts producing.18 If a firm exits the market, it has to pay bankruptcy costs.19 The
firm will thus exit, if the difference between its generated present value of production
and the exit costs is non-positive. The proportionality constant of exit costs, fX , are
also assumed to be proportional to the marginal costs,20 i.e.
Ψi,t = (ρi,t −mci,t) yi,t +
Et {∆0,t+1}
∆0,t
Et
{
Ψi,t+1| [zi > δ
out
t+1]
}
≤ fXmci,t (3.10)
When comparing (3.9) and (3.10), it directly follows that the productivity thresholds
for entering and exiting the market, i.e. the specific individual productivity levels
where (3.9) and (3.10) hold with equality, only coincide if fE = fX . As long as the
entry costs exceed the exit costs, the productivity threshold for an entry is larger
than the threshold for staying in the market. This implies that a higher individual
productivity level is needed to enter the market than for staying. Empirically, this
can be justified with the existence of barriers to entry.
The change in the mass of producing firms in the market, ∆Nt, is defined as the mass
of new firms, NE,t, minus the mass of firms which leaves the market, NX,t. When
denoting the time-dependent share of leaving firms with γt, the mass of exiting firms
16The entry decision in BGMa and BGMb is also based on a present value criterium. They assume firms to
be homogeneous.
17This assumption is in line with BGMa, BGMb, and Ghironi and Melitz (2005) but contrasts with Bergin
and Corsetti (2008) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) who assume entry costs to be paid proportional to
the production volume.
18In BGMa and BGMb firms are hit with a death shock with a constant probability. Consequently, their model
does not endogenously determine firm exits at all.
19We assume that entry and exit costs are sunk costs which are paid by the owners – the households – in
terms of the consumption good.
20Alternatively, one could interpret fXmci,t as the liquidation value of a firm implying that a firm exits the
market if the present value of production is smaller than the liquidation value.
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is given by NX,t = γtNt−1. By assumption, there exists a constant set of potential
entrants, Nmax, which enter the market, if their respective entry is profitable, such
that NE,t = φt−1(N
max − Nt−1) where φt denotes the share of entering firms. We
implement a time-to-build lag to capture the empirical finding of the lagged firm
creation [see Figure 3.3].21
The mass of producing firms in the market then follows22
Nt = φt−1N
max +Nt−1(1− φt−1 − γt) (3.11)
More precisely, the shares of entering and exiting producers are given by
φt = 1− Γ(δ
in
t ), γt = Γ(δ
out
t ) (3.12)
where Γ is the CDF of the individual productivity level. (3.12) implies that on the
one hand all non-producing firms with an individual productivity which is above the
threshold, δint , will enter the market since their net present value of entering is at least
non-negative. On the other hand, all existing firms with an individual productivity
below the threshold, δoutt , will consequently leave since their net present value of
production is non-positive.
3.2.2 Aggregation
The price index, defined in (3.2), can be expressed in terms of the average producer
price23
Pt = N
1
1−ζ
t P˜t ⇔ ρ˜t =
P˜t
Pt
= N
1
ζ−1
t (3.13)
where P˜t ≡ Pi,t(zi = z˜). As in Melitz (2003), the average individual productivity
level, z˜, is based on a weight which is proportional to the relative output share of
firms
z˜ ≡
[∫ ∞
zmin
zζ−1i g(zi)dzi
] 1
ζ−1
(3.14)
where g(·) is the PDF of the Pareto distribution.
Hence, the real price of the average intermediate good, ρ˜t, is a function of prod-
uct variety, as it ceteris paribus increases in the mass of firms. This also holds for
aggregate production which is given by24
Yt = N
ζ
ζ−1
t y˜t (3.15)
21An equivalent assumption can also be found in Bergin and Corsetti (2008), Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz
(2007a, 2007b), and Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
22An equivalent law of motion is applied in Lechthaler, Merkl, and Snower (2010) and Faia, Lechthaler, and
Merkl (2010a) for employment dynamics.
23See the Appendix for a proof. There we solve the integral defined in (3.4). Hence, equation (3.13) represents
an exact solution and not an approximation via average values.
24Equation (3.15) directly follows from (3.13). See the Appendix for a proof.
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where y˜t ≡ yi,t(zi = z˜). As in Bergin and Corsetti (2008), a rising mass of firms thus
causes ceteris paribus the aggregate level of output to increase.
The aggregated production function consequently follows
Yt = Atz˜N
1
ζ−1
t Lt (3.16)
where total hours worked, Lt, is given by Nt l˜t with l˜t ≡ li,t(z˜). The total factor
productivity, TFP, defined as Yt/Lt, is thus not only a function of productivity but
also of the mass of producers
TFPt = Atz˜N
1
ζ−1
t (3.17)
According to (3.13), the change in the average individual price level, π˜t, i.e. producer
price index (PPI) inflation, can be expressed as
π˜t = πt
(
Nt
Nt−1
) 1
ζ−1
(3.18)
Note that in general the two inflation rates only coincide in the steady state.25
3.2.3 Households
In opposition to firms, households are homogeneous. They supply their labor force
to all kinds of producing firms.
Since firms decide to leave the market before they start producing, i.e. before they
have a need for input factors, households do not supply labor to exiting firms. The
probability of exiting the market can thus be neglected in the decision process of
the household. Without loss of generality, we moreover assume the representative
household to be faced with a mutual fund that pays dividends equal to total profits,
Ψt, instead of being faced with the mass of heterogeneous single firms.
26 Writing
the problem in terms of share holdings in individual firms would complicate the
notation and ultimately result in identical equilibrium conditions [see Ghironi and
Melitz (2005)].
The representative household maximizes its expected utility life-time value given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
1
1− σ
C1−σt −
χ
1 + η
L1+ηt
)
(3.19)
subjected to its budget constraint which in real terms follows
Ct +
Bt
Pt
=
Rt−1
Pt
Bt−1 + wtLt +Ψt + Tt (3.20)
25Since the mass of firms is pre-determined – implying a smooth adjustment pattern – and ζ > 1, the absolute
difference between pit and epit is very small. Our simulations in Section 3.4 verify this result.
26As in the baseline New Keynesian model, Ψt, is thus exogenous for the optimization problem of the household.
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where Ct, Lt, Bt, and Tt respectively represent the household’s real consumption
expenditure, the labor supply, bonds holdings, and received transfers in period t.
Rt is the gross nominal interest rate. The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply are represented
by σ and η, respectively. Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate. β ∈ (0, 1) is a
discount factor and χ > 0.
The following optimality conditions hold
wt = χL
η
tC
σ
t (3.21)
C−σt = βEt
{
C−σt+1
Rt
πt+1
}
(3.22)
3.2.4 Overall Resource Constraint
The resource constraint of the government is given by
PtGt = Bt −Rt−1Bt−1 − PtTt (3.23)
where Gt is government expenditure.
Inserting (3.23) in the household’s resource constraint (3.20) yields
Ct +Gt = wtLt +Ψt (3.24)
Aggregate per period profits are given by
Ψt = Nt
[
ρ˜ty˜t − wt l˜t − φt−1fEm˜ct
]
−
θc
2
(πt − π)
2Yt −NX,tfXm˜ct (3.25)
i.e. aggregate average profits from production minus entering cost minus adjustment
costs of the wholesale sector and exiting costs. Inserting (3.15) and (3.13) in (3.25)
yields
Ψt = NtN
1
ζ−1
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ˜t
N
ζ
1−ζ
t Yt︸ ︷︷ ︸
y˜t
− wtNt l˜t︸︷︷︸
Lt
−
θc
2
(πt − π)
2Yt −Ntφt−1fEm˜ct −NX,t︸︷︷︸
Ntγt
fXm˜ct
= Yt − wtNt −
θc
2
(πt − π)
2Yt −Ntφt−1fEm˜ct −NtγtfXm˜ct (3.26)
By inserting (3.26) in (3.24), we finally obtain the overall resource constraint27
Ct = Yt −Gt −
θc
2
(πt − π)
2 Yt −Ntm˜ct(fEφt−1 + fXγt) (3.27)
27Remark: In contrast to the previous chapter, we assume that entry and exit costs are paid in terms of the
consumption good. Consequently, they are a component of goods demand. We thus do not have to distinguish
between output and GDP in this framework. Hence, we will use the terms output and GDP synonymously
in the following.
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3.2.5 Monetary Policy and Endogenous Trade-Off
In contrast to BGMb, our model generates an endogenous trade-off for monetary
policy by endogenizing firm entry and exit. To show that, we aggregate and log-
linearize the Phillips curve (3.6) and insert equation (3.13).28
̂˜πt = β̂˜πt+1 + ζ − 1
θc
m̂ct −
1
θc
N̂t (3.28)
For the threshold δint , (3.9) holds with equality. Log-linearizing this equation yields
29
m̂ct = δ̂
in
t +
Ψ
fE
fmc
δin
[
ŵt + l̂t + βEtΨ̂t+1 + βσ(Ĉt − EtĈt+1)
]
(3.29)
It directly follows from (3.28) and (3.29) that the threshold for the entry decision,
δ̂int , acts as an endogenous cost push shock and thus generates an endogenous trade-
off for monetary policy between the stabilization of output and inflation.30 If the
threshold for an entry increases, the endogenous cost push shock leads to an increase
in the marginal costs. This result is analogous to models concerning labor turnover
costs, where the introduction of hiring/firing costs generates a similar cost push
shock [see Faia, Lechthaler, and Merkl (2010a)].
There is however no attempt to derive the optimal monetary policy in this chapter.
We leave that for future research. Instead, the monetary authority simply follows
a standard Taylor rule. The endogenous cost-push shock has however important
implication for the resulting dynamics.
The applied monetary policy rule in log-linear form is given by
r̂t = ̺r̂t−1 + (1− ̺)(λpiπ̂t + λyŷt) + κt (3.30)
where κt represents an AR(1) interest rate shock which follows
κt = ρκκt−1 + ε
κ
t (3.31)
The complete model is shown in Table 3.1
3.3 Parameterizations
In the baseline calibration, we set the discount factor, β, to 0.99 which implies
a steady state value of the annual interest rate of about 4%. As widely applied
in the literature, the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, σ, and
28In the following, a hat denotes a variable which is log-linearized around the corresponding zero inflation
steady state, i.e. bxt =
Xt−X
X
. Variables without time index are steady state values.
29See the Appendix for a proof.
30Naturally, the same holds true for the threshold for exiting.
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Table 3.1: The complete New Keynesian model with endogenous firm entry and exit
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, η, are respectively set to 1 and 2.31 Following
BGMa, BGMb, and Ghironi and Melitz (2005) the price elasticity of the demand
for the intermediate good, ζ, is assumed to be equal to 3.8 which is a rather small
value.32 However, we want to remain as close as possible to the calibration of BGMb.
Therefore, we also set θc to 77 as estimated by Ireland (2001) in order to obtain the
same slope of the Phillips curve as in BGMb. We moreover abstract from trend
inflation, i.e. π = 1.
For calibrating the first scaling parameter of the Pareto distribution, k, it is impor-
tant that the condition k > ζ − 1 holds in order to ensure the standard deviation of
the idiosyncratic shock to be finite and positive [see Ghironi and Melitz (2005)].33
31In contrast to Chapter 2, we set η to 2 which is also a standard value in this chapter. The influence of this
parameter will be shown in Section 3.4.1.
32In Section 3.6, we estimate the CPI-Phillips curve. It turns out that ζ has to be significantly higher than we
assume here.
33Remark: The standard deviation of the Pareto distributed individual productivity level is given by (k− ζ +
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Therefore, k is calibrated to 3.4 as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005). To be able to com-
pare our results with models without heterogeneity, the second scaling parameter,
zmin, is chosen to obtain an average individual productivity level equal to one. The
exogenous government spending/GDP ratio in steady state, G/Y , is calibrated at a
18% level as in Smets and Wouters (2007). Moreover, we set the steady state values
of the probability of exiting and entering, φ and γ, both equal to 0.025 implying
an average annual firms’ birth and death rate of 10% which is consistent with US
economy data.34 Without loss of generality, we normalize the mass of potential firms
Nmax to 100%. The proportionality constants of the entry and exit costs, fE and
fX , are endogenously determined by the steady state system. It turns out that entry
costs are about twice as large as exit costs which seems to be plausible.35 In particu-
lar, this implies that a potential firm needs a higher individual productivity level for
a profitable entry than an existing firm for staying in the market. As a consequence,
producing firms are protected by barriers to entry.
The Taylor rule is calibrated in the standard fashion, i.e. λpi and λy are set to 1.5
and 0.125, respectively. Finally, the smoothing parameter, ̺, is set to zero in the
baseline calibration.
The shocks to aggregate productivity, to government spending, and to the interest
rate follow an AR(1) process: xt = ρxxt−1 + ε
x
t with x = {a, g, κ}. We calibrate
these processes to the estimated values of Smets and Wouters (2007). Hence, the
corresponding autocorrelation coefficients (ρa, ρg, and ρκ) are respectively 0.95, 0.97,
and 0.15 whereas the standard errors are 0.45, 0.53, and 0.24.
3.4 Impulse Responses
In the following, we will discuss the described shocks to aggregate technology, to
government spending, and to the interest rate. To deliver comparable results with
BGMb, we will first present the results of our model for each shock when assuming
exits to be exogenous. For this model specification, we simply set the exit rate
equal to its calibrated constant steady state value, i.e. γt = γ. Then a constant
fraction of firms exits the market before it starts production. It turns out that due
to heterogeneity and due to the different entry mechanism,36 our approach performs
better than BGMb in some important aspects even in this simplified specification.
Second, we show when endogenizing firm exit the model generates an additional
amplification effect.
1)−1.
34Industry level data for the US economy is provided by the US Small Business Administration (SBA) and
available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/dyn us 89 98s4.txt
35The numerical evaluation of fE and fX yields approximately 2.12 and 1.24, respectively.
36In contrast to BGMb, we do not assume firms to be homogenous. Instead, we assume firms – producing
and potential ones – to be heterogeneous. The heterogenous individual productivity level is then crucial for
evaluating the profitability of entering and exiting the market.
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3.4.1 Overall Productivity Shock
Figure 3.5 shows the impulse responses37 to the persistent shock to aggregate tech-
nology when firm exits are assumed to be exogenous. As expected and in line with
numerous empirical analyses, the shock causes aggregate output and consumption
to increase while (PPI and CPI) inflation decreases.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse responses to a persistent shock to aggregate productivity with exogenous exits
As in BGMa and BGMb, the production volume of the average firm however in-
creases only on impact. Thereafter, the reaction turns negative. The economic inter-
pretation is that although the aggregate productivity shock has a positive effect on
the production level of the individual firm, this effect is compensated by a decreasing
market share. As higher productivity leads to higher profit opportunities – which
causes the threshold for entering the market to decrease – the probability of entering
increases. Hence, our model depicts the empirically observed pro-cyclical movement
of firm entry [cf. Figure 3.1]. The rising mass of producing firms in turn causes the
market share of the individual firm – defined as y˜t/Yt – per se to decrease.
38 In
contrast to BGMb, the adjustment time-path of the mass of producers and GDP
37We simulate the model in log-linear form using Dynare V.4. The complete model in log-linear form is shown
in the Appendix. The number of years are on the abscissa. However, we interpret periods as quarters. On
the ordinate we plot the percentage deviation of a variable from the corresponding steady state value, i.e.
xt = (Xt −X)/X, where X is the steady state value.
38Remark: According to (3.15) the ratio eyt/Yt is given by
eyt
Yt
=
eyt
N
ζ
ζ−1
t eyt
= N
−
ζ
ζ−1
t
Log-linearizing this expression yields byt− bYt = −
ζ
ζ−1
bNt such that the resulting dynamics look qualitatively
equivalent to those of the mass of firms with inverse sign. They are thus hump-shaped and negative over the
total adjustment path.
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are both hump-shaped.
Moreover, Figure 3.5 indicates that as in BGMa and BGMb the shock impact is
amplified by assuming an endogenous mass of firms since total factor productivity,
TFP, increases more than aggregate productivity. This directly follows from equa-
tion (3.17) as the mass of producers rises. This result is also obtained by Jaimovich
and Floetotto (2008) who show that TFP is a decreasing function in the firms’ mark-
up in their approach.39 This finding is moreover analogous to the results of Bergin
and Corsetti (2008) and Totzek and Winkler (2010) who show that an increasing
mass of firms leads to an amplification effect in the case of an expansionary shock to
monetary and fiscal policy, respectively. In line with the empirical findings of Gal´ı,
Gertler, and Lo´pez-Salido (2007), Martins, Scapetta, and Pilat (1996), and Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1991, 1999), our model is also able to generate counter-cyclical
mark-up movements without implying counter-cyclical profits.40 Note however that
these mark-up movements result from the assumption of sticky prices.
When comparing the impulse responses to those of BGMb, it turns out that be-
side the dynamics of inflation our model behaves qualitatively equivalent. However,
BGMb show that an expansionary shock to aggregate technology can lead to a posi-
tive reaction of inflation depending on the degree of shock persistence in their model
[see also Lewis (2009b)]. Lewis (2006) moreover shows that the entry model of BGMb
causes inflation only to decrease on impact. Thereafter, the reaction is positive for
degrees of shock persistence between 0.6 and 0.99. A positive reaction of inflation
however conflicts with the empirical insights of e.g. Dedola and Neri (2007), Gal´ı
and Rabanal (2004), Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), and Lewis (2009b, 2006).
As Figure 3.6 depicts, our model generates a completely negative reaction of infla-
tion independently of the persistence coefficient, ρa. It even generates a decrease in
inflation after a one-off shock to aggregate technology.
There are two opposing effects leading to an increase in inflation in BGMb. On
the one hand, the real wage increases more than aggregate technology. As a result,
marginal costs increase which has a positive impact on inflation according to the
Phillips curve. The rising mass of producers on the other hand has a negative impact
on inflation [cf. equation (3.28)]. The reaction of the mass of producers is however
rather small in BGMb.41 By contrast, our framework generates a stronger reaction
of the mass of firms development. At the peak, the percentage deviation of the mass
of firms from its steady state value is even above that of the technology shock.
The increase in marginal costs is moreover dampened by the endogenous cost-push
39The mark-up then turns out to be a declining function of the mass of producers.
40This result is also obtained by Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008), BGMa, and BGMb in a framework with
endogenous entry. See Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe´, and Uribe (2006, 2008) for an alternative theoretical approach
which also generates counter-cyclical mark-up movements by introducing ’deep habits’. Standard DSGE
models, on the other hand, predict a positive correlation between mark-up and profit movements.
41An increase in aggregate technology by 1% leads to a maximum reaction of the mass of producers by about
0.5%.
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Figure 3.6: Impulse responses to a shock to aggregate productivity with exogenous exits
shock since the threshold for an entry decreases in our model [cf. equation (3.29)].
All in all, the effects leading to a decrease in inflation are much stronger in our
framework causing a robust reaction of inflation independently of the degree of
shock persistence.
There is a widespread agreement in the empirical literature that the correlation
between productivity shocks and total hours worked is negative [see amongst oth-
ers Francis and Ramey (2004, 2005), Gal´ı and Rabanal (2004), and Gal´ı (1999)].42
Under our baseline calibration, total hours worked increase on impact. Thereafter,
the reaction turns negative [see Figure 3.5]. However, the reaction of total hours
worked is very sensitive to the calibration of the households’ utility function in our
framework. By decreasing the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
σ, to 0.5, our model generates a totally expansionary reaction of total hours worked
leaving the remaining variables qualitatively unchanged. Note that also a completely
contractionary reaction of aggregate labor can be generated when setting σ = 2.
It is worthwhile to mention that an equivalent result can also be obtained in the
RBC core of our model. We can thus contribute to the debate in the RBC literature
initiated by Gal´ı (1999), whether an overall technology shock leads to an expansion-
ary or contractionary reaction of aggregate labor. To show that, we have to modify
our framework. First, we do not assume prices to be sticky for this exercise. Sec-
ond, we have to consider capital in our model. The production function is assumed
to follow yi,t = Atzil
1−α
i,t k
α
i,t with α = 0.3 which is a standard value. The capital
42Note however that there also exists empirical support for the increase in aggregate labor, e.g. by Dedola and
Neri (2007) who emphasizes a positive correlation between total hours worked and productivity in the US
economy.
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depreciation rate, δk, is set to 0.025.43 This is a further advantage of our model
since the framework of BGMa can only be extended by capital in product creation
and production when considering a depreciation rate larger than 50%. Otherwise,
the resulting impulse responses are oscillating and no longer plausible [see BGMa].
When varying the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, the RBC
core version of our model can depict both an increase and a decrease in total hours
worked leaving other variables qualitatively unchanged. The corresponding impulse
responses are depicted in Figure 3.7.
0 10 20 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Output
 
 
σ=3
σ=1
σ=0.5
0 10 20 30
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Labor
Figure 3.7: The impact of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution on total hours worked in the
RBC version
We obtain a completely expansionary reaction of total hours worked in the case σ =
0.5, while our model generates a completely contractionary reaction when the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is above 3. By contrast, standard RBC
models always generate a positive co-movement between GDP and labor.44
The economic intuition for the qualitative change in the reaction of total hours
worked is as follows. Independently of σ, the increasing real wage and the decreasing
production volume of the single firm causes the labor demand of the average firm,
l˜, to decrease. However, total hours worked rise due to the expansionary reaction
of the extensive margin. When decreasing the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, present consumption is shifted into the future. The responses of
consumption and GDP are thus dampened on impact. Due to the decreasing goods
demand, the thresholds for entering increases. The expansionary reaction of the
mass of firms is consequently dampened by raising the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. As a result, total hours worked react contractionary since
the effect resulting from the decline in individual labor demand becomes decisive if
σ is sufficiently high.
Figure 3.8 shows impulse responses when firm entries and exits are both endoge-
43The complete RBC model considering capital is shown in the Appendix.
44As already mentioned, the sign of the reaction of hours worked crucially depends on the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution within in a classical monetary model, i.e. in an RBC framework without capital[cf.
Gal´ı (2008, Ch.2)]. However, when considering capital in the model, hours worked always react expansionary
[cf. Gal´ı (1999)].
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Figure 3.8: Impulse responses to a persistent shock to aggregate productivity – endogenous [solid
lines] vs. exogenous exits [dashed lines]
nously determined via the incentive-based mechanism in comparison with the sim-
plified model. As expected, the exit rate decreases after the expansionary technol-
ogy shock. Our framework can thus depict the empirically observed counter-cyclical
nature of exits [cf. Figure 3.2]. The decreasing exit rate additionally amplifies the
development of the mass of producers. This in turn leads to a larger amplification ef-
fect on GDP leaving the qualitative reaction of other variables unchanged. However,
the additional amplification in terms of output is rather small.
3.4.2 Government Spending Shock
Figure 3.9 depicts the impulse responses to an expansionary shock to government
spending when firm exits are assumed to be exogenous.45 As standard in New Key-
nesian and RBC models, private consumption crowds out due to the negative wealth
effect.46 The contractionary reaction of private consumption is dominated by the ex-
pansionary effect on government spending such that the aggregate goods demand
increases.
Due to increasing profit opportunities, the threshold for an entry decreases. The
extensive margin consequently reacts expansionary in a hump-shaped manner and
amplifies the rise in (individual) output. During the remaining adjustment process,
the reaction of individual output turns negative caused by the decreasing market
share. This in turn leads to counter-cyclical mark-up movements without implying
counter-cyclical profits.
As shown by Totzek and Winkler (2010), the reaction of the mass of firms caused
by an increase in government consumption is not unambiguous in the entry model
45Note that BGMa and BGMb do not consider government spending in their analyses. In the following, we
thus compare our results to Lewis (2009b) and Totzek and Winkler (2010) who extend the model of BGMb
and BGMa to allow for government spending shocks, respectively.
46The wealth effect in New Keynesian and RBC models works as follows. Since the increase in government
spending is financed by lump-sum taxation, it represents a negative effect on the total income of households.
The households consequently decrease their consumption expenditures and increase their labor supply to
compensate for the additional tax expenditures. This increase in labor supply in turn leads to an expansionary
reaction of production [cf. Baxter and King (1993)].
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Figure 3.9: Impulse responses to an expansionary shock to government spending (exogenous γ)
of BGMa. Instead, the extensive margin only increases if the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is low. For higher but commonly applied values of η, as
for instance η = 2, the mass of firms decreases. A possible explanation for this
development would be that the increasing profit opportunities caused by the fiscal
stimulus are insufficient to cover the entry costs. The extensive margin then declines.
However, a decreasing mass of producers caused by an expansionary demand shock
conflicts with the intuition and the empirical results of Lewis (2009b). She shows
that an expansionary shock to government spending causes a boom in firm entry.
In our framework, the reaction of the mass of producers is unambiguous. As shown
in Figure 3.10, our model generates an expansionary reaction of the extensive margin
for commonly applied values of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
0.5 ≤ η ≤ 4.47 The impulse responses indicate that although the reaction of the
mass of producers decreases in η, it remains strictly positive. Our approach is thus
more robust with respect to this aspect when compared to the model of BGMa and
BGMb.
The differences are caused by the assumption of heterogeneity across firms and the
corresponding differences in the entry mechanism. Due to heterogeneity, there will
always exist a firm with an individual productivity level which is only slightly below
the threshold for a profitable entry.48 This implies that even in the case of a small
expansionary shock, an entry for this specific firm will be profitable and it will enter
the market. As a consequence, the mass of producers increases. In the entry model
of BGMb however, firms are homogeneous implying that small expansionary shocks
do not have to cause firms to enter. Since the exit rate is assumed to be constant,
47Our model even generates an increase in the mass of firms for higher values of η.
48Note that this result would also hold for other distributions of the individual productivity level, e.g. a Normal
or Student’s t-distribution.
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Figure 3.10: Mass of firms development under different Frisch elasticities of labor supply (exoge-
nous γ)
the mass of firms declines, if entries do not react expansionary.
Figure 3.11 schematically depicts the differences in the entry decisions under hetero-
geneity and homogeneity. Under homogeneity all firms have the same productivity
level. Under heterogeneity firms differ in their individual productivity level. Now,
consider the following thought experiment and assume that there exists the same
mass of firms in the initial position and that entry costs are constant in both scenar-
ios. Since firms with a higher zi are more productive, the profit opportunity function,
PO, is increasing in zi under heterogeneity, while it is constant under homogeneity
across firms. Let us now assume that an expansionary shock hits the economy that
increases the profit opportunities for all firms. As Figure 3.11 indicates, under ho-
mogeneity across firms, small expansionary shocks do not have to result in profitable
entries, i.e. that the profit opportunities do not cover the entry costs. When how-
ever assuming heterogeneity across firms, also small shocks lead to profitable entries
since there will always exist a firm with an individual productivity level which is
slightly below δin0 in the initial position. In Figure 3.11, the shock causes firms with
an individual productivity level δin1 ≤ zi < δ
in
0 to enter the market. Given a small
shock, the mass of firms will consequently increase under heterogeneity, while it will
not under homogeneity.
Moreover, Figure 3.10 shows that it is also possible to generate a positive reaction
of private consumption in the longer-run in our framework. When assuming a larger
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, i.e. a smaller η, the reaction of consumption turns
positive.49 The rationale is that by decreasing η, the reaction of labor supply is larger
leading to a positive wealth effect. The reaction of the real interest rate consequently
49Naturally, the initial reaction always stays negative due to the negative wealth effect [see Baxter and King
(1993)].
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Figure 3.11: Schematic illustration of entry decisions under heterogeneity and homogeneity [PO:
profit opportunities, EC: entry costs]
decreases and turns negative after some periods. This result also holds in the RBC
specification of our model.
Another unsatisfactory feature of the entry model of BGMa and BGMb is that
the mass of firms only increases for very high degrees of shock persistence [see
Lewis (2009b) and Totzek and Winkler (2010)]. As shown by Totzek and Winkler
(2010), a shock persistence of 0.9 is still too low to generate a boom in the extensive
margin since the additional profit opportunities caused by the increase in government
consumption are insufficient to cover the entry costs.
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Figure 3.12: Mass of firms development under different degrees of shock persistence (exogenous γ)
The impulse responses depicted in Figure 3.12 indicate that our model is more
robust with respect to this aspect, too, since it generates an increase in the mass of
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producers even for lower degrees of shock persistence.50 This result is again caused
by the assumption of firms’ heterogeneity and the corresponding entry mechanism.
As a result, also less persistent shocks cause a boom in the extensive margin.
As shown in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) and Lewis (2009b), inflation increases
after a rise in government consumption which is at odds with the impulse responses
depicted in Figure 3.9. However, Linnemann and Schabert (2003) show that the
qualitative reaction of inflation crucially depends on the design of monetary policy
in the baseline New Keynesian model. More precisely, the coefficient on output, λy,
is the decisive factor. Figure 3.13 shows that this is also the case in our model. The
reaction of inflation turns from completely negative to completely positive when
decreasing the coefficient on output in the Taylor rule.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Output
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Inflation
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Consumption
 
 
λ
y
=0.5
λ
y
=0.125
λ
y
=0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Mass of Firms
Figure 3.13: Mass of firms development under different Taylor rule coefficients λy (exogenous γ)
As in the baseline New Keynesian model, λy > 0 leads to a downward-pressure on
the nominal interest rate.51 This in turn leads to a higher goods demand. Figure 3.13
moreover shows that consumption can also react expansionary in the longer-run, if
the monetary authority reacts to changes in output, too. The real interest rate then
turns negative after some periods leading to an increase in private consumption. As
a consequence, the increasing profit opportunities are larger compared to the case
λy = 0 leading to larger reaction in the extensive margin and in GDP.
Also in the case of an expansionary shock to government spending, all results re-
50Note however that also in our model a contractionary reaction of the mass of producers is possible. This is
the case if the shock persistence is below 0.88. When applying a Taylor rule with λy = 0.5, the mass of firms
also increases for ρa = 0.85.
51The fiscal demand shock causes goods demand and thus inflation to increase. The monetary authority
consequently increases the interest rate which ceteris paribus leads to a decline in current consumption. If
λy > 0 this would dampen the rise in the interest rate. By contrast, this is not the case if λy = 0 [cf.
Linnemann and Schabert (2003)].
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Figure 3.14: Impulse responses to an expansionary shock to government spending – endogenous
[solid lines] vs. exogenous exits [dashed lines]
main qualitatively unchanged when endogenizing firm exit. The decreasing exit rate
causes a stronger reaction of the extensive margin in comparison with the outcome
under exogenous exits. As a result and as in the case of the expansionary tech-
nology shock, the model with endogenous exits generates a stronger amplification
effect with respect to GDP. Figure 3.14 shows the corresponding impulse responses
in comparison with the simplified model. However, the quantitative change in the
development of output is even smaller than in the case of the technology shock [cf.
Figure 3.8].
3.4.3 Interest Rate Shock
Since the shock to monetary policy is not assumed to be very persistent, we fol-
low BGMb and apply a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing to generate more
persistent developments. The applied Taylor rule is given by: rt = 0.9rt−1 + (1 −
0.9)(1.5πt+0.5yt)+κt. Figure 3.15 shows the resulting impulse responses when firm
exits are assumed to be exogenous.
The impulse responses of GDP, inflation, and total hours worked are in line with
the empirical evidence of amongst others Smets and Wouters (2007, 2003). When
comparing our results with BGMb, it turns out that beside the reaction of the
extensive margin, our model also behaves qualitatively equivalent. However, our
model generates an increase in the mass of producers whereas BGMb obtain the
counter-intuitive result that an expansionary shock to monetary policy causes the
mass of producers to decline. This result moreover conflicts with empirical insights
of Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Lewis (2009b). Their VAR analyses show that a
rise in the interest rate discourages entry.52
The underlying intuition for the different quantitative reactions is as follows. There
exist two opposing effects which determine the reaction of the extensive margin.
52Remark: Bergin and Corsetti (2008) however show the sign of the unconditional correlation between the
federal funds rate and firm creation crucially depends on the chosen measure for firm creation. They find a
positive (negative) correlation between new incorporations (net business formation) and the federal funds
rate.
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Figure 3.15: Impulse responses to an expansionary shock to monetary policy (exogenous γ)
(i) According to the Euler consumption equation, future consumption is shifted
into the present when the interest rate falls. As a result, the expansionary reaction
of goods demand leads to higher profit opportunities for producing and potential
firms. (ii) The upward-pressure on marginal costs caused by a higher demand for
labor results in an opposing negative effect on firm entry. In BGMb the second effect
dominates the first since – as already mentioned – higher profit opportunities do not
necessarily result in a positive effect on entry if entry costs are too high. As a result,
the model of BGMb generates a decrease in the mass of firms which is at odds with
the empirical evidence by Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Lewis (2009b).53 In our
framework the first effect is stronger due to heterogeneity. Furthermore, the second
effect is dampened by the endogenous cost-push shock which is expansionary in this
case since the threshold for an entry decreases [cf. equation (3.29)]. All in all, the
effects encouraging entry are stronger in our model leading to an increase in the
mass of firms.
3.5 Second Moments
In this section, we evaluate our model by comparing the generated second moments
with the empirical ones provided by King and Rebelo (1999). For this exercise, we
first apply the RBC specification of our model with endogenous exits and compare
53Lewis (2009b) shows that by introducing wage stickiness to the model of BGMb, she can also generate
an expansionary reaction of firm entry. However, her impulse responses are not hump-shaped as her VAR
analysis indicates. Alternatively, Lewis (2009b) introduces an endogenous but ad hoc survival probability.
In this case, net entry initially increases in a hump-shaped manner but then the reaction turns significantly
negative.
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the results with those obtained by BGMa. Second, we show that the introduction of
sticky prices yields a further improvement since it intensifies our results. Third, we
show that the assumption of exogenous exits leads to worse results.
We simulate the reaction of our model to an aggregate productivity shock 500 times
for 400 quarters54 and discard the first 200 quarters55 to obtain the same sample size
as in King and Rebelo (1999). We use the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing
parameter of 105. In order to deliver comparable results with the data and BGMa,
we calibrate the productivity shock process according to the empirically observed
values of King and Rebelo (1999). We thus set the standard deviation, σa, and the
autocorrelation coefficient, ρa, of the shock to 0.0072 and 0.979, respectively. For the
exercise, we set ζ to 9 as estimated by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).56
The previously applied value of BGMa and BGMb (ζ = 3.8) implies an empirically
implausible mark-up of about 36%. In order to keep the k/ζ ratio constant, we also
have to re-calibrate k to 8.05.57 As standard in the literature, we further set α to
0.2. The rest of the parameters remains unchanged.
Table 3.2 shows the simulated second moments of our RBC model with endogenous
firm entries and exits as log-deviations from the HP-trend in comparison to the
empirically reported values (bold values) and the values obtained by BGMa (in
parenthesis).58 In contrast to BGMa, we do not introduce total investment as a new
variable to the model. Instead, we will distinguish between investment in physical
capital, It, and investment in new firms, Ntφt−1Ψt. This has the advantage that we
can have a closer look at the single components of investment.59
X σX σX/σY E(XtXt−1) corr(X,Y )
Y 1.81 1.43 (1.40 ) 1.00 0.84 0.70 (0.70 ) 1.00
C 1.35 1.21 (0.57 ) 0.74 0.85 (0.41 ) 0.80 0.74 (0.65 ) 0.88 0.77 (0.99 )
L 1.79 1.40 (0.97 ) 0.99 0.98 (0.69 ) 0.88 0.71 (0.71 ) 0.88 0.53 (0.99 )
I
5.30
1.82
(3.33 ) 2.93
1.27
(2.38 ) 0.87
0.69
(0.73 ) 0.80
0.73
(1.00 )
NφΨ 2.40 1.68 0.64 0.73
Table 3.2: Second moments to an aggregate productivity shock [data, RBC model, (BGMa)]
Table 3.2 shows that in contrast to BGMa our model performs better than standard
54In Chapter 2, we simulate 500 periods and then discard some periods to obtain the same sample size as in
the data. However, this does not alter the results.
55King and Rebelo (1999) apply a data range of 1947:1-1996:4, i.e. 200 periods.
56More precisely, this is the estimated value for the RBC specification of their model.
57As already mentioned, it is important to generate a positive and finite standard deviation of the individual
productivity level.
58More precisely, we compare our results with those of BGMa under a CES technology and capital in pro-
duction. BGMa moreover provide the second moments for a model specification with capital in production
as well as in firm creation. This specification would be the closest to our approach. However, this model
specification has problems with indeterminacy and delivers implausible impulse responses if the capital de-
preciation rate is below 50% [cf. BGMa] which is at odds with the data. Therefore, we will compare our
results with the model specification of BGMa with capital only in production.
59Note that King and Rebelo (1999) evaluate an RBC model. Therefore, they do not consider the inflation
rate in their analysis.
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RBC models. First, total hours worked and consumption do not react too smooth
relative to output which is the case in BGMa. Instead, the relative standard deviation
of total hours worked is very close to the empirically observed value and the relative
standard deviation of consumption even slightly exceeds the empirically observed
one. Second, the well-known problem of New Keynesian and RBC models – including
BGMa and BGMb – that all variables behave too pro-cyclical vanishes, too. In
BGMa the correlations between output and the other variables are approximately
one.60 In our model the generated values are even too low. With respect to the
autocorrelations our model performs approximately equivalent to that of BGMa.
Both models thus do not generate enough endogenous persistence. This is however
another well-known problem of New Keynesian and RBC models.
When regarding the different types of investment, it turns out that investment in
new firms is more volatile than investment in existing physical capital. Moreover,
investment in new firms is less sticky, i.e. autocorrelated, than investment in physical
capital which seems to be plausible.
For the next exercise, we assume sticky prices again. As in BGMb, we moreover
assume the monetary authority to follow a Taylor rule with a higher weight on
inflation (λpi = 3.5), and a zero-weight on output (λy = 0). The generated second
moments of our New Keynesian model are shown in Table 3.3 in comparison with
those under flexible prices.
X σX σX/σY E(XtXt−1) corr(X,Y )
Y 1.81 1.37 (1.43 ) 1.00 0.84 0.71 (0.70 ) 1.00
C 1.35 1.14 (1.21 ) 0.74 0.82 (0.83 ) 0.80 0.74 (0.74 ) 0.88 0.77 (0.77 )
L 1.79 1.75 (1.40 ) 0.99 1.28 (0.98 ) 0.88 0.68 (0.71 ) 0.88 0.57 (0.53 )
I
5.30
1.81 (1.82 )
2.93
1.30 (1.27 )
0.87
0.70 (0.69 )
0.80
0.75 (0.73 )
NφΨ 1.81 (2.40 ) 1.30 (1.68 ) 0.71 (0.64 ) 0.76 (0.73 )
Table 3.3: Second moments to an aggregate productivity shock [data, New Keynesian Model, (RBC
model) ]
BGMb state that the introduction of sticky prices to the model does not change
the results of the RBC version significantly since the outcomes of both models are
virtually indistinguishable. However, this does not hold in our framework. By in-
troducing sticky prices to our model, all previously obtained results become even
stronger. The relative standard deviations of both consumption and labor now ex-
ceed the empirically observed such that both economic indicators do not react too
smooth relative to output.61 The absolute standard deviation of Lt is moreover very
close to the empirically observed one.
60In the specification with capital in production as well as in firm creation BGMa obtain slightly lower values
under the empirically implausible calibration. However, they are still above the empirically observed ones.
61This implies that the generated standard deviations of total hours worked and consumption in our framework
are not too small in relation to the standard deviation of GDP as in standard RBC and New Keynesian
models [cf. King and Rebelo (1999)].
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As before, all variables do not react too pro-cyclical as it is the case in standard New
Keynesian and RBC models [cf. King and Rebelo (1999)]. The cross-correlations
between the variables and GDP only increase marginally in comparison with our
RBC framework. In the New Keynesian specification the two types of investment
nearly perform identical.
X σX σX/σY E(XtXt−1) corr(X,Y )
Y 1.81 1.38 (1.37 ) 1.00 0.84 0.71 (0.71 ) 1.00
C 1.35 1.08 (1.14 ) 0.74 0.78 (0.82 ) 0.80 0.75 (0.74 ) 0.88 0.72 (0.77 )
L 1.79 1.04 (1.75 ) 0.99 0.75 (1.28 ) 0.88 0.69 (0.68 ) 0.88 0.69 (0.57 )
I
5.30
1.73 (1.81 )
2.93
1.25 (1.30 )
0.87
0.54 (0.70 )
0.80
0.71 (0.75 )
NφΨ 1.83 (1.81 ) 1.33 (1.30 ) 0.44 (0.71 ) 0.69 (0.76 )
Table 3.4: Second moments to an aggregate productivity shock [data, New Keynesian Model with
exogenous exits, (New Keynesian Model with endogenous exits)]
Table 3.4 shows the second moments for the New Keynesian specification of our
model when assuming endogenous entries and exogenous exits. It shows that the
simplified model can also generate a relative standard deviation of consumption
which is slightly above the empirically observed value. However, this does not hold for
total hours worked. In contrast to the model specification with endogenous exits and
in line with standard New Keynesian models, total hours worked react too smooth
relative to output. With respect to the autocorrelations the simplifying assumption of
exogenous exits do not change the results significantly. Both model specifications do
not generate enough endogenous persistence. Moreover, the autocorrelations of the
two types of investment are rather small when exits are assumed to be exogenous.
As in the RBC specification with endogenous exits, we obtain the unsatisfactory
result that investment in new firms is more volatile than investment in physical
(existing) capital. The result that the cross-correlations between the variables and
GDP are smaller than the empirically observed values is additionally amplified by
the assumption of exogenous exits.
All in all, the New Keynesian specification of our model with endogenous exits
delivers the best results with respect to the second moments.
3.6 An Empirical Exercise
Since in our framework – as well as in BGMb – the Phillips curve occurs with an
additional term depending on the development of the extensive margin, the question
arises whether this term is significant at all [cf. Midrigan (2007)]. For quantifying the
importance of this additional driving force in the inflation equation, we will estimate
the log-linearized Phillips curve with the generalized method of moments (GMM)
as in Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) in this section.
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Inserting the aggregate expression for the marginal costs as well as the aggregated
production function (3.16) in the PPI Phillips curve (3.6) and log-linearizing yields
̂˜πt = βEt̂˜πt+1 + ζ − 1
θc︸ ︷︷ ︸
ω
Ŝt (3.32)
where Ŝt ≡ ŵt + L̂t − Ŷt is the labor share of national income.
62 ω represents the
reduced form slope coefficient of the Phillips curve. Equation (3.32) represents a
standard Phillips curve just depending on expected future inflation and the labor
share. Hence, the mass of producers does not effect PPI inflation in our approach.
This result is supported by US economy data since we do not find any significant
correlation between PPI inflation and the extensive margin.63
However, by inserting the log-linearized version of (3.18) in (3.32), we obtain the
CPI Phillips curve
π̂t = βEtπ̂t+1 +
ζ − 1
θc
Ŝt +
1
ζ − 1
[
βEt∆N̂t+1 −∆N̂t
]
(3.33)
where ∆N̂t ≡ N̂t − N̂t−1. Hence, the change in the mass of producers occurs ad-
ditionally to the labor share in the CPI Phillips curve (3.33). When regarding US
economy data, it moreover turns out that the cross-correlation between CPI inflation
and the change in the mass of firms is −0.13 and significant at a 95% level. This
finding indicates that the development of the mass of firms affects CPI inflation.
For our estimations, we follow Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) by using quarterly data for
the US economy over the period 1960Q1:1997Q4.64 The instrument set includes four
lags of the output gap, the long-short interest rate spread, wage inflation, commod-
ity price inflation, the non-farm labor’s share, and overall GDP deflator inflation.
Additionally, we take the data for the extensive margin seasonally adjusted and
de-trended by application of the HP-filter. The data is constructed from new incor-
porations and firms’ failures which are provided by the ”Survey of Current Business”
and the ”Economic Report of the President” by the Council of Economic Advisors.
Following Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), we use a 12-lag Newey-West estimate of the
covariance matrix.
In order to generate a benchmark, we first estimate the standard Phillips curve65
with Calvo pricing where the marginal costs can be approximated by the labor share
62Note however that due to firm entry mct 6= bSt. See the Appendix for a proof.
63The applied data set is described below.
64The data of the extensive margin is just capable for 1959Q3:1998Q3. We thus do not loose many observations
by applying the data range of Gal´ı and Gertler (1999).
65In standard New Keynesian model, PPI and CPI inflation coincide.
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[see Gal´ı and Gertler (1999)].66 It is given by
π̂t = βEtπ̂t+1 +
(1− ϑ)(1− βϑ)
ϑ︸ ︷︷ ︸
ω′
Ŝt (3.34)
where ϑ ∈ (0, 1) represents the Calvo parameter. ω′ is the resulting reduced form
slope parameter. Note that in contrast to Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) but for the sake
of comparability, we take the CPI for generating inflation for this exercise.67 Under
rational expectations the corresponding orthogonality condition68 is given by
Et
{
(π̂t − βπ̂t+1 − ω
′Ŝt)Λt
}
= 0
[
∈ ℜΞ
]
(3.35)
where Λt ∈ ℜ
Ξ is the column vector of instruments and Ξ is the number of instru-
ments. All instruments are observable at time t.
In the following an asterisk indicates significance at a 99% level. The estimation of
(3.35) in reduced form yields
π̂t = 0.9814
∗Etπ̂t+1 + 0.2062
∗Ŝt (3.36)
Both estimates are significant and reasonable. As already shown by Gal´ı and Gertler
(1999), current inflation is significantly affected by the labor share beside expected
future inflation, as the theoretical literature suggests.
The corresponding structural estimation of (3.35) using a nonlinear instrumental
variables estimator yields a discount factor, β, equal to 0.98 and a Calvo parameter
of 0.63 implying an average price duration of 2.75 quarters. Both parameter estimates
are significant at a 99% level and very close to commonly assumed and estimated
values.69 The resulting reduced form slope coefficient, ω′, is 0.22 which is very close
to the slope of the reduced form estimation.
After generating a benchmark, we will now estimate our CPI Phillips curve (3.33)
which additionally depends on changes in the mass of producers. The corresponding
orthogonality condition is given by
Et
{(
π̂t − βπ̂t+1 −
ζ − 1
θc
Ŝt −
1
ζ − 1
[
β∆N̂t+1 −∆N̂t
])
Λt
}
= 0 (3.37)
In order to show that the impact of the extensive margin has a significant effect on
current inflation, we first estimate (3.37) in reduced form. The resulting estimated
66Remark: Since we also want to estimate the baseline Phillips curve in structural form we cannot use the
standard Phillips curve with Rotemberg adjustment costs as a benchmark because it has two reduced-form
parameters but three structural parameters.
67Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) take the GDP deflator for generating inflation.
68Under rational expectations the forecast error, bpit − βbpit+1 − ω′ bSt, is uncorrelated with past variables – the
vector of instruments.
69For example Gal´ı (2008) assumes β = 0.99 and ϑ = 2/3.
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equation is given by
π̂t = 0.9895
∗Etπ̂t+1+ 0.1599
∗Ŝt+ 0.3684
∗Et∆N̂t+1− 0.1351
∗∆N̂t (3.38)
Hence, both the future as well as the present change in the mass of producers
have a statistically significant impact on CPI inflation which is consistent with our
theoretical approach. When comparing the reduced form estimation in (3.38) with
that of our benchmark (3.36), it turns out that the slope of the Phillips curve becomes
lower in an inflation/labor share-space by introducing the extensive margin. This
implies that an endogenous mass of producers causes the impact of the labor share
on CPI inflation to decrease since there occur additional effects from changes in the
mass of firms.
Finally, we estimate (3.37) in structural form. Also in this case, the GMM estimation
delivers very plausible and highly significant parameter values for CPI data. They
are shown in Table 3.5 in comparison with the benchmark estimation. Note that
the estimation of the CPI Phillips curve (3.37) using PPI data delivers completely
insignificant and implausible estimates. This result again indicates the absence of a
significant impact of the mass of firms on PPI inflation.
Phillips curve β ζ θc ϑ ω (ω′)
(3.35) 0.9797∗ 0.6325∗ 0.2210∗
(3.37) 0.9861∗ 14.6454∗ 73.1282∗ 0.1866∗
Table 3.5: Structural parameter estimates [∗: 99% significance level]
The elasticity of substitution between the goods, ζ, is estimated to be 14.65 which is
within the commonly applied/estimated range between 3.8 [BGMa, BGMb, Ghironi
and Melitz (2005)] and 17 [Uusku¨la (2008)]. This value thus seems to be plausible.
The absolute value of the Rotemberg parameter, θc, is hard to interpret as it is
commonly set only to obtain an appropriate slope of the Phillips curve. The resulting
slope coefficient, ω, in turn becomes slightly lower as in our benchmark estimation
which is in line with the reduced form estimations [cf. (3.36) and (3.38)].
The histograms of the estimation errors which respectively result from the structural
estimations of (3.35) and (3.37) are depicted in Figure 3.16. The figure indicates that
both errors are normally distributed which is supported by the Jarque-Bera test.70
The corresponding properties of the estimation errors are finally shown in Table 3.6.
It shows that the estimation errors resulting from (3.37) have a mean which is closer
to zero, have a lower standard deviation and skewness, and are less autocorrelated
in comparison with those resulting from the structural estimation of (3.35). Beside
the skewness the differences are however rather small.
70The Jarque-Bera test is a goodness-of-fit measure of departure from the normality distribution. It is based
on the sample kurtosis and skewness [see Bera and Jarque (1980)].
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Figure 3.16: Histograms
Phillips expected standard skewness auto-
curve value deviation correlation
(3.35) -0.075 2.107 0.264 -0.240
(3.37) -0.048 2.096 0.152 -0.216
Table 3.6: Moments of estimation errors
All in all, the additional term in the CPI Phillips curve resulting from endoge-
nizing the firm entry and exit is significant. The resulting reduced and structural
estimations moreover deliver plausible results which are in line with the underlying
theoretical insights.
3.7 Conclusion
As GDP is even more correlated with firm failures than with firm creations and
since an endogenous tendency of firms to leave the market is neglected in recent
theoretical literature, yet, we build up a totally microfounded New Keynesian model
with heterogeneous firms and endogenous firm entry and exit. It turns out that
the resulting model – even in a simplified model with exogenous exits – can solve
some empirical problems of existing theoretical models which result in counterfactual
developments of important economic variables.
In contrast to BGMb, our model generates the empirically observed decrease in
inflation in the case of an expansionary technology shock. This result is moreover
independent of the assumed degree of shock persistence, i.e. for all ρa ∈ [0, 1).
Moreover, the RBC specification of our model can depict both a pro-cyclical and a
counter-cyclical reaction of total hours worked when varying the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply, η−1. Standard RBC models can only depict a positive co-movement
which is at odds with the widespread agreement in the empirical literature that there
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exists a negative correlation between hours worked and GDP. When considering a
government spending shock, our model delivers more robust reactions of the mass of
firms than the model of BGMa and BGMb where the mass of firms only increases for
small ranges of parameter values. Furthermore, BGMb obtain the counter-intuitive
result that an expansionary shock to monetary policy, i.e. an exogenous drop in
the nominal interest rate, causes the mass of producers to decline. This however
conflicts with the empirical findings of Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Lewis (2009b).
In our model a decrease in the interest rate encourages entry. We moreover show
that when endogenizing firm exits our model generates an additionally amplification
effect which is however very small.
In contrast to BGMa and BGMb, our model performs better than standard RBC and
New Keynesian models with respect to the generated second moments since it solves
two standard problems of this type of models. First, the standard deviation of hours
worked relative to GDP is very close to the empirically observed value and that of
consumption is even larger in our model. In the New Keynesian specification, both
total hours worked and consumption do not react too smooth relative to output.71
Second, all variables do not behave too pro-cyclical. These results hold in both the
New Keynesian and RBC specification of our model. In comparison with our RBC
version, the introduction of sticky prices to the model delivers slightly stronger
effects with respect to these two aspects. When assuming exits to be exogenous the
results become worse since the autocorrelation of investment becomes rather small
and total hours worked reacts too smooth relative to output in this simplified New
Keynesian specification.72 Hence, endogenizing firm exits improves the performance
of the model with respect to the second moments. The endogenous counter-cyclical
tendency of firms to leave the market should thus not be neglected.
Furthermore, we show that the resulting CPI Phillips curve turns out to be depen-
dent on the extensive margin while PPI inflation – like the baseline NK Phillips
curve – is only affected by expected future inflation and the labor share. The GMM
estimation of the CPI Phillips curve shows that the impact of the change in the
mass of producers on CPI inflation is highly significant and reacts in line with our
theoretical findings. Moreover, it turns out that the estimated CPI Phillips curve
becomes flatter in an inflation/labor share-space in comparison with the estimated
standard NK Phillips curve. This implies that the introduction of an endogenous
mass of producers causes the impact of the labor share on inflation to decrease as
there occur additional effects from changes in the mass of firms.
By endogenizing firm entry (and exits), our model generates an endogenous trade-off
between stabilizing output and inflation for monetary policy. Future research may
71This implies that the generated standard deviation of total hours worked and consumption in our framework
are not too small in relation to the standard deviation of GDP as in standard RBC and New Keynesian
models [cf. King and Rebelo (1999)].
72σL/σY is then smaller than the empirically observed value.
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concern about the optimal monetary policy.
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Appendix
Proof of (3.6):
Optimizing (3.5) subjected to the demand for the wholesale good
ywj,t =
(
Pwj,t
Pt
)−ζ
Yt (A.3.1)
yields
∆0,t
[
ywj,t
Pt
+
Pwj,t
Pt
(−ζ)
(Pwj,t)
−ζ−1
P−ζt
Yt −mc
w
j,t(−ζ)
(Pwj,t)
−ζ−1
P−ζt
Yt
−θc
(
Pwj,t
Pwj,t−1
− πwj
)
ywj,t
Pj,t−1
−
θc
2
(
Pwj,t
Pwj,t−1
− πwj
)2
(−ζ)
(Pwj,t)
−ζ−1
P−ζj,t
Yt

−θcEt
{
∆0,t+1
(
Pwj,t+1
Pwj,t
− πwj
)
ywj,t+1
Pwj,t+1
(Pwj,t)
2
}
= 0 (A.3.2)
Multiplying by Pj,t/∆0,t and considering (A.3.1) yields
Pwj,t
Pt
ywj,t − ζ
Pwj,t
Pt
ywj,t + ζmc
w
t y
w
j,t − θ
c(πj,t − πj)πj,ty
w
j,t + ζ
θc
2
(πj,t − πj)
2ywj,t
+θcEt
{
∆0,t+1
∆0,t
(πj,t+1 − πj)πj,t+1y
w
j,t+1
}
= 0 (A.3.3)
where πj,t ≡ P
w
j,t/P
w
j,t−1. Dividing by y
w
j,t yields
(ζ − 1)ρj,t = ζmc
w
j,t − θ
c(πj,t − πj)πj,t + ζ
θc
2
(πj,t − πj)
2
+θcEt
{
∆0,t+1
∆0,t
(πj,t+1 − πj)πj,t+1
ywj,t+1
ywj,t
}
(A.3.4)
where ρj,t ≡ P
w
j,t/Pt. We finally obtain (3.6) by dividing by (ζ − 1).
Proof of (3.13)
In equilibrium, there exist Nt firms which are Pareto distributed according to g(zi)
where g(·) is the PDF of the Pareto distribution. The price level of a wholesale firm
(3.4) then follows:
Pwj,t =
(∫ ∞
zmin
NtPi,t(zi)
1−ζg(zi)dzi
) 1
1−ζ
(A.3.5)
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Inserting the nominal marginal costs (3.8) yields
Pwj,t =
(∫ ∞
zmin
Nt
[
ζ − 1
ζ
wnominalt
Atzi
]1−ζ
g(zi)dzi
) 1
1−ζ
= N
1
1−ζ
t
[
ζ − 1
ζ
wnominalt
At
](∫ ∞
zmin
zζ−1i g(zi)dzi
) 1
1−ζ
(A.3.6)
When defining
z˜ ≡
[(∫ ∞
zmin
zζ−1i g(zi)dzi
) 1
1−ζ
]−1
=
(∫ ∞
zmin
zζ−1i g(zi)dzi
) 1
ζ−1
(A.3.7)
it follows that
Pwj,t = N
1
1−ζ
t
[
ζ − 1
ζ
wnominalt
At
]
1
z˜
= N
1
1−ζ
t
[
ζ − 1
ζ
wnominalt
Atz˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pi,t(zi = z˜)
= N
1
1−ζ
t P˜t (A.3.8)
where P˜t ≡ Pi,t(zi = z˜).
According to symmetry across firms in the wholesale sector, i.e. Pwj,t = P
w
t = Pt,
equation (3.13) holds.
Proof of (3.15)
The demand for the intermediate good is given by
yi,t =
(
Pi,t
Pwj,t
)−ζ
ywj,t ⇒ yi,t(zi = z˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
y˜t
=
(
Pi,t(zi = z˜)
Pwj,t
)−ζ
ywj,t (A.3.9)
Inserting (A.3.8) yields
y˜t =
 P˜t
N
1
1−ζ
t P˜t
−ζ ywj,t = N− ζζ−1t ywj,t ⇔ ywj,t = N ζζ−1t y˜t (A.3.10)
According to symmetry across firms in the wholesale sector, i.e. ywj,t = y
w
t = Yt,
equation (3.15) holds.
Proof of (3.29)
A firm i sets its real price, ρi,t, as a constant mark-up ζ/(ζ − 1) over its marginal
costs, mci,t such that
ρi,t −mci,t =
[
ζ
ζ − 1
− 1
]
mci,t =
1
ζ
mci,t (A.3.11)
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For the threshold zi = δ
in
t inequality (3.9) holds with equality
[ρi,t(zi = δ
in
t )−mci,t(zi = δ
in
t )]yi,t(zi = δ
in
t ) + Et {∆t,t+1Ψt+1} = fEmci,t(zi = δ
in
t )
(A.3.12)
where mci,t(zi = δ
in
t ) = wt/(Atδ
in
t ) and yi,t(zi = δ
in
t ) = Atδ
in
t lt and Et∆t,t+1 =
Et∆0,t+1/∆0,t. Inserting these expressions and (A.3.11) in (A.3.12) yields
1
ζ
wt
Atδt
Atδtlt + Et {∆t,t+1Ψt+1} = fE
wt
Atδt
(A.3.13)
Note that
wt
Atδint
=
wt
Atz˜
z˜
δint
= m˜ct
z˜
δint
(A.3.14)
where m˜ct = wt/(Atz˜).
Inserting (A.3.14) in (A.3.13) yields
1
ζ
wtlt + Et {∆t,t+1Ψt+1} = fEm˜ct
z˜
δint
(A.3.15)
The total differential of (A.3.15) is given by
1
ζ
ldwt +
1
ζ
wdlt +ΨdEt∆t,t+1 +∆dEtΨt+1 = fE
z˜
δin
dm˜ct − fEm˜c
z˜
(δin)2
dδint
1
ζ
wl
(
dwt
w
+
dlt
l
)
+Ψ∆
(
dEtΨt
Ψ
+
dEt∆t,t+1
∆
)
= fEm˜c
z˜
δin
(
dm˜ct
m˜c
−
dδint
δin
)
(A.3.16)
When denoting a log-linearized variable with X̂t = dXt/X, we obtain
1
ζ
wl(ŵt + l̂t) + Ψ∆(EtΨ̂t + Et∆̂t,t+1) = fEm˜c
z˜
δin
(m̂ct − δ̂
in
t )
⇔ m̂ct = δ̂
in
t +
Ψ
fEm˜c
ez
δin
[
ŵt + l̂t +∆EtΨ̂t + Et∆̂t,t+1
]
(A.3.17)
where the steady state of per period profits is given by Ψ = (ρ−mc)y = 1ζwl. As in
Chapter 2, the stochastic real discount factor is given by Et∆t,t+1 = β
(
EtCt+1
Ct
)−σ
implying ∆ = β and Et∆̂t,t+1 = βσ(Ĉt − EtĈt+1). Moreover, we calibrate z˜ = 1
to deliver comparable results with models without heterogenous firms. Inserting the
latter expressions in (A.3.17) yields equation (3.29).
The steady state of δint is obtained by calibrating the steady state entry rate to the
empirically observed value and by equation (3.12) in steady state.
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Proof of (3.32):
The marginal costs, m˜ct, are given by
m˜ct =
wt
Atz˜
(A.3.18)
or in log-linear form
m̂ct = ŵt − Ât (A.3.19)
The aggregated production function is given by (3.16) or in log-linear form
Ŷt = Ât +
1
ζ − 1
N̂t + L̂t ⇔ Ât = Ŷt −
1
ζ − 1
N̂t − L̂t (A.3.20)
Inserting (A.3.20) in (A.3.19) yields
m̂ct = ŵt − Ŷt + L̂t +
1
ζ − 1
N̂t (A.3.21)
When finally inserting (A.3.21) in (3.28), we obtain equation (3.32):
̂˜πt = βEt̂˜πt + ζ − 1
θc
m̂ct −
1
θc
N̂t
= βEt̂˜πt + ζ − 1
θc
[
ŵt − Ŷt + L̂t +
1
ζ − 1
N̂t
]
−
1
θc
N̂t
= βEt̂˜πt + ζ − 1
θc
[
ŵt + L̂t − Ŷt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ŝt
(A.3.22)
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Models
The complete New Keynesian model with endogenous firm entry and exit in log-
linear form is given by
Yt =
C
Y
Ct +
G
Y
Gt +
mcφNfE
Y
[φt−1 +mct +Nt]
+
mcγNfE
Y
(γt +mct +Nt) (A.3.23)
Ct = Ct+1 −
1
σ
[rt − π
CPI
t+1 ] (A.3.24)
wt = ηLt + σCt (A.3.25)
Yt = At + ρt + Lt (A.3.26)
wt = At +mct (A.3.27)
φt = −kδ
in
t (A.3.28)
γt =
(kδout)−k
zmin−k − (δout)−k
δoutt (A.3.29)
Nt = (1− φ− γ)Nt−1 + φ
Nmax −N
N
φt−1 − γγt (A.3.30)
fXmc
Ψ
(wt −At − δ
outδoutt ) = wt + lt + βΨt+1 + βσ(Ct − Ct+1) (A.3.31)
fEmc
Ψ
(wt −At − δ
inδint ) = wt + lt + βΨt+1 + βσ(Ct − Ct+1) (A.3.32)
Ψt+1 =
1
1− β(1− γ)
[At+1 + lt+1 +
ρ
ρ−mc
ρt+1 −
mc
ρ−mc
mct+1 −
γ
1− γ
γt+1]
+ β(1− γ)Ψt+2 − βγγt+2 + β(1− γ)σ(Ct+1 − Ct+2) (A.3.33)
ρt = mct −
θc
ζ − 1
(πPPIt − βπ
PPI
t+1 ) (A.3.34)
rt = ̺rt−1 + (1− ̺)(λpiπt + λyYt) + κt (A.3.35)
πPPIt = πt +
1
1− ζ
(Nt−1 −Nt) (A.3.36)
ρt =
1
ζ − 1
Nt (A.3.37)
y =
ζ
1− ζ
Nt + Yt (A.3.38)
lt = Lt −Nt (A.3.39)
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Steady State Values
C 0.71 Ψ 0.77 Y 0.90 δin 1.59 δout 0.54
γ 0.025 φ 0.025 mc 0.94 π 1.00 π˜ 1.00
G 0.16 N 0.5 ρ 1.29 R 1.01
Table 3.7: Numerically computed steady state values
The RBC model with endogenous firm entries and exits
The RBC model with endogenous firm entry and exit considering capital is given by
Yt = N
ζ
ζ−1
t y˜t (A.3.40)
Yt = Atz˜N
1
ζ−1
t L
1−α
t K
α
t (A.3.41)
It = EtKt+1 − (1− δ
k)Kt (A.3.42)
wt = χL
η
tC
σ
t (A.3.43)
C−σt = βEt
{
C−σt+1Rt+1
}
(A.3.44)
C−σt = βEt
{
C−σt+1[r
k
t+1 − (1− δ
k)]
}
(A.3.45)
Ct = Yt −Gt − It −Ntm˜ct(fEφt−1 + fXγt) (A.3.46)
m˜ct =
wt
Atz˜(1− α)
(
Kt
Lt
)α (A.3.47)
rKt =
α
1− α
Lt
Kt
(A.3.48)
Nt = φt−1N
max +Nt−1(1− φt−1 − γt) (A.3.49)
φt = 1− Γ(δ
in
t ), γt = Γ(δ
out
t ) (A.3.50)
ρ˜t = N
1
ζ−1
t (A.3.51)
fEmct(δ
in
t ) =
1
ζ − 1
mct(δ
in
t )yt(δ
in
t ) +
Et∆0,t+1
∆0,t
EtΨt+1(δ
in
t ) (A.3.52)
fEmct(δ
out
t ) =
1
ζ − 1
mct(δ
out
t )yt(δ
out
t ) +
Et∆0,t+1
∆0,t
EtΨt+1(δ
out
t ) (A.3.53)
Part Two: Monetary and Fiscal
Policy Analyses
90
4 Barro-Gordon Revisited: An
Analysis of Reputational Equilibria
in a New Keynesian Model
4.1 Introduction
In order to fight the recessionary impacts of the financial crisis 2007-2009 central
banks around the globe switched over to discretionary monetary policy. As the fi-
nancial crisis seems to be overcome, monetary authorities have however to think
about exit strategies and thus a way to credibly return to a commitment monetary
policy. The topic of policy switching regimes and the resulting consequences for the
credibility of central banks are already discussed in the famous study of Barro and
Gordon (1983a,b). However, their framework is completely represented by a tradi-
tional Phillips curve, i.e. the authors do not consider any demand side effects which
also played a crucial role in the subprime crisis. The authors moreover assume that
the Central Bank can directly control for the inflation rate. More precisely, Barro
and Gordon (1983a,b) assume that the policymaker controls an instrument which
has a direct connection to the inflation rate – for instance, the money growth rate.1
The aim of this chapter2 is not to depict the decision problem of a monetary au-
thority under the circumstances of the financial crisis. Instead, this chapter offers an
approach which enables us to discuss both the debate in the New Keynesian litera-
ture about the optimality of commitment vs. discretion and the time-inconsistency
problem a` la Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) com-
bined in a unified framework.3 Within the standard New Keynesian model we can
solve the inconsistency problem and derive time-consistent (or: stable) interest rate
rules of Taylor-type. Thereby, this framework enables us to consider the demand
side of the economy and to deviate from the assumption that the central bank can
directly control for the inflation rate. Instead, the mechanism in New Keynesian
models is as follows. (i) The central bank commits itself to follow an interest rate
1Jarchow (2010, Chapter 5) also extends the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach for a demand side.
However, this equation just determines the money growth rate. Jarchow (2010, Chapter 5) moreover analyzes
optimal monetary commitment and discretion strategies within this framework.
2For a different version of this Chapter see ”Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria in a New Key-
nesian Model” (with H.-W. Wohltmann), March 2010, Economics Working Paper 2010-04, Department of
Economics, Christian-Albrechts-Universita¨t zu Kiel.
3See Wohltmann and Kro¨mer (1989) for a comment on the different concepts of time-consistency in the
economics literature.
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rule of Taylor-type. (ii) Private agents form inflation expectations. (iii) The central
bank sets the interest rate and the households adjust their consumption expenditures
according to the Euler consumption equation. (iv) Inflation is then determined by
expected future inflation and the output realization via the New Keynesian Phillips
curve.
There already exists a couple of studies which show that the crucial assumption
made by Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) introducing the time-inconsistency problem –
namely, that the central bank aims at an output gap target larger than zero – leads
to an inflation bias in a New Keynesian framework [see amongst others Clarida, Gal´ı,
and Gertler (1999)]. However, an explicit derivation and the analysis of the resulting
welfare consequences of the optimal monetary policy, including purely discretionary
and inconsistent monetary policy as well as time-(in)consistent Taylor rules, are
neglected in the literature.
Our main findings are as follows. Under a completely standard calibration includ-
ing a time preference rate of the monetary authority equal to the long-run interest
rate, the standard Taylor rule is time-consistent (or: stable) in the presence of a
cost-push shock. The central bank thus does not have an incentive to deviate from
the announced rule and to switch over to the inconsistent policy regime. However,
there exists a multiplicity of stable Taylor rules which are superior to the standard
one. In contrast to the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach, implementing a
monetary rule such that the cost and benefit resulting from inconsistent policy coin-
cide – which implies a net gain of inconsistent policy behavior equal to zero – is not
optimal. Instead, the solution can be enhanced by moving into the time-consistent
area where the net gain of inconsistent monetary policy is negative. Moreover, there
does not exist a stable monetary policy rule maximizing the welfare when consider-
ing monetary policy of Taylor-type rules. The continuum of stable rules furthermore
becomes larger when assuming an additional term in the social loss function con-
cerning interest rate stability. This implies that the reputation of the central bank
naturally improves if the policy maker is also concerned about stabilizing the interest
rate. Our results remain robust with respect to the analysis of simultaneous supply
and demand shocks.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 shortly describes the applied model.
In Section 3, we turn to monetary policy issues including the optimal discretionary
monetary policy, simple Taylor rules, and the incentive to deviate from the an-
nounced policy rule. We moreover derive the continuum of time-consistent Taylor
rules, discuss the problem of finding an optimal stable rule, and check our results
for robustness. The last section concludes.
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4.2 The Model
For the sake of simplicity, we apply a static approximation of the microfounded
canonical New Keynesian model following Bofinger, Meyer, and Wollmersha¨user
(2006).4 The model can be represented by a three-dimensional equation system
including an IS curve, a Phillips curve, and a monetary policy rule. The IS curve is
given by
x = a− br + ε1 (4.1)
where x denotes the output gap which is defined as the deviation of output from its
natural level. a is a constant. b represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
r is the real interest rate. As shown in the Appendix, the demand shock, ε1, can
also be interpreted as a shock to aggregate technology or innovation.5
The second building block of the model is the static approximation of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve
π = πe + δx+ ε2 (4.2)
where π and πe represent current and expected future inflation, respectively. δ is the
slope of the Phillips curve. ε2 represents a cost-push shock.
In contrast to the demand shock, the supply shock causes a trade-off for the monetary
authority between stabilizing output and inflation. Therefore, we will restrict our
analysis to cost-push shocks. However, we will re-consider the demand shock for a
robustness check at the end of our analysis.
4.3 Monetary Policy
In the following, we will discuss different types of policy regimes, namely the optimal
discretionary monetary policy, D, the commitment regime a` la Taylor, TR, and the
regime under inconsistent policy, IP . Independently of the assumed type of monetary
policy, the central bank seeks to minimize a social loss function.
As shown by Gal´ı (2008, Chapter 4) and Woodford (2003, Chapter 6), the second
order approximation of the households’ utility function delivers a quadratic loss
function which represents flexible inflation targeting in the spirit of Svensson (1999).
4Bofinger, Meyer, and Wollmersha¨user (2006) already highlight that their approach can be extended for
implementing the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach. However, they only point out that an output
gap target above zero as assumed in Barro and Gordon (1983a) leads to an inflation bias which was already
shown by Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999) within the dynamic New Keynesian model.
5In the dynamic version of the standard New Keynesian model, it can moreover be shown that in the case
of an expansionary but persistent technology shock, the resulting demand shock is contractionary because
the current output level reacts less expansionary than its natural counterpart. The output gap consequently
declines. In the case of a permanent innovation, the resulting technology shock however has an expansionary
impact on the output gap.
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The static approximation of this function is given by
V = (π − πT )2 + λx2 (4.3)
where πT represents the target inflation rate and λ ∈ [0, 1] is the central bank’s
preference parameter on stabilizing the output gap. In the case λ = 0, the central
bank’s preferences represent a strict inflation targeting regime, i.e. the monetary
authority is just concerned about stabilizing inflation.
Following Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), we additionally assume that the monetary
authority’s target of the output gap is positive, i.e. xT > 0. An economic rationale
is that e.g. monopolistic distortions or taxes keep potential output below its efficient
level [see Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999)]. Then the social loss is given by
V = (π − πT )2 + λ(x− xT )2 (4.4)
An alternative approach to include the problem of time-inconsistency into the model
is to assume an asymmetric loss function [see Cukiermann and Gerlach (2003),
Nobay and Peel (2003), or Ruge-Murcia (2003)]. There is empirical evidence for both
approaches [see for instance Ireland (1999) and Gerlach (2003)]. However, there is
no micro-foundation for such a loss function, at all. We moreover want to remain as
close as possible to the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach.
4.3.1 Discretionary Monetary Policy
In this section, we will derive the optimal discretionary monetary policy. In this
regime, the expected inflation rate is taken as given for the central bank since the
monetary authority applies a sequential optimization. Therefore, it is unable to
make credible announcements concerning the design of monetary policy that could
influence private expectations.
The central bank minimizes the social loss (4.4) subjected to the Phillips curve (4.2).6
Inserting the Phillips curve (4.2) in the social loss function (4.4) and optimizing the
resulting equation with respect to the output gap yields the following first order
condition:
2δ(πe + δx+ ε2 − π
T ) + 2λ(x− xT ) = 0 (4.5)
Following Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), we assume that private expectations about
inflation are formed before the shocks occur. This implies that when forming expec-
tations about inflation, the shocks (ε1 and ε2) are not included in the information
set of private agents [see also Walsh (2010, Chapter 8), Lohmann (1992), or Persson
and Tabellini (1990)].
6Note that the IS curve is not a binding restriction in this case. However, the demand side is essential for the
simple rule analysis and when considering simultaneous supply and demand shocks.
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Inserting (4.5) in the Phillips curve and taking rational expectations conditional on
the set of private information, I, with E[ε2|I] = 0, yields the expected inflation rate
under discretionary monetary policy.
πe|D = π
T +
λ
δ
xT (4.6)
Note that in the case of a flexible inflation targeting regime implying λ > 0, expected
inflation is above the central bank’s target level when the monetary authority aims
at a positive output gap.
Combining (4.5) and (4.6) yields the solution path of the output gap.
x|D = −
δ
δ2 + λ
ε2 (4.7)
The solution of the output gap is independent of the corresponding target level, xT ,
and moreover coincides with the discretionary solution in the case where the central
bank does not target a positive output gap, i.e. x|x
T>0
D = x|
xT=0
D .
However, this does not hold for the solution of inflation. By inserting (4.6) and (4.7)
in the Phillips curve, we obtain
π|D = π
T +
λ
δ
xT +
λ
λ+ δ2
ε2 (4.8)
The central bank’s target level of the output gap represents an inflation bias in
the solution of inflation which pushes inflation above its target level. Since under
rational expectations the model structure including the loss function is known by
private agents, the intention of the central bank to push the output gap above its
natural level fails. Instead, the solution of output remains unchanged and that of
inflation is ’biased’. This result also holds in the absence of a supply shock, i.e.
ε2 = 0.
7
Moreover, equation (4.8) implies that inflation only coincides with its target level
when the central bank’s preferences represent strict inflation targeting (λ = 0). This
is a very intuitive result since in this case the central bank is not concerned about
the output gap, at all.
When combining (4.7) and (4.8), discretionary monetary policy can be expressed as
a targeting rule [see Svensson (1999)] given by
x|D − x
T = −
δ
λ
[
π|D − π
T
]
(4.9)
implying a negative relationship between the stabilization of inflation and the output
gap at the respective target level.
7Remark: In the absence of the supply shock all results remain qualitatively unchanged. In fact, the assumption
of the supply shock biases our results towards optimal discretion. However, we want to simultaneously discuss
the inflation bias and the optimal discretion vs. commitment debate within a unitary framework in this
chapter.
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Finally, the social loss under discretionary monetary policy can be derived by insert-
ing the solutions of the output gap (4.7) and inflation (4.8) in the welfare function
(4.4).
V |D =
λ
λ+ δ2
[
δ2 + λ
δ
xT + ε2
]2
(4.10)
If the cost-push shock is existent, i.e. ε2 6= 0, the loss is strictly positive as long as
λ > 0.
4.3.2 Simple Rules
In this section, we will derive the social loss when the central bank credibly commits
itself to follow a simple monetary policy rule of Taylor-type. Since the commitment
is credible in this case, the central bank influences private expectations in this policy
regime.
The Taylor rule is commonly represented as
i = iT + kpi(π − π
T ) + kx(x− x
T ) (4.11)
where kx and kpi are the elasticities of the nominal interest rate, i, with respect to
the deviation of the output gap and the inflation rate from their respective target
level. In the following, we will refer to them as Taylor rule coefficients. The real
interest rate which is the argument of the IS curve (4.1) is then obtained from the
nominal interest rate via the well-known Fisher equation.
As shown by Bullard and Mitra (2002), the following condition is necessary to ensure
that the dynamic counterpart of our model has a unique and stable equilibrium [see
also Walsh (2010, Chapter 5)]
δ(kpi − 1) + (1− β)kx > 0 (4.12)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor of private households. The stability of the
whole system thus crucially depends on the Taylor rule coefficients. In the following,
we will assume that the Taylor principle, kpi > 1, and the condition kx ≥ 0 hold.
Then the stability condition (4.12) is obviously satisfied.
iT is the central bank’s target level of the nominal interest rate which follows
iT = rT + πT (4.13)
The corresponding target level of the real interest rate, rT , follows from the IS
equation and is given by
rT =
1
b
(a− xT ) (4.14)
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Note that the target level of the real interest rate coincides with its natural level,
rn = ab , in the borderline case x
T = 0.
Combining the Taylor rule (4.11) with (4.13), (4.14), the IS curve (4.1), and the
Phillips curve (4.2) and taking rational expectations, yields expected inflation rate
under the monetary policy regime TR.
πe|TR = π
T +
1 + bkx
b(kpi − 1)
xT (4.15)
As long as kpi > 1 and kx ≥ 0, expected inflation exceeds the target level when
the monetary authority seeks to achieve a positive target level of the output gap.
Since we consider an ad hoc Taylor rule for the moment, the expected inflation rate
is however independent of the central bank’s preferences on stabilizing output. By
contrast and as shown in the last section, under optimal discretionary monetary
policy expected inflation exceeds its target level only in the case of flexible inflation
targeting, λ > 0 (cf. equation (4.6)).
When combining (4.15) and the Phillips curve (4.2), we obtain the solution path of
the output gap and the inflation rate
x|TR = −
bkpi
α
ε2 (4.16)
π|TR = π
T +
1 + bkx
b(kpi − 1)
xT +
1 + bkx
α
ε2 (4.17)
where α ≡ 1 + b(kx + δkpi). Equivalently to the case of the discretionary monetary
policy, the solution of the output gap is independent of its target level. Hence,
equation (4.16) also represents the solution of the borderline case xT = 0 where the
central bank targets a closed output gap. Again, this result does not hold for the
solution of inflation since inflation is biased. Considering a positive target level of
the output gap thus leads to higher inflation while the resulting output gap remains
unchanged.8
In order to obtain the social loss under the policy regime TR for arbitrary coefficients
kpi and kx, we finally insert the solutions of the output gap and inflation in the welfare
function (4.4).
V |TR = (1 + bkx)
2
[
1
b(kpi − 1)
xT +
1
α
ε2
]2
+ λ
[
xT +
bkpi
α
ε2
]2
(4.18)
From (4.18) it directly follows that the social loss approaches infinity, if kpi tends to
unity. In this limit case the social loss exceeds that under discretionary monetary
policy (4.10). The rationale is the reaction of expected inflation which according to
(4.15) also tends to infinity, if kpi → 1. The following numerical example however
8Note that this result also holds when assuming ε2 = 0.
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shows that when applying a standard calibration, the social loss under discretionary
monetary policy clearly exceeds that under TR. The Taylor rule regime is then
preferable.
As standard in the New Keynesian literature, we assume the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, b, to be equal to one. Under commonly chosen deep parameters, the
slope of the Phillips curve is 0.0858 implying an average price duration of four quar-
ters and an annual nominal interest rate of about 4%. Following Svensson (1999),
we set the flexible inflation targeting parameter λ to 0.5. We arbitrarily assume the
target level of the output gap to be 0.1 implying that the potential output level is
10% higher than the current one. The shock impact is normalized to one.
Figure 4.1: Comparing the social loss under the regime TR [grey area] and D [white area]
Under this standard calibration, Figure 4.1 depicts the social loss in the regime TR
for different combinations of kpi and kx [grey area] as well as the loss under regime
D [white shaded area]. The social loss under TR can exceed that under D, when
the Taylor rule coefficient kpi tends to unity. However, if kpi is sufficiently larger than
one and kx is sufficiently larger than zero, V |TR is preferable to V |D.
9
In the case of standard Taylor rule, i.e. kpi = 1.5 and kx = 0.5, the social loss in
9Note that there also exists a small area with V |TR > V |D, if kx is sufficiently small and kpi is sufficiently
large.
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the regime TR is significantly lower than in the discretionary case. The numerical
evaluation of V |D and V |TR yields
V |TR = 2.0120 < 2.4956 = V |D (4.19)
The credible commitment to the standard monetary policy rule yields a significant
welfare gain via the expectation channel which is not active in the discretionary
case.10 The social loss under D exceeds that under TR by about 24%.
4.3.3 Inconsistent Policy
In this section, we will show that the central bank has an incentive to deviate from
the announced Taylor rule and thus renege on their commitment if the monetary
authority is faced with a purely static one-period optimization approach.
If the central bank credibly announces to follow a specifically calibrated Taylor rule,
expected inflation is tied at a given level according to (4.15). However, the central
bank can then achieve a welfare gain by re-optimizing in a discretionary manner. In
this case, the monetary authority will not implement the announced policy rule. We
will refer to this policy regime as inconsistent monetary policy, IP .
The maximization problem of the central bank under IP is given by
max
x, pi
L = (π − πT )2 + λ(x− xT )2
s.t. π = πe + δx+ ε2 (4.20)
πe = πe|TR
As in the discretionary case, the first order condition with respect to the output gap
is given by
x|IP = −
δ
λ+ δ2
[
πe|TR − π
T + ε2
]
+
λ
λ+ δ2
xT (4.21)
Equation (4.21) just deviates from (4.5) via the formation of the expected inflation
rate.
By inserting (4.15) in (4.21), we obtain the solution of the output gap under the
inconsistent policy regime, IP .
x|IP =
1
λ+ δ2
[
λ−
δ(1 + bkx)
b(kpi − 1)
]
xT −
δ
λ+ δ2
ε2 (4.22)
In contrast to the purely discretionary monetary policy and the regime under com-
mitment to a Taylor rule, the solution of the output gap (4.22) now depends on its
10Remark: In the dynamic New Keynesian framework, Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (1999)
show that a commitment strategy can be advantageous even in the absence of the inflation bias. See also
Dennis (2010) for an insightful discussion of this topic.
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target level.11 This implies that the central bank’s intention to push output above
its natural level can now be achieved.
The solution of inflation is obtained from (4.22) via the Phillips curve (4.2).
π|IP = π
T +
λ
λ+ δ2
[
α− δb
b(kpi − 1)
xT + ε2
]
(4.23)
In line with our previous finding under discretionary monetary policy, inflation only
coincides with its target level when the central bank follows strict inflation targeting.
The combination of (4.22) and (4.23) necessarily yields the same targeting rule as
in the discretionary case (cf. equation (4.9)):
x|IP − x
T = −
δ
λ
[
π|IP − π
T
]
(4.24)
The social loss under inconsistent monetary policy can finally be obtained by insert-
ing (4.22) and (4.23) in (4.4).
V |IP =
λ
λ+ δ2
[
α− δb
b(kpi − 1)
xT + ε2
]2
(4.25)
By definition, V |TR must exceed V |IP , i.e. the deviation from the announced Taylor
rule yields a welfare enhancement. The numerical evaluation for the two policy
regimes under the standard parameterizations delivers
V |IP = 1.6875 < 2.0120 = V |TR (4.26)
The welfare gain resulting from the inconsistent policy regime if the monetary au-
thority credibly announces to follow a standard Taylor rule is thus about 19%.
4.3.4 Time-Consistent Simple Rules
In this section, we will derive a continuum of time-consistent (or: stable) simple rules.
This is done by assuming a long-run planning horizon of the monetary authority as
in Barro and Gordon (1983a,b).
As shown in the previous section, the central bank has an incentive to re-optimize,
if it can credibly announce to follow a commitment strategy. If its announcements
are not credible, private expectations are given for the central bank and the mone-
tary authority should follow a discretionary monetary policy. By assuming that the
central bank looses its reputation, if it deviates once from its announcement, i.e. if
the central bank switches over to the regime IP , one can find both a continuum of
time-consistent and time-inconsistent simple rules. More precisely, we assume a pun-
ishment interval of one period implying that the central bank looses its reputation
11Again, it is worth mentioning that this result also holds if ε2 = 0.
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for exactly one period when reneging on their commitment once.12 The announce-
ments of the central bank will then no longer be credible such that private agents
will form their expectations as in the discretionary case.
In this framework a` la Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), the central bank is faced with
a simple cost-benefit calculation where the benefit, B, is the welfare gain resulting
from the inconsistent policy in comparison to the implementation of the announced
Taylor rule, V |TR − V |IP . The cost, C, is the discounted next period welfare loss
resulting from the sacrifice in the central bank’s reputation, V |D − V |TR. The net
gain, N , of the inconsistent policy is then given by13
N = B − C = (V |TR − V |IP )−
1
1 + z
(V |D − V |TR) (4.27)
Equation (4.27) implies that there exists a subjective time preference rate, z, such
that the net gain is zero. In this case, the monetary authority is indifferent between
switching over to IP and executing the announced rule. This critical time preference
rate, z∗, is given by
z∗ =
V |D − V |TR
V |TR − V |IP
− 1 ⇔ N = 0 (4.28)
A central bank with a rate of time preference larger than z∗, i.e. a monetary authority
whose planning horizon is rather short, consequently expects N > 0. Correspond-
ingly, a more long-run oriented central bank, z < z∗, expects N < 0, i.e. it would
not switch over to the regime IP .
In our numerical example, the critical time preference rate z∗ is 0.4903. The cor-
responding discount factor, 1/(1 + z∗), is then about 0.67 implying a central bank
whose planning horizon is rather short. In the monetary economics literature, a basic
assumption is that the subjective preference rate coincides with the long-run real
interest rate.14 The latter is typically chosen to be equal to 4% which is clearly
below the critical subjective rate of time preference. Hence, such a central bank is
farsighted and does not yield a net gain from inconsistent monetary policy. Assuming
z = 0.04, the standard Taylor rule is consequently stable.15
12Alternatively, one can analyze the case where the central bank looses its reputation for all times when
reneging once. However, the qualitative results remain unchanged.
13By assuming that the central bank looses its reputation for all times when deviating once from the an-
nouncement, the total gain resulting from IP would be given by
N ′ = B − C′ =
 
V |TR − V |IP

−
∞
X
i=1

1
1 + z′
i
 
V |D − V |TR

⇔ N ′ =
 
V |TR − V |IP

−
1
z′
 
V |D − V |TR

14As already mentioned, the social loss function (4.3) can be derived by a second order approximation of
the household’s utility function. Hence, the discount factors of the central bank and the households must
coincide. Further note that when assuming a zero-inflation steady state, the real interest rate is equal to its
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Figure 4.2: Stable and unstable simple rules
Figure 4.2 illustrates the net gain resulting from the deviation from the announced
simple rule for different combinations of Taylor rule coefficients. The white shaded
area indicates the zero plane. The intersection of this area and the net gain function
consequently delivers the specific kpi/kx-combinations which result in N = 0. This
implies that the kpi/kx-combinations within the white area on the right-hand side
of Figure 4.2 deliver N < 0 since the cost exceeds the benefit of inconsistent policy.
These rules are consequently time-consistent.16 The limit case N = 0 just holds for
the boundary of this area. It can moreover be observed from Figure 4.2 that a Taylor
rule with kx = 0 is never stable given our assumptions.
As in Barro and Gordon (1983a), there exists a continuum of reputational equilibria
where the central bank has no incentive to deviate from the announced monetary
policy. The monetary authority will consequently not switch over to inconsistent
nominal counterpart in the long-run.
15Note however that this result crucially depends on the calibration of the applied model. More precisely, the
standard Taylor rule becomes unstable when assuming a lower weight on the output gap in the social loss
function, λ.
16Remark: When disregarding the Taylor principle, i.e. by allowing kpi < 0, we moreover obtain a second
continuum of stable simple rules. This is a plausible result since the social loss under TR (4.18) is a function
in kpi of fourth order implying that for a given kx there can exist up to four different real-valued solutions
of kpi .
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policy. Announcing such a rule is necessarily credible. The next step is to find an
optimal stable interest rate rule.
Since the policy maker follows a Taylor rule – satisfying the Taylor principle and
kx > 0 – the monetary authority has to control for two parameters, kpi and kx. In
contrast to the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach where the central bank
can directly control for the inflation rate, the optimal stable policy must now be
determined in a three-dimensional space. Moreover, the optimal choice in Barro and
Gordon (1983a) is a point in the intersection of the functions B and C since it
minimizes the social loss. In our approach, the social loss resulting from the kpi/kx-
combinations implying N = 0 can however be improved when moving into the stable
area.
For illustrating this issue, we will fix one Taylor coefficient for the moment in order to
obtain a two-dimensional decision problem. Figure 4.3 illustrates the corresponding
partial social loss function under TR (dashed lines) and the net gain resulting from
inconsistent monetary policy (solid lines) when holding the Taylor rule coefficient on
the output gap constant.17 The figure indicates that under constant kx there always
exists a coefficient on inflation such that the resulting social loss is optimal. These
(restricted) optima are denoted with a black dot. Figure 4.3 moreover shows that
the kpi/kx-combinations which result in N = 0 can be enhanced as they do not yield
an optimal loss for given kx.
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Figure 4.3: The net gain N and the social loss under TR for different Taylor rule coefficients
For instance, the combination kx = 0.5 and kpi = 1.35 results in N = 0. However,
this combination of Taylor rule coefficients is not optimal as the social loss can be
enhanced when increasing the Taylor rule coefficient on inflation up to 1.8. The
latter combination is within the stable area. This turns out to be a general result
17When holding kpi constant, we obtain a totally equivalent outcome.
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since all (restricted) optima are within the stable area and not in the intersection
of B and C. By contrast, the optimal policy choice in Barro and Gordon (1983a) is
in the intersection of cost and benefit resulting from inconsistent monetary policy.
Furthermore, Figure 4.3 indicates that the larger the Taylor rule coefficient, kx, the
larger is the second one, kpi, in the optimum. This result also holds vice versa when
kpi is kept constant.
Figure 4.4: Optimal Taylor rule coefficients
Figure 4.4 depicts these optimal coefficients, kopt.pi and k
opt.
x , when respectively taking
kx and kpi as given. It can directly be observed that the corresponding lines of partial
optima do not have an intersection. Consequently, there does not exist a globally
optimal choice of Taylor rule parameters when both coefficients are variable. Since
the loss decreases in both coefficients (cf. Figure 4.3), the minimal loss is obtained
in the limit case kpi → ∞ and kx → ∞. In Figure 4.4, this fact is indicated with a
black arrow.
All in all, the unsatisfactory feature that there exists a multiplicity of stable mone-
tary policy rules remains. However, Taylor rule coefficients resulting in N = 0 can be
improved when moving into the stable area which contrasts with Barro and Gordon
(1983a). Moreover, there does not exist a globally optimal time-consistent Taylor
rule.
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4.3.5 Extensions
For checking the robustness of the previous results, we will now turn to a monetary
authority which is also concerned about stabilizing the interest rate as in Svensson
(2000). The extended social loss function then looks as follows
V ′ = (π − πT )2 + λ(x− xT )2 + γ(i− iT )2 (4.29)
with λ > γ > 0. Although (4.29) cannot be derived from the household’s utility
function in the canonical New Keynesian framework, Kobayashi (2008) and Teranishi
(2008) show within a framework where the financial sector has a non-trivial role,
the social loss function should include a positive weight on a financial variable. We
set γ to 0.05.
The proceeding for the derivation of the social loss for the different policy designs is
equivalent to that in the previous sections.18
The Impact of Stabilizing the Interest Rate
The numerical evaluation of the different policy regimes in the case of the cost-push
shock yields
V |′D = 6.5586 > V |
′
TR = 2.1044 > V |
′
IP = 1.6987 (4.30)
resulting in a critical rate of time preference equal to 9.9790. Consequently, the
standard Taylor rule is only unstable when assuming very myopic considerations of
the central bank. Under our standard calibration including z = 0.04, the standard
Taylor rule however remains stable when extending the social loss function.
Figure 4.5 shows the net gain resulting from the deviation of the announced Taylor
rule for different kpi/kx-combinations. The qualitative results remain unchanged in
comparison to the case with γ = 0. However, it is worth mentioning that the stable
area, i.e. the set of kpi/kx-combinations that do not cause any incentive for the mon-
etary authority to switch over to inconsistent policy, becomes larger when assuming
γ > 0. This implies that the reputation of the central bank naturally improves if
the policy maker is also concerned about stabilizing the interest rate. The rationale
is that the social loss under discretionary monetary policy relatively increases more
than those under inconsistent policy and under the Taylor rule. As a result, the cost
of inconsistent policy, C, increases more than the benefit, B.
In contrast to the case γ = 0, a Taylor rule with kx = 0 may be time-consistent if
the Taylor rule coefficient on inflation is rather small.
18See the Appendix for the different social losses in the different policy regimes with γ > 0 and the respective
derivations.
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Figure 4.5: Stable and unstable simple rules with γ > 0
Simultaneous Supply and Demand Shocks
As already mentioned and as shown in the Appendix, the demand shock can be
interpreted as a shock to aggregate technology which is typically assumed to be
expansionary (ψ > 0). In our notation this implies ε1 < 0 since a technology shock
causes the natural level, y∗, to increase more than the current one, y. This in turn
leads to a decline in the output gap, x ≡ y − y∗.
It is well-known that a pure demand shock can be totally compensated by discre-
tionary monetary policy in the case γ = 0. This can be directly observed from the
IS curve (4.1).19 Hence, we will analyze simultaneous supply and demand shocks in
the following. For the sake of simplicity, we will also normalize the impact of the
demand shock to one, i.e. ε1 = −1.
Then, the numerical evaluation of the different policy regimes yields
V |′D = 6.4250 > V |
′
TR = 2.7489 > V |
′
IP = 1.6992 (4.31)
implying a critical subjective discount factor equal to 2.5020. Hence, the standard
Taylor rule still remains stable when additionally considering an technological inno-
19In this specific case, the discretionary monetary policy would obviously be the first best solution.
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vation.
Figure 4.6: Stable and unstable simple rules – simultaneous supply and demand shocks (ε1 < 0
and ε2 > 0)
Figure 4.6 shows the net gain resulting from a deviation from the announced Tay-
lor rule for a continuum of kpi/kx-combinations. The continuum of stable Taylor
rules now becomes smaller when considering the contractionary demand shock (cf.
Figure 4.5).20 The rationale is that the social loss under the commitment strategy
increases relative to those under inconsistent and discretionary policy. Consequently,
the cost resulting from the loss in the central bank’s reputation declines leading to
an increasing incentive to switch over to inconsistent policy.
4.4 Conclusion
We implement the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach in a static approxi-
mation of the canonical New Keynesian model. Within this framework, we are able
to discuss both the commitment vs. discretion debate of the New Keynesian litera-
ture and the time-inconsistency problem of Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) in a unified
framework.
20As expected, the stable area becomes larger when assuming the demand shock to be expansionary, too, i.e.
ε1 = ε2 = 1.
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We first show that commitment strategies can be advantageous to discretionary
monetary policy. Second, we show that these policy rules cause the monetary au-
thority to deviate from their announcements since the re-optimization yields a wel-
fare gain. By assuming a long-run planning horizon of the central bank and that the
monetary authority looses its reputation when switching over to inconsistent pol-
icy, we find a continuum of stable interest rate rules of Taylor-type. In contrast to
the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach, implementing a monetary rule such
that the cost and benefit resulting from inconsistent policy coincide, is not optimal.
Instead, the solution can be enhanced by moving into the stable area where the net
gain of inconsistent monetary policy behavior is negative.
By introducing an additional term in the social loss function concerning interest
rate stabilization, the continuum of stable Taylor rules becomes larger. This implies
that the reputation of the monetary authority naturally improves when it is also
concerned about stabilizing the interest rate. Third, we find that under a standard
calibration including a time preference rate equal to the long-run interest rate, the
standard Taylor rule is time-consistent for the cost-push shock as well as for simul-
taneous supply and demand shocks. Fourth, there does not exist a stable Taylor rule
in explicit form which minimizes the social loss.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the Demand Shock
For production firms (intermediate good producers) need only one input factor,
labor, which is denoted by N . The production function is then simply given by
Y = ΨN (A.4.1)
where Y is output and Ψ represents a shock to aggregate productivity.21
Under flexible prices the marginal costs, MC, are constant. They are obtained by
cost minimization
MC =
W
Ψ
= const. ⇔ w = ψ (A.4.2)
The Euler consumption equation and the labor supply equation follow from the
utility maximization of the representative household.
y = a− br (A.4.3)
w = ηn+
1
b
y (A.4.4)
where η represents the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Subtracting the natural level from the Euler equation yields22
x ≡ y − y∗ = a− br − y∗ (A.4.5)
Log-linearizing the production function (A.4.1) expressed in natural levels and in-
serting the resulting equation in (A.4.5) considering (A.4.2) and (A.4.4), yields
x = a− br −
b+ bη
1 + bη
ψ (A.4.6)
Since b+bη1+bη > 0, a shock to aggregate technology can thus be interpreted as a con-
tractionary demand shock. The economic intuition is that the natural level increases
more to an expansionary shock to productivity than the distorted actual output level
such that the difference – the output gap – decreases.
Appendix B: Social Losses with γ > 0 and ε1 6= 0 and
ε2 6= 0
The modified loss function now contains an additional term concerning nominal
interest rate stabilization.
V ′ = (π − πT )2 + λ(x− xT )2 + γ(i− iT )2 (A.4.7)
21In the following, capital letters denote variables in non-log-linearized form, while small letters denote log-
linearized variables.
22In the following, an asterisk denotes a natural variables, i.e. the realization of a variable without any nominal
or real rigidity.
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Simple Rules
The proceeding for deriving the social loss is equivalent to that in the main text.
Since we analyze calibrated instead of optimal simple rules, private expectations are
thus not altered by the modified loss function and still follow (4.15)
πe|TR = π
T +
1 + bkx
b(kpi − 1)
xT (A.4.8)
When combining (4.15) and the Phillips curve (4.2), we obtain the solution path of
the output gap and the inflation rate.
x|′TR =
1
α
ε1 −
bkpi
α
ε2 (A.4.9)
π|′TR = π
T +
1 + bkx
b(kpi − 1)
xT +
δ
α
ε1 +
1 + bkx
α
ε2 (A.4.10)
The additional demand shock causes an upward-pressure on both inflation and the
output gap.
Finally, we need the solution for the nominal interest rate. Therefore, we insert
(A.4.9) and (A.4.10) in the Taylor rule (4.11).
i|′TR = i
T +
kpi + bkx
b(kpi − 1)
xT +
δkpi + kx
1 + b(kx + kpiδ)
ε1 +
kpi
1 + b(kx + kpiδ)
ε2 (A.4.11)
In order to obtain the social loss under the policy regime TR for arbitrary coefficients
kpi and kx, we insert the solutions of the output gap, inflation, and the interest rate
in the welfare function (4.4).
V |′TR =
[
1 + bkx
b(kpi − 1)
xT +
δ
α
ε1 +
1 + bkx
α
ε2
]2
+ λ
[
1
α
ε1 −
bkpi
α
ε2 − x
T
]2
+ γ
[
kpi + bkx
b(kpi − 1)
xT +
δkpi + kx
1 + b(kx + kpiδ)
ε1 +
kpi
1 + b(kx + kpiδ)
ε2
]2
(A.4.12)
Naturally, the latter expression simplifies to (4.18), if γ = 0 and ε1 = 0.
Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy
In contrast to the case where the demand shock is absent, the monetary authority
must now consider the IS curve in the optimization approach.
Inserting the Phillips curve and the Euler consumption equation in the social loss
function and optimizing the resulting expression with respect to the output gap
delivers the following first-order condition
λ(x− xT ) + δ(π − πT )−
γ
b
(i− iT
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By inserting this expression considering (4.1) in the Phillips curve (4.2) and taking
rational private expectations, we obtain
πe|′D = π
T +
λb2 + γ
b(δb− γ)
xT (A.4.14)
The solution of the output gap is then given by
π|′D = π
T +
λb2 + γ
b(bδ − γ)
xT +
γδ
b2(λ+ δ2) + γ
ε1 +
λb2 + γ
b2(λ+ δ2) + γ
ε2 (A.4.15)
Inserting (A.4.14) and (A.4.15) in the Phillips curve, yields the solution of the output
gap
x|′D =
γ
b2(λ+ δ2) + γ
ε1 −
δb2
b2(λ+ δ2) + γ
ε2 (A.4.16)
The solution of the nominal interest rate is finally obtained by inserting (A.4.15)
and (A.4.16) in (A.4.13)
i = iT +
δ + bλ
bδ − γ
xT +
b(λ+ δ2)
b2(λ+ δ2) + γ
ε1 +
δb
b2(λ+ δ2) + γ
ε2 (A.4.17)
Inconsistent Monetary Policy
The proceeding is totally analogous to the main text. Therefore, we will only present
the resulting solutions of the output gap, the inflation rate, and the nominal interest
rate. They are given by
π|′IP − π
T =
(λb2 + γ)(1 + b(kx + δkpi)) + δb
2(γkx − λb)
(b2(λ+ δ2) + γ)b(kpi − 1)
xT
+
γδ
b2(λ+ δ2) + γ
ε1 +
λb2 + γ
b2(λ+ δ2) + γ
ε2 (A.4.18)
x|′IP − x
T =
γ(1 + bkx)− δb(1 + b(kx + δkpi)− δb)
(kpi − 1)(b2(λ+ δ2) + γ)
xT
+
γ
b2(λ+ δ2) + γ
ε1 −
δb2
b2(λ+ δ2) + γ
ε2 (A.4.19)
i|IP − i
T =
λb(1 + bkx) + δ(1 + b(kx + δ(kpi + bkx)))
(kpi − 1)(b2(λ+ δ2) + γ)
xT
+
b(λ+ δ2)
b2(λ+ δ2) + γ
ε1 +
δb
b2(λ+ δ2) + γ
ε2 (A.4.20)
5 Fiscal Stimulus in a Business Cycle
Model with Firm Entry
5.1 Introduction
In order to fight the recessionary impacts of the recent financial crisis, governments
throughout the globe have passed large fiscal packages and thereby triggered a debate
about the effectiveness of government spending in stimulating economic activity.
In this context Romer and Bernstein (2009) evaluate the impacts of the US fiscal
package of January 2009 and find a multiplier significantly larger than one. However,
several authors challenge this finding. Cogan et al. (2010) and Cwik and Wieland
(2009) respectively employ empirically estimated models for the US and Euro econ-
omy [Smets and Wouters (2007, 2003)] also incorporating rule-of-thumb consumers
and report multipliers less than one. Uhlig (2010) emphasizes the role of distor-
tionary taxation for the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli. He shows that an increase in
government consumption which is financed not only by debt but partly by distor-
tionary labor taxes leads to a short-run boom in output but comes at the cost of an
output reduction later on. Faia, Lechthaler, and Merkl (2010b) and Campolmi, Faia,
and Winkler (2010) demonstrate that a pure demand stimulus leads to very small
(or even negative) multipliers in models with frictional labor markets. Moreover,
both studies emphasize that other forms of fiscal stimuli such as hiring subsidies or
income tax cuts are much more effective in boosting output and employment.
All these contributions analyze the impacts of fiscal stimuli on standard measures
of economic activity (GDP, employment, investment) but neglect their impact on
the extensive margin, i.e. the mass of incumbent and new products (or: firms) in the
market.1 However, a recent literature highlights the role of an endogenous mass of
firms as an important propagation and amplification mechanism for business cycle
fluctuations.2 Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008)
respectively demonstrate that technological innovations and shocks to monetary
policy are amplified by endogenizing the extensive margin. With respect to fiscal
interventions, a substantial pro-cyclical behavior of the mass of firms may help to
explain how fiscal stimuli generate large and persistent business cycle fluctuations.
1Remark: As standard in the macroeconomics literature, there is a one-to-one identification between a firm
and a product. We will thus use the latter expressions synonymously.
2Among others, Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996), Bergin and Corsetti (2008), and Totzek (2010) show
that GDP is highly correlated with the number of producing firms.
5.1 Introduction 113
In particular, this amplification effect potentially gives rise to larger multipliers.3
The aim of this chapter4 is thus twofold. First, we explore the impacts of different
fiscal stimuli on firm entry applying a Real Business Cycle model with firm entry
which we estimate for the US using Bayesian techniques. Second, we calculate fiscal
multipliers for both our baseline model with an endogenous mass of firms and for the
standard case of a constant extensive margin. This enables us to investigate whether
a changing mass of firms alters the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli. Our framework
moreover allows for a closer examination of investment decisions – and crowding-
out/in effects of fiscal interventions – since we can distinguish between investments
in physical capital and those in new products. A further advantage of this kind of
models is that profit taxation is not lump-sum. This allows a broader base for fiscal
policy analysis.
Note that the aim of this chapter is however not to calculate fiscal multipliers of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) since we do not apply a large
scale DSGE model with several nominal and real frictions as for instance in Cogan et
al. (2010) or Cwik and Wieland (2009). Instead, we apply a rather simple framework
and focus on the qualitative and quantitative differences to the standard RBC model.
More precisely, we apply a variant of the model outlined in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and
Melitz (2007a) with endogenous firm entry and capital in production. We consider
six forms of fiscal stimuli: (i) a standard increase in government spending5 (a pure
demand stimulus), (ii) a consumption tax cut, (iii) a cut in labor income taxes,
(iv) a cut in capital income taxes, (v) a cut in dividend income taxes, and (vi) a
unified cut in dividend and capital taxes. Thereby, we first assume that all fiscal
stimuli are financed by lump-sum taxes. Thereafter, we reassess the results for the
pure demand stimulus considering that the increase in government consumption is
financed by different schemes of distortionary tax financing.
Our main findings are as follows. We demonstrate that the extensive margin can
indeed act as an accelerator for the impacts of fiscal stimuli. However, we find that
the quantitative reaction of the extensive margin – in particular, the sign of the
reaction – crucially depends on the form of a fiscal stimulus. Moreover, we find that
3Other well-known mechanisms to generate larger fiscal multipliers are for instance the introduction of sticky
prices [cf. Linnemann and Schabert (2003)], rule-of-thumb consumers [cf. Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle`s
(2007)] or backward indexation of prices [cf. Chari et al. (2009)]. We however want to analyze the pure
effects of firm entry on fiscal multipliers.
4For a different version of this chapter see ”Fiscal Stimulus in a Model with Endogenous Firm Entry”, (with
R. C. Winkler) November 2010, Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper No. 26829.
5As standard in the literature, we assume that the government only purchases consumption goods [see amongst
others Smets and Wouters (2007, 2003), Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle`s (2007) or Linnemann and Schabert
(2003)]. Therefore, we will use the expressions ”government spending” and ”government consumption” syn-
onymously. Alternatively, Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2010) consider government investment or Cavallo
(2005), Gomes (2009) or Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2010) assume that governments employ workers to
produce goods used for government consumption or government investment. However, these approaches do
not generate larger multiplier. Instead, they often generate negative short-run multipliers before they turn
positive in the longer-run.
5.1 Introduction 114
if in response to a fiscal expansion the mass of firms increases, fiscal multipliers are
amplified. In this case, two expansionary effects arise. First, an increasing extensive
margin has a positive impact on goods production via the ’love of variety effect’
[see Benassy (1996) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008)].6 Second, households have to
invest in start-ups to create new firms. Additional investments in turn boost GDP.
When compared to the standard RBC model – with a constant extensive margin –
the multipliers are significantly larger. If, by contrast, the mass of firms decreases,
the extensive margin dampens the impacts of fiscal stimuli on economic activity.
The drop in new firm investment then represents an additional crowding-out effect.
In comparison with the standard RBC model, the resulting multipliers are then
significantly smaller.
With respect to the different fiscal packages, our analysis shows that the reaction of
the extensive margin in response to an increase in government consumption turns out
to be ambiguous. In line with this finding, Lewis (2009b) points out that the mass of
firms only reacts expansionary if the fiscal demand shock is sufficiently persistent.7
The economic rationale is that only under highly persistent shocks potential firms
expect future profit opportunities which cover the entry cost and consequently enter
the market.
We extend this analysis by demonstrating that the ambiguous impact of government
consumption shocks on the mass of firms is not only driven by the shock persistence
but by the combination of the latter with the labor supply elasticity. Furthermore,
we show that the source of government financing is a crucial dimension, too. The eco-
nomic intuition why the reaction of the mass of product varieties may turn negative
when the labor supply elasticity is low is as follows. Suppose labor is the only input
in production and is supplied totally inelastic. In an RBC model with a fixed mass
of producers, an increase in government consumption consequently then causes a
complete crowding-out of private consumption. In the entry model, however, house-
holds can reallocate their labor force between working in the manufacturing sector
and creating new products.8 Households are then able to dampen the drop in private
consumption by increasing hours worked in the manufacturing sector and decrease
hours worked for product creation. The mass of firms consequently declines when
labor supply is sufficiently inelastic.
The impulse response analysis based on the estimated mean of the parameters shows
a decrease in the mass of firms in response to an increase in government consumption.
The additional crowding-out effect pushes the multiplier below that of the RBC
6This effect directly follows from the aggregation of intermediate goods and implies that an increase in the
mass of firms has ceteris paribus a positive impact on aggregate production.
7Lewis (2009b) extends the sticky price framework of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007b) to allow for gov-
ernment spending shocks. The optimal fiscal policy in a framework with firm entry and flexible prices is
derived in Chugh and Ghironi (2009).
8Remark: As in amongst others Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007b), we assume that labor is needed to create
new products.
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model with a constant mass of firms. This is particularly true when considering
the case of an increase in government consumption financed by distortionary income
taxation. In line with the findings of Uhlig (2010) the long-run fiscal multipliers then
become significantly negative. Similar results are found for the case of a demand
stimulus through a cut in consumption taxes.
Due to the fact that fiscal demand stimuli may cause a crowding-out not only of
investment in physical capital and consumption but also of investment in new firms,
we show that these interventions lead to small fiscal multipliers in the applied frame-
work.9 By contrast, the multipliers of labor and dividend tax cuts are significantly
larger.10 The reason is that in these cases we find a crowding-in of private consump-
tion, of investment in existing capital, and of investment in product creation. The
latter effect in turn leads to an increasing mass of firms. Although the multiplier
of a cut in capital taxes is also close to one, this policy comes at the cost of a
crowding-out in new firm investment and thus of a decrease in the mass of firms.
Finally, this study is – to the best of our knowledge – the first that conducts a
Bayesian estimation of a DSGE model with firm entry incorporating several struc-
tural shocks. In a complementary study, Lewis and Poilly (2010) estimate a DSGE
model with firm entry by using a VAR minimum distance approach. They apply a
framework with several nominal and real frictions but focus on a single shock to
monetary policy.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section
3, the results of the Bayesian estimation are presented. In Section 4, we discuss the
estimated responses to an increase in government consumption. The fiscal multipliers
of six fiscal packages, all financed with lump-sum taxes, are discussed in Section
5. In Section 6, we analyze a pure demand stimulus that is financed by raising
distortionary taxes. Section 7 concludes.
9Note that we apply an RBC framework. A corresponding ”traditional” approach would be the famous
AD/AS-model with flexible prices and wages of a closed economy [neoclassical variant, see amongst others
Wohltmann (2007, Ch. 6)]. In this framework, an increase in government spending has no effects on output,
at all, since it does not affect the supply side of production. By contrast, an increase in government spending
financed by lump-sum taxation leads to an increase in labor supply in an RBC framework caused by the
negative wealth effect [cf. Baxter and King (1993)]. The wealth effect works as follows. Since the increase in
government spending is financed by lump-sum taxation, it represents a negative effect on the total income of
households. The households consequently decrease their consumption expenditures and increase their labor
supply to compensate for the additional tax expenditures. This increase in labor supply in turn leads to an
expansionary reaction of production. In contrast to traditional approaches, this wealth effect is thus not a
direct but an indirect effect.
10This is not a very surprising result since these taxes are distortionary and have a direct impact on the
supply side of the economy. Moreover, the cuts in these tax rates are financed by lump-sum taxation which
additional leads to an expansionary reaction of production via the negative wealth effect. The result that
tax cuts which affect the supply of production leads to larger multipliers than an increase in government
spending is already known from the neoclassical variant of the AD/AS-model, too. This is for instance the
case when analyzing a cut in ancillary labor costs. This tax cut has positive effects on GDP while – as already
mentioned – an increase in government spending has only allocational effects in such an environment [cf.
Wohltmann (2007, Ch.6).]
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5.2 The Model
We apply the entry model of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) with capital in pro-
duction.11 The economy consists of final goods producers (or: bundlers), intermediate
goods producers (or: manufacturing firms), new product creators, the government,
and households. Each manufacturing firm employs labor and capital to produce a
single differentiated intermediate good in a monopolistic competitive market under
flexible prices.12 New product creators use labor to invent new varieties of intermedi-
ate goods. Notice that new product creation is equivalent to the production of a new
manufacturing firm due to the common assumption of a one-to-one identification be-
tween a manufacturing firm and an intermediate good. Final goods producers bundle
the intermediate goods to a homogeneous final good used for private and fiscal con-
sumption as well as for investment in physical capital. Households consume, invest
in physical capital, hold government bonds, and hold shares of the stock of inter-
mediate goods producers. Moreover, households supply labor to the manufacturing
and the product creation sector. Government consumption is financed by issuing
bonds, by collecting lump-sum taxes, by levying taxes on consumption purchases,
and by levying income taxes on labor, capital, and dividends. The model structure
is depicted in Figure 5.1.
5.2.1 Final Goods Producers
Final goods producers buy the differentiated intermediate goods or varieties, yt(ω),
bundle them to a homogeneous final good, Y Ct , and sell it to households and to the
government under perfectly competitive conditions. A final goods producer max-
imizes his profits, Y Ct Pt −
∫ Nt
0 pt(ω)yt(ω)dω, subjected to the following CES pro-
duction function Y Ct ≡
(∫ Nt
0 yt(ω)
(ζt−1)/ζtdω
)ζt/(ζt−1)
, where Pt is the price of the
final good, pt(ω), is the price of variety ω, and ζt is the time-varying elasticity
between the intermediate goods. The latter follows an exogenous AR(1) process:
log ζt = (1 − ρζ) log ζ + ρζ log ζt−1 + ε
ζ
t , where ε
ζ
t is white noise and 0 ≤ ρζ < 1.
13
Nt denotes the non-stationary mass of firms operating in the economy at t. The
first-order condition for profit maximization yields the demand function for variety
ω which is given by yt(ω) = ρt(ω)
−ζt Y Ct , where ρt(ω) ≡ pt(ω)/Pt is the relative
11Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) present three specifications of a model for a closed and cashless economy
with endogenous firm entry: (i) the baseline model without capital, (ii) a model with capital in production,
and (iii) a model with capital in production and in product creation. Of course, the model specifications
with capital perform better by fitting the empirically observed second moments. However, the model with
capital in both production and in product creation requires a highly implausible calibration including a 50%
depreciation rate to ensure stability and non-oscillating impulse responses. We therefore restrict our analysis
to the second model specification, i.e. a model with endogenous firm entry and capital in production.
12Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007b) extend the framework of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) by in-
troducing sticky prices. Since we do not want to discuss the interdependency between fiscal and monetary
interventions, we apply the pure RBC version. See amongst others Linnemann and Schabert (2003) for an
investigation of this topic in the standard New Keynesian model.
13In the following, a variable without a time index denotes the respective steady state value.
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Figure 5.1: Model structure
price of variety ω and Pt =
(∫ Nt
0 pt(ω)
1−ζtdω
)1/(1−ζt)
is the resulting price index.
Since there is no heterogeneity in this framework, we refer to symmetry across firms,
implying yt(ω) = yt, pt(ω) = pt, ρt(ω) = ρt. The aggregate amount of intermediate
goods (or: aggregate demand) is obtained by solving the CES technology:
Y Ct = N
ζt
ζt−1
t yt. (5.1)
The price index can be written as Pt = N
1/(1−ζt)
t pt implying ρt = N
1/(ζt−1)
t .
5.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Each intermediate goods producer is a monopolistic supplier of product ω. A firm
uses the amount lt of labor, the amount kt−1 of physical capital and the constant
returns to scale technology
yt = ztl
α
t k
1−α
t−1 (5.2)
to produce the intermediate good, yt. zt is total factor productivity (or: an aggregate
technology shock14) which follows the process: log zt = (1− ρz) log z + ρz log zt−1 +
εzt , where ε
z
t is white noise. α ∈ (0, 1) denotes the share of labor in production.
The firm takes the factor prices wt and r
K
t as given. The marginal costs, mct =
α−α(1 − α)−(1−α)wαt (r
K
t )
1−α/zt, are identical for all firms implying a symmetric
equilibrium.15
14In contrast to Chapter 3, Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) assume firms to be homogeneous such that
we do not have to distinguish between individual and aggregate productivity.
15See Appendix for a proof.
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The firm chooses the real price, ρt, in order to maximize profits, dt = (ρt −mct)yt,
subjected to the demand function yt = ρ
−ζt
t Y
C
t . The optimization yields
ρt =
ζt
ζt − 1
mct . (5.3)
In the absence of shocks to the intratemporal elasticity between intermediate goods,
the real price is set as a constant mark-up over real marginal costs.
Factor demands are obtained by cost minimization and read as16
wt = αmct
yt
lt
= α
ζt − 1
ζt
Y Ct
LCt
, (5.4)
rKt = (1− α)mct
yt
kt−1
= (1− α)
ζt − 1
ζt
Y Ct
Kt−1
, (5.5)
where LCt = Ntlt are hours worked in the manufacturing sector and Kt−1 = Ntkt−1
is aggregate demand for capital.
Using (5.3) and ρt = N
1/(ζt−1)
t , the profits of a firm can be expressed as
dt =
(
1−
ζt − 1
ζt
)
Y Ct
Nt
=
1
ζt
Y Ct
Nt
. (5.6)
5.2.3 New Product Creators
Firms in this perfectly competitive sector create new products amounting to, NE,t,
by using labor, LEt , and the technology NE,t = L
E
t /fE,t in order to maximize their
profits vtNE,t − (wt/zt)L
E
t . vt denotes the real value of an operating firm in the
intermediate goods sector which is equal to the discounted sum of all current and
future profits. 1/fE,t denotes a productivity shifter such that fE,t can also be in-
terpreted as a time-varying entry cost that follows the exogenous AR(1) process:
log fE,t = (1 − ρfE) log fE + ρfE log fE,t−1 + ε
fE
t , where ε
fE
t is white noise and
0 ≤ ρfE < 1. The first-order condition for profit-maximization yields the free entry
condition vt = (wt/zt)fE,t.
To capture the empirical finding that firm entries do not take place contempora-
neously with GDP [see amongst others Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996)], we
assume a time-to-build lag in new product creation. As in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and
Melitz (2007a), we assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the firm’s death rate is
exogenous.17 The recursive law of motion of the extensive margin is then given by
Nt = (1− δ)(Nt−1 +NE,t−1) , (5.7)
where NE,t is the mass of new firms and δ denotes the exogenous probability of
exiting the market. Equation (5.7) states that a fraction, δ, of incumbent and new
firms is hit by an exogenous death shock at the very end of any period.
16See Appendix for a proof.
17See Totzek (2010) or Chapter 3 for a New Keynesian framework where endogenous entries and exits are
considered simultaneously.
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5.2.4 Households
The economy is made up by a continuum of homogeneous households distributed
over the unit interval. The representative household determines the amount of the
final good for consumption, Ct, and for investment, It, its one-period real bond
holdings, Bt, its share holdings, xt+1, and its supply of hours worked, Lt, in order
to maximize its expected lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
logCt −
χt
1 + η
L1+ηt
)
, (5.8)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, η > 0 is the inverse of the labor supply
elasticity, and χt > 0 is a shock to the labor supply that follows an AR(1) process:
logχt = (1 − ρχ) logχ + ρχ logχt−1 + ε
χ
t , where ε
χ
t is white noise and 0 ≤ ρχ < 1.
The maximization of (5.8) is subjected to the household’s period-by-period budget
constraint
Bt − (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 + vt(Nt +NE,t)xt+1 + (1 + τ
C
t )Ct + It + τt =
(vt + (1− τ
d
t )dt)xtNt + (1− τ
L
t )wtLt + (1− τ
K
t )(r
K
t − δ
K)Kt−1 + δ
KKt−1 ,
(5.9)
the capital accumulation equation
Kt = (1− δ
K)Kt−1 + It , (5.10)
and the dynamics of firm entry and exit described by equation (5.7). rt and δ
K
denote the real interest rate and the capital depreciation rate, respectively. The
government collects lump-sum taxes, τt, and levies taxes on consumption, on labor
income, wtLt, on capital income net of depreciation, (r
K
t −δ
K)Kt−1, and on dividend
income, dtxtNt where xtNt denotes the share of firms in which a household has
invested and dt are per period profits. The respective tax rates are τ
C
t , τ
L
t , τ
K
t , and
τdt .
18 The household uses its net income for consumption, investment in physical
capital, investment in government bonds, and investment in shares of incumbent
firms and entrants in the intermediate goods sector, vt(Nt +NE,t)xt+1. The return
of firm investment is then given by (vt+ (1− τ
d
t )dt)xtNt where vt denotes the value
of a firm. After the derivation of the first-order conditions, we come to this point
into more detail.
18Note that we do not model explicitly a tax rate levied on the income from savings in government bonds but
rt−1Bt−1 can be interpreted as real interest payments net of taxes.
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The first-order conditions for utility maximization are given by19
λt = βEt {λt+1(1 + rt)} , (5.11)
λt = βEt
{
λt+1
(
1 + (1− τKt )(r
K
t+1 − δ
K)
)}
, (5.12)
vt = (1− δ)βEt
{
λt+1
λt
(
vt+1 + (1− τ
d
t+1)dt+1
)}
. (5.13)
λt = C
−1
t
(
1 + τCt
)−1
(5.14)
where λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint.
When solving (5.13) forward,20 we can express the value of a firm as the present
value of dt, i.e. the discounted sum of all future profits
vt = Et
{
∞∑
s=t+1
∆t,s(1− δ)
s−t(1− τds )ds
}
(5.15)
where ∆t,t+1 ≡ βEtλt+1/λt.
Households supply their labor force to manufacturing firms (or: intermediate goods
producers) and product creators. Total hours worked are determined by the following
intratemporal optimality condition:
(1− τLt )wt = χtL
η
tCt(1 + τ
C
t ) . (5.16)
The optimal labor supply equation implies that both a decrease in labor and in
consumption taxes leads ceteris paribus to an increase in total hours worked and
consumption.
19Remark: In the following, we will investigate amongst others an increase in government spending financed
by lump-sum or distortionary taxation. However, we assume that bonds always exist. This is analogous to
assumptions in the baseline New Keynesian and RBC model where government spending is not existent but
bonds exist. Consequently, households have always the possibility to invest in bonds and thus shift current
consumption into the future.
20The forward solution of (5.13) is given by
vt = (1− δ)Et
n
∆t,t+1(vt+1 + (1− τ
d
t+1)dt+1)
o
= (1− δ)Et
n
∆t,t+1([(1− δ)∆t+1,t+2(vt+2 + (1− τ
d
t+2)dt+2)] + (1− τ
d
t+1)dt+1)
o
= (1− δ)Et
n
∆t,t+1(1− τ
d
t+1)dt+1
o
+ (1− δ)2Et
n
∆t,t+2(vt+2 + (1− τ
d
t+2)dt+2)
o
= (1− δ)Et
n
∆t,t+1(1− τ
d
t+1)dt+1
o
+ (1− δ)2Et
n
∆t,t+2(1− τ
d
t+2)dt+2
o
+ (1− δ)3Et
n
∆t,t+3(1− τ
d
t+3)dt+3
o
+ . . .
= Et
8
<
:
∞
X
s=t+1
∆t,s(1− δ)
s−t(1− τds )ds
9
=
;
where ∆t,t+1 ≡ βEtλt+1/λt, ∆t,t+2 = ∆t,t+1 · ∆t+1,t+2 = β
λt+1
λt
· β
λt+2
λt+1
= β2
λt+2
λt
and ∆t,t+3 =
∆t,t+2 ·∆t+2,t+3.
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5.2.5 Aggregation
Aggregating the budget constraint across households, using the equilibrium condi-
tion xt+1 = xt = 1,
21 as well as the government budget constraint
Gt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 = Bt + τ
L
t wtLt + τ
C
t Ct + τ
d
t dtNt + τ
K
t (r
K
t − δ)Kt−1 + τt
(5.17)
yields the overall resource constraint
Y Ct + vtNE,t = wtLt +Ntdt + r
K
t Kt−1 , (5.18)
where Y Ct = Ct + It + Gt denotes aggregate demand of final goods and vtNE,t is
investment in new firms. Gt is government consumption which is described by the
AR(1) process: Gt = (1 − ρg)G + ρgGt−1 + ε
G
t , where ε
G
t is white noise and 0 ≤
ρg < 1. Following Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a), we define total investment
as TIt ≡ It + IE,t where IE,t ≡ NE,tvt denotes investment in new firms. The gross
domestic product (GDP), Yt, is equal to Yt ≡ Y
C
t +NE,tvt.
22
The complete RBC model with endogenous firm entry and capital in production is
shown in Table 5.1.
5.2.6 The Benchmark Model
In order to generate a benchmark for our analysis, we apply a standard RBC model
with a constant extensive margin. It can be obtained by setting NE,t = 0 and
normalizing the mass of firms to Nt = N = 1. This implies L
E
t = 0, Lt = L
C
t ,
ρt = 1,
23 Yt = Y
C
t , and TIt = It.
5.3 Parameter Estimates
In this section, we estimate the structural entry model using Bayesian techniques.24
The estimation is based on US data for the quarterly growth rates of real GDP,
real consumption, hours worked, the real wage, and net business formation over the
sample period 1964Q2 to 1995Q3.25 All series are demeaned prior to estimation.26
21In equilibrium all shares of firms are owned by the households.
22As in Chapter 2, we have to distinguish between total output and GDP since by assumption entry costs are
not paid in terms of the consumption good but in terms of labor.
23In contrast to the entry model, the price level set by a firm now coincides with the aggregate price level
since without an endogenous mass of firms the aggregate price index simplifies to
Pt =

Z 1
0
pt(ω)
1−ζdω
1/(1−ζ)
Due to the assumption of homogeneity across firms it follows that Pt = pt implying that ρt = pt/Pt = 1.
24We estimate and simulate the model in non-linear form using Dynare V.4. The corresponding steady state
system is numerically computed by an own Matlab file. They are shown in the Appendix.
25A full description of the data is given in the Appendix. The sample period is limited through the lack of
data on net business formation.
26Since the applied model abstracts from trend inflation or GDP growth in the steady state, we have to
subtract the mean of the respective growth rates from our data series.
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Description Equation
Consumption Euler C−σt /(1 + τ
C
t ) = βEt
n
C−σt+1/(1 + τ
C
t+1)(1 + rt)
o
Capital Euler C−σt /(1 + τ
C
t ) = βEt
n
C−σt+1/(1 + τ
C
t+1)
 
1 + (1− τKt )(r
K
t+1 − δ
K)

o
Shares Euler vt = (1− δ)βEt
n
C−σt+1(1 + τ
C
t )/
 
C−σt (1 + τ
C
t+1)
 
vt+1 + (1− τdt+1)dt+1

o
Labor supply (1− τLt )wt = χL
η
tC
σ
t (1 + τ
C
t )
GDP Yt = Y Ct + vtNE,t
Aggregate demand Y Ct = Ct + It +Gt
Investment in new firms IE,t = vtNE,t
Total profit income Ntdt = (1− (ζt − 1)/ζt)Y Ct
Pricing ρt = ζt/(ζt − 1)mct
Real wage wt = α(ζt − 1)Y Ct /(ζL
C
t )
Rental rate rKt = (1− α)(ζ − 1)Y
C
t /(ζtKt−1)
Labor in manufacturing Y Ct = ρtzt(L
C
t )
αK1−αt−1
Labor in entry LEt = fE,t/ztNE,t
Capital accumulation Kt = (1− δK)Kt−1 + It
Number of firms Nt = (1− δ)(Nt−1 +NE,t−1)
Free entry vt = (fE,t/zt)wt
Real price ρt = N
1/(ζt−1)
t
Table 5.1: The complete RBC model with firm entry and capital in production
In order to generate data-consistent time series from the model, we divide the real
model variables Ct, Yt, and wt by the relative price ρt.
27 The measurement equations
then read as follows:
data GDPt =
(
Yt/ρt
Yt−1/ρt−1
− 1
)
100 , data WAGEt =
(
wt/ρt
wt−1/ρt−1
− 1
)
100 ,
data CONSt =
(
Ct/ρt
Ct−1/ρt−1
− 1
)
100 , data HOURSt =
(
Lt
Lt−1
− 1
)
100 ,
data NBFt =
(
Nt
Nt−1
− 1
)
100 .
The application of five data series requires at least five exogenous disturbances.
Therefore, we estimate the baseline model including shocks to government consump-
tion, εgt , to total factor productivity, ε
z
t , to entry costs, ε
fE
t , to labor supply, ε
χ
t , and
to the price mark-up, εζt .
27Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) point out that for data-consistency real model variables should be
deflated by pt instead of Pt.
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The following parameters are kept fixed in the estimation procedure. The discount
rate, β, is fixed equal to 0.99 implying an annual steady state real interest rate of
approximately 4 percent. The quarterly capital depreciation rate, δK , is set to the
standard value 0.025. The share of labor in the production function, α, is set to
0.8 which is the value estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007). Following Bilbiie,
Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a, 2007b) and Lewis (2009b), the value of the elasticity
of substitution between intermediate goods, ζ, is set to 3.8.28 For reflecting the US
economy, the steady state tax rates and steady state government consumption are
set to τC = 0.05, τL = 0.28, τK = 0.36, and G/Y = 0.18 which are values calculated
by Trabandt and Uhlig (2009). The steady state tax rate on dividend income, τd, is
equalized to the steady state tax rate on capital income. Throughout the estimation
process, χ is computed endogenously such that in the steady state 1/3 of time is
devoted to work. The steady state value of total factor productivity, z, is normalized
to 1.
For the remaining parameters we choose priors for the Bayesian estimation following
previous literature, in particular Smets and Wouters (2007). Table 5.2 shows the
prior distribution, alongside with the estimated parameters as modes of the posterior
distribution and the 95 percent confidence intervals obtained by the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm [see Metropolis et al. (1953) and Hastings (1970) or Chib and
Greenberg (1995)]. The standard deviations of shocks are assumed to be inverse-
gamma distributed with a mean of 0.01. The prior means for the autoregressive
parameters are beta distributed with prior means of 0.5 and standard deviations of
0.2. We assume a normal distribution for the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, η. The prior mean of 1 and the standard deviation is chosen to cover a wide
range of parameter values typical used in calibration exercises. The entry cost, fE ,
is assumed to be normal distributed with a prior mean of 1 and a standard deviation
of 0.5.29 Finally, the firm exit rate, δ, is beta distributed with a mean of 0.025 which
is the calibrated value used by Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) to match the
average annualized job destruction rate in the US.
The results of the Bayesian estimation are shown in Table 5.2. It depicts that the
processes for government spending, total factor productivity, entry costs, and for
the labor supply shock are highly persistent with an AR(1) coefficient of 0.92, 0.99,
0.98, and 0.98, respectively.30 The persistence of the price mark-up shock is quite
28Although this value seems to be rather small, Lewis and Poilly (2010) estimate the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods to be even smaller (3.31) in a model with firm entry.
29Remark: Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) log-linearize their model and conclude that the steady state of
the entry costs cancels out and thus does not affect the resulting dynamics, at all. By contrast, we apply the
non-linear representation. Hence, the steady state of the entry costs now plays a crucial role by determining
the steady state value of vt and thus influences the dynamics of the whole entry mechanism.
30The mode and the mean are both consistent estimators. In our estimation they are moreover very close to
each other. We take the modes to calibrate our model since the inverse of the Frisch elasticity is slightly
lower and the persistence of the fiscal demand shock is slightly higher. The impact of these parameters will
be investigated in Section 5.4.
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Parameters Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Type Mean Std. Dev. Mode Mean Confid. Interval
Inv. of Frisch elasticity η Normal 1 0.75 2.9899 3.1761 [2.3784− 4.0188]
Firm exit rate δ Beta 0.025 0.01 0.0966 0.0944 [0.0810− 0.1073]
Entry cost fE Normal 1 0.5 0.3398 0.3535 [0.2866− 0.4165]
Persistence of g shock ρg Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9287 0.8879 [0.8125− 0.9714]
Persistence of z shock ρz Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9990 0.9984 [0.9970− 0.9998]
Persistence of fE shock ρfE Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9758 0.9604 [0.9319− 0.9908]
Persistence of ζ shock ρζ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.1943 0.1948 [0.1190− 0.2733]
Persistence of χ shock ρχ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9838 0.9819 [0.9694− 0.9948]
Std. dev. g shock εgt Inv. Gam. 0.01 2 0.0536 0.0709 [0.0384− 0.0997]
Std. dev. z shock εzt Inv. Gam. 0.01 2 0.0148 0.0154 [0.0132− 0.0176]
Std. dev. fE shock ε
fE
t Inv. Gam. 0.01 2 0.0177 0.0164 [0.0128− 0.0197]
Std. dev. ζ shock εζt Inv. Gam. 0.01 2 0.0852 0.0876 [0.0757− 0.0992]
Std. dev. χ shock εχt Inv. Gam. 0.01 2 0.0258 0.0274 [0.0211− 0.0334]
Table 5.2: Results from the Bayesian estimation including prior distribution and confidence inter-
vals
low. These results are consistent with studies such as Smets and Wouters (2007).
The point estimate of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, η, is ap-
proximately 3 with a 95 percent confidence interval from 2.4 to 4. The confidence
interval for the entry cost ranges from 0.29 to 0.42 with a point estimate of around
1/3. Finally, our estimation delivers a firm exit rate of about 10 percent. This high
value is more in line with the findings of Broda and Weinstein (2010) who report a
product turnover rate of about of 6.25 percent than with the calibrated 2.5 percent
used by Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a). Notice that – as pointed out in Lewis
and Poilly (2010) and Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) – a higher value of δ
implies less persistent dynamics. Remarkably, the data seems to speak in favor of
a high value (less persistent dynamics) although we are estimating a rather simple
model without features that generates additional persistence such as habit persis-
tence or capital adjustment costs. This finding suggests that the entry mechanism
per se leads to sufficiently persistent dynamics.
5.4 Estimated Responses to a Government
Consumption Shock
In this section, we analyze the effects of an increase in government consumption, Gt,
financed by raising lump-sum taxes.31 We use the estimated model to analyze the
impulse responses and to discuss the ambiguous reaction of investment in new firms
and consequently of the mass of firms.
Figure 5.2 displays the estimated impulse responses to an increase in government
31Due to Ricardian equivalence it does not matter whether an increase in government spending is financed by
lump-sum taxes or by issuing bonds since both interventions lead to the same wealth effect [cf. Buchanan
(1976)].
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Figure 5.2: Impulse responses to a temporary increase in government consumption
consumption.32 The solid lines are the means of the distribution of impulse response
functions, the grey shaded areas depict the 90 percent highest probability density
intervals. Figure 5.2 shows that in response to an increase in government consump-
tion, private consumption, and investment in physical capital decline significantly.
The reason is the negative wealth effect of a rising tax burden [see Baxter and King
(1993)]. The wealth effect also causes households to expand their total labor supply
which in turn induces a decline in real wages and a significant expansion of output.
The insignificant reactions of hours worked in the new product sector, of investment
in new firms, and of the total mass of firms suggest that the reaction of the extensive
margin in response to a government spending shock is ambiguous.33 This was al-
ready mentioned by Lewis (2009b) within a calibrated firm entry model with sticky
prices and labor as the only input factor. Lewis (2009b) points out that the mass
of producers only increases for sufficiently high degrees of fiscal shock persistence,
ρg. The rationale is that only under highly persistent shocks, the expected future
profits will cover the entry costs such that new firm creation is boosted. This result
32The number of years are on the abscissa. However, we interpret periods as quarters. On the ordinate we
plot the percentage deviation of a variable from the corresponding steady state value, i.e. xt = (Xt−X)/X,
where X is the steady state value. Further note that all variables under consideration return to their initial
steady state.
33Remark: In the longer-run the contractionary reactions of investment in new firms and of the mass of firms
become significant.
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also holds in our estimated RBC model considering capital in production.
Notably, we find that the response of the mass of firms does not only depend on the
shock persistence in insolation but on the combination of the latter with the labor
supply elasticity, 1/η. In the following exercise, we focus on investment in new firms
which will be important for the analysis of the effectiveness of fiscal policy because
it affects GDP via two channels. The following equation for GDP, Yt, reveals these
two channels:
Yt ≡ vtNE,t +N
ζ
ζ−1
t yt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y Ct
(5.19)
First, investment in new firms, vtNE,t, is naturally a component of GDP. Second,
investment in new firms changes the mass of firms, Nt, which in turn has an impact
on the overall production of final goods. Analytically, the latter effect follows from
the aggregation of intermediate goods since an increase in the mass of products has
ceteris paribus a positive effect on aggregate production since ζ > 1. This effect is
known as ’love of variety’ [see Benassy (1996) or Bergin and Corsetti (2008)]. This ef-
fect directly follows from the aggregation of intermediate goods (Y Ct = N
ζt/(ζt−1)
t yt)
and implies that an increase in the mass of firms has ceteris paribus a positive impact
on aggregate production. Note that a decrease in investment in new firms represents
an additional crowding-out effect of fiscal policy that is absent in a model with a
constant extensive margin.
In order to analyze how firm entry depends on ρg and η, we simulate the model
under a range of parameter values for ρg = [0, 1) and η = [1, 4] keeping the remaining
parameters fixed to the estimated modes shown in Table 5.2.
Figure 5.3 shows investment in new firms (grey area) and the zero plane (white
shaded area) from two different lines of sight. Figure 5.3 indicates that the develop-
ment of this type of investment and thus of the extensive margin is unambiguously
expansionary for a high degree of shock persistence. Moreover, the model also gen-
erates an expansionary reaction of this type of investment for lower degrees of shock
persistence if the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, 1/η, is sufficiently large, i.e. η is
sufficiently small. By contrast, the reaction turns negative if the shock persistence
is low and the labor supply is sufficiently inelastic.
The economic intuition why the reaction of the mass of firms may turn negative
when the labor supply elasticity is low is straightforward. Therefore, let us conduct
the following thought experiment and consider the limiting case of a totally inelastic
labor supply. Let us moreover abstract from capital such that labor is the only
input factor in production. Accounting for these assumptions within an RBC model
with a fixed mass of producers, employment and thus output will remain unchanged
after an increase in government spending. Government consumption consequently
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Figure 5.3: On the ambiguous reaction of investment in new firms [white area: zero plane, grey
area: investment in new firms]
causes a complete crowding-out of private consumption. In the entry model, however,
households can reallocate their labor force between working in the manufacturing
sector and creating new products. Households are then able to dampen the drop in
private consumption without reducing leisure just by increasing hours worked in the
manufacturing sector in the same amount as they decrease hours devoted to product
creation. Product variety consequently declines when the inverse of the labor supply
elasticity, η, is large.
All in all, Figure 5.3 depicts that the qualitative reaction of investment in new firms
and thus of the extensive margin is ambiguous. By contrast, Bilbiie, Ghironi, and
Melitz (2007a) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008) respectively show that technological
innovations and shocks to monetary policy are unambiguously amplified by endoge-
nizing the extensive margin. In line with these findings, it is worth mentioning that
the estimated response of the mass of firms to the other shocks under consideration
are unambiguous. Figure 5.4 shows that in response to an increase in total factor
productivity, firm entry is boosted significantly. By contrast, a cost-push shock, a
utility shock, and an increase in entry costs lead to a significant fall in the mass of
firms.
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Figure 5.4: Impulse responses of the mass of firms to different shocks
5.5 Multiplier Analysis
After having analyzed the impulse responses to an increase in government consump-
tion, we now investigate the return of a fiscal stimulus, the fiscal multiplier. Thereby,
we do not focus only on a pure demand stimulus, but also consider other fiscal stim-
uli in form of income or consumption tax cuts. For the purpose of comparability, we
normalize the corresponding innovations such that the cost of each fiscal package
amounts to 1% of GDP in the implementation period.
For each fiscal intervention, we compute a dynamic multiplier as proposed by Uhlig
(2010). The value of this multiplier at time t is equal to the sum of discounted GDP
changes until time t divided by the sum of discounted cost changes until time t
dynamic multipliert =
∑t
s=0 β
s∆Ys∑t
s=0 β
s∆Gs
. (5.20)
By setting t = 4 and t → ∞, we obtain the short-run and the long-run multiplier,
respectively. The short-run multiplier is thus defined as the discounted change in
GDP in the first year divided by the discounted costs of a fiscal stimulus during the
first year. The long-run multiplier is defined as the discounted overall output effects
divided by the discounted overall costs.
To highlight the role of firm entry, we compare the results in our baseline entry
model with those in the standard RBC model sketched in Section 5.2.6.
5.5.1 The Pure Demand Stimulus
The evaluation of the pure demand stimulus yields a short-run and a long-run mul-
tiplier amounting to 0.09 and -0.30, respectively. Thereby, the reaction of the mass
of firms becomes a decisive factor when comparing the fiscal multipliers with those
obtained by a standard RBC framework. In comparison with the standard RBC
model, the short-run multiplier remains approximately unchanged while the long-
run multiplier is about 36% smaller.34 The reason is that investment in new firms
34Remark: Consequently, the long-run multiplier is also negative in the standard RBC model when applying
our estimated parameters.
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and consequently the mass of firms decline as shown in Figure 5.4. This additional
crowding-out effect pushes down the effectiveness of an increase in government con-
sumption.
Figure 5.5 shows that the fiscal multiplier generated by the entry model exceeds that
under a constant extensive margin only if the mass of firms increases. Figure 5.5 is
based on simulations of the model for different values of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply and the shock persistence, keeping the remaining calibration unchanged.
More precisely, the figure shows dynamic fiscal multipliers for both the entry model
and the standard RBC model with a constant mass of firms for the boundaries of
the estimated confidence intervals of ρg = {0.81, 0.97} and η = {2.38, 4.02}. The
left panel shows the fiscal multiplier for the case of a high shock persistence and a
relatively elastic labor supply (ρg = 0.97, η = 2.38). This parameter set leads to
an increase in the mass of firms which in turn pushes the dynamic multiplier above
that of the RBC model with a constant extensive margin. The right panel is based
on the opposite case of a low shock persistence and a more inelastic supply of labor
(ρg = 0.81, η = 4.02) which leads to decrease in the mass of firms and thus yields a
smaller multiplier compared to the standard RBC model.
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Figure 5.5: Fiscal multipliers for the endogenous entry and a standard RBC model
As a general rule, the mass of firms acts as an accelerator for the positive impacts of
fiscal stimuli if the mass of firms increase while it acts as a decelerator if the mass of
firms decreases.35 As will be shown later, this result also holds in the case of other
fiscal interventions such as tax cuts or demand stimuli under distortionary taxation.
5.5.2 Tax Cuts
After having analyzed the impacts of an increase in government consumption, we
now turn to other forms of fiscal stimuli, namely tax cuts. In what follows, we
stick to the assumption that an increase in government spending (now in form of
35A more detailed graphical analysis of the fiscal multiplier and the mass of firms for different parameter sets
of ρg and η can be found in Appendix.
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consumption and income tax cuts) is financed via lump-sum taxation. We consider
temporary cuts in consumption, labor, capital income, and dividend income taxes,
all of the following form
τ it = (1− ρi)τ
i + ρτ iτ
i
t−1 − ε
τ i
t for i = C,L,K, d , (5.21)
where the persistence of the AR(1) processes describing the evolution of the tax cuts
are set to ρτ i = ρg for i = C,L,K, d.
The aim of this exercise is twofold. First, we want to compare the effectiveness of
different forms of fiscal stimuli. Second, we want to check the robustness of our find-
ing that firm entry can accelerate and decelerate the multiplier effects.
The labor tax cut
Figure 5.6 shows the impulse responses to a labor tax cut for the firm entry model
and the standard RBC model as well as the resulting dynamic multipliers. The cut in
labor taxes induces households to increase both time spent to create new products
and to work for intermediate good producers causing a decline in the real wage
and an increase in output. In contrast to the increase in government consumption,
private consumption now reacts expansionary since the net wealth effect is positive.
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Figure 5.6: Impulse responses to a temporary cut in labor taxes
Higher goods demand and lower marginal costs result in higher profit opportunities
for firms in the intermediate goods market. As new product creation becomes tem-
porarily more profitable, investment in new firms increases. This effect is in turn
amplified by decreasing entry costs. By contrast, investment in existing capital de-
creases on impact. Thereafter, the reaction turns positive. All in all, total investment
(not depicted here) reacts expansionary. In the RBC model investment in physical
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capital increases due to the positive wealth effect. The rise in the mass of firms re-
sults in a fiscal multiplier above that of the RBC model by about 8% in the short-run
and 36% in the long-run.
The capital income tax cut
Figure 5.7 depicts the impulse responses to a capital tax cut and the resulting mul-
tipliers. In both models, the capital tax cut triggers a boom in capital investment.
Since households know the tax cut to be temporary, they use their resources to fi-
nance the increase in physical capital. Households consequently lower consumption
and increase their labor supply. In the entry model, households additionally shift
labor time from product creation to the manufacturing sector in order to take ad-
vantage of the subsidized input factor which is not used for product creation in the
applied framework. As a consequence, investment in new firms drops. In the entry
model there thus exists a substitution relation between the two types of investment.
The decline in new product investment causes a decrease in the mass of products.
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Figure 5.7: Impulse responses to a temporary cut in capital income taxes
The substitution relation between new firm investment and capital investment can
analytically be shown by substituting (5.12) in (5.13):
vt =
(1− δ)(vt+1 + (1− τ
d
t+1)dt+1)
1 + (1− τKt )(r
K
t+1 − δ
K)
. (5.22)
From (5.22) it directly follows that a drop in capital income tax, τKt , causes the real
value of an operating firm in the intermediate goods sector, vt, to decrease. This in
turn induces a contractionary reaction of investment in new firms.
When compared to the RBC model, the firm entry model generates significantly
smaller multipliers – 22% smaller in the short-run and 20% smaller in the long-run
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– caused by the additional crowding-out of new firm investment.
The dividend income tax cut
Figure 5.8 shows the impulse responses to a dividend income tax cut, τdt . In the
standard RBC model, profits only represents a residual. Consequently, the divi-
dend income tax cut is lump-sum in the framework without an endogenous mass of
firms. Hence, it does not affect the dynamics of the economy, at all. In the entry
model, however, the cut in dividend taxes increases after tax profits which induces
households to invest in new firms. Therefore, private agents shift labor from the
manufacturing sector towards the creation of new products. To finance the boom
in product creation, capital investment is sharply reduced on impact. Again, the
model depicts the substitution relation between the two types of investment. As in
the case of the capital tax cut, the non-subsidized investment form drops for the sake
of increasing the other one. Since the increase in investment in new firms exceeds
the decline in that in physical capital, total investment reacts expansionary.
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Figure 5.8: Impulse responses to a temporary cut in dividend income taxes
Analytically, the substitution relation can be shown by re-arranging (5.22):
rKt+1 =
(1− δ)(vt+1 + (1− τ
d
t+1)dt+1)− vt
(1− τKt )vt
+ δK . (5.23)
It follows that a dividend tax cut increases, in isolation, the rental rate of physical
capital which equals the marginal product of capital. An increase in the marginal
product of capital requires a decrease in physical capital and thus a drop in capital
investment.
Figure 5.8 depicts that consumption increases due to the positive wealth effect re-
sulting from higher labor income. Since labor used for product creation rises more
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than hours worked in the manufacturing sector decreases, total hours worked also
react expansionary. All in all, the dividend tax cut has an expansionary effect on
GDP since it induces a crowding-in of private consumption, total investment, and
product variety which in turn leads to a larger multiplier when compared to a cut
in capital taxes.
The simultaneous cut in the capital and dividend income tax
Up to now, we have assumed that capital income and dividend income are taxed
separately. Since there exists a trade-off between investment in physical capital and
investment in new firms, an isolated cut in capital income taxes leads, on the one
hand, to an increase in capital investment but comes at the cost of a decline in
investment in new products. A cut in dividend income taxes, on the other hand,
triggers a boom in investment in new firms and a decline in capital investment. In
reality, governments however do not distinguish between the income from renting
capital to firms and the profit income from holding shares of these firms. Therefore,
we now assume that there exists a unified tax rate on capital and dividend income,
i.e. τdt = τ
K
t .
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Figure 5.9: Impulse responses to a simultaneous temporary cut in capital and dividend income
taxes
Figure 5.9 shows impulse responses to a cut in the unified tax rate on dividend and
capital income. In the entry model, the impacts of a combined dividend and capital
tax cut turn out to be qualitatively equivalent to those of an isolated cut in dividend
taxes. The results show a sharp initial decline in capital investment but a jump in
investment in new firms which in turn leads to an increase in the mass of firms.
This increase amplifies the fiscal multiplier significantly by about seven times, when
36Note that this fiscal package is still normalized such that the cost of the fiscal stimulus in the implementation
period amounts to 1% of GDP.
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compared to the RBC model with a fixed mass of firms.
The rationale is that in the RBC model, this fiscal package has much smaller pos-
itive effects since part of the package is ’wasted’ for a cut in dividend taxes which
is completely lump-sum and thus ineffective in stimulating economy activity if the
mass of firms is constant.
The consumption tax cut
The last fiscal stimulus under consideration is a cut in consumption taxes. Figure
5.10 shows the corresponding impulse responses. The temporary tax cut stimulates
aggregate demand through an increase in private consumption. Otherwise, the re-
sults for a cut in consumption taxes are qualitatively equivalent to those in response
to an increase in government consumption described above. This is a plausible result
since both fiscal interventions are expansionary shocks to goods demand. In contrast
to the standard RBC model with a constant mass of producers, the consumption
tax cut crowds out investment in new firms.37 As a result, the extensive margin
decreases. This in turn dampens the long-run multiplier effects compared to the
RBC model by about 33%. As in the case of a pure demand stimulus, the short-run
multiplier remains however unaffected.
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Figure 5.10: Impulse responses to a temporary cut in consumption taxes
Robustness checks
In Section 5.4, we have demonstrated that the sign of the response of the mass
of firms to an increase in government consumption is ambiguous when varying the
labor supply elasticity, η, and the shock persistence, ρg. In line with these findings,
Table 5.3 shows that we obtain the same result for a consumption tax cut. This
37In the next section (Robustness checks), we will show that as in the case of an increase in government
consumption, the reaction of the mass of firms is also ambiguous in response to a consumption tax cut.
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is not surprising since we already pointed out that the qualitative results for a
cut in consumption taxes are equivalent to those for an increase in government
consumption.
Stimulus τi η = 4.02 η = 3.17 η = 1 ρτi = 0 ρτi = 0.89 ρτi = 0.97
τC − − + − − +
τL + + + + + +
τK − − − − − −
τd + + + + + +
τK = τd + + + −* + +
* ρ ≥ 0.08 is however sufficient to obtain an increasing mass of firms.
Table 5.3: Response of the mass of firms [+ : expansionary reaction of the mass of firms, − :
contractionary reaction of the mass of firms]
However, when regarding isolated labor, capital, and dividend income tax cuts, re-
sults change. Under these fiscal stimuli, the sign of the reaction of the mass of firms
is unambiguous. The extensive margin always reacts expansionary in the case of a
cut in labor and dividend income taxes, whereas it always decreases when consid-
ering a cut in capital taxation. Only if capital and dividend income taxes are not
distinguishable, some degree of autocorrelation is necessary to ensure that the posi-
tive impact of the dividend tax cut dominates the contractionary impact of the cut
in capital income taxes. Under our baseline calibration a degree of autocorrelation
amounting to ρg ≥ 0.08 is sufficient to obtain an increasing mass of firms.
5.5.3 The Different Stimuli at a Glance
Table 5.4 shows the short- and long-run fiscal multipliers for the previously analyzed
fiscal stimuli in both models and indicates the qualitative reaction of the mass of
firms, N .
Stimulus Short-Run % dev. Long-Run % dev. N
Multiplier of RBC Multiplier of RBC
G 0.09 0% - 0.30 - 36% −
τL 0.56 8% 0.99 36% +
τC 0.09 0% - 0.28 - 33% −
τK 0.32 - 22% 0.90 - 20% −
τd 0.45 n.a.* 1.73 n.a.* +
τK = τd 0.44 529% 1.60 700% +
*The dividend tax cut is lump-sum in the RBC model and thus does not yield to any fluctuations,
at all.
Table 5.4: Fiscal multipliers and mass of firms, N [+ : expansionary reaction of the mass of firms,
− : contractionary reaction of the mass of firms]
The pure demand stimulus generates small short- and long-run multipliers, since
the increase in government consumption causes a crowding-out of private consump-
tion, investment in physical capital, and investment in new firms. As in the RBC
model, the long-run multiplier becomes even negative, − 0.30. As already mentioned,
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the cut in consumption tax yields qualitatively the same results as the increase in
government consumption. Table 5.4 moreover shows that both interventions also
perform approximately equivalent from a quantitative point of view. The decline in
the extensive margin leads to a long-run multiplier which is 33% lower than in the
RBC model.
In both the RBC and the firm entry model, the cuts in labor and capital taxes
perform quite well. However, the cut in capital tax, in particular, generates a long-
run multiplier slightly larger than one in the RBC model. By contrast, this is not the
case in the entry model where the labor tax cut has a stronger impact than the capital
tax cut. Since the capital tax cut comes at the cost of a crowding-out of investment
in new firms, the multiplier is significantly dampened when compared to the RBC
model. However, the capital tax cut still results in a positive long-run multiplier
close to one. The labor tax cut results in a crowding-in of private consumption,
investment in physical capital and in new firms. As a result, the multiplier becomes
significantly amplified.
As already mentioned, the dividend income tax rate is lump-sum in the RBC model
and thus does not result in any fluctuations, at all. In the entry model, however, this
tax cut has strong effects (1.73) since it causes all components of GDP to increase
over the cycle. This policy intervention is thus more effective than for instance
the cut in capital taxes. The unified cut in capital and dividend income taxes also
leads to large multipliers in the endogenous entry model (1.60). However, when the
mass of firms is fixed, the multiplier is very small but positive. The rationale is
the lump-sum nature of dividend taxes under these circumstances and the resulting
non-effectiveness of a part of the fiscal package.
Table 5.4 moreover depicts our general result since in all cases where product variety
increases, the multipliers generated by the entry model exceed those of the standard
RBC model. Additionally, our results imply that in line with the findings of Cam-
polmi, Faia, and Winkler (2010) and Faia, Lechthaler, and Merkl (2010b), a pure
demand stimulus leads to rather small real effects.38 Disburdening private agents
from labor, dividend, or capital income taxes is much more effective. The dividend
tax cut is thereby the most effective fiscal tool since it induces a crowding-in of
consumption, investment, and the extensive margin.
5.6 Distortionary Taxation
Up to now, we have assumed that fiscal interventions are financed by raising lump-
sum taxes. In the following, we investigate the effects of distortionary taxation for
38The absolute size of the multiplier could naturally be increased by assuming for instance rule-of-thumb
consumers [cf. Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle`s (2007)] or backward indexation of prices [cf. Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2009)]. However, we and the cited authors want to analyze the pure effects of firm entry and
frictional labor markets on fiscal multipliers, respectively.
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government spending multipliers and the mass of firms. We follow Uhlig (2010) and
assume that an increase in government consumption is financed partly by raising
distortionary taxes on labor income and partly by issuing debt.39 The adjustment
of distortionary taxes can be analyzed by introducing the following tax rule
τLt wtLt = φg
(
Gt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 − τ
C
t Ct − τ
d
t dtNt − τ
K
t (r
K
t − δ)Kt−1 − τt
)
,
(5.24)
where φg denotes the share of distortionary taxation. φg = 0 is consequently equiv-
alent to pure lump-sum taxation. We assume that all taxes, other than the labor
income tax, stick to their steady state values, i.e., τt = τ , τ
C
t = τ
C , τKt = τ
K ,
τdt = τ
d.
In contrast to Uhlig (2010), we furthermore want to explore the effects of an increase
in government consumption financed by raising the tax on consumption purchases
as well as the unified tax on capital and dividend income. We therefore introduce
the following variants of the tax rule described above:
τCt Ct = φg
(
Gt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 − τ
L
t wtLt − τ
d
t dtNt − τ
K
t (r
K
t − δ)Kt−1 − τt
)
,
(5.25)
where τLt = τ
L, τt = τ , τ
K
t = τ
K , τdt = τ
d, and
τdt (dtNt + (r
K
t − δ)Kt−1)
= φg
(
Gt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 − τ
C
t Ct − τ
L
t wtLt − τ
K
t (r
K
t − δ)Kt−1 − τt
)
, (5.26)
where τCt = τ
C , τLt = τ
L, τt = τ , τ
K
t = τ
d
t .
We set φg = 0.5 implying that half of the increase in government consumption is
financed by distortionary taxation. Table 5.5 shows the resulting short- and long-
run multipliers and indicates the qualitative reaction of the extensive margin. The
results for φg = 0 are obviously those shown in Table 5.4.
Stimulus Short-Run % dev. Long-Run % dev. N
Multiplier of RBC Multiplier of RBC
τL - 0.35 - 6% - 1.67 - 45% −
τC - 0.05 - 67% - 0.06 - 20% −
τK = τd - 0.53 - 430% - 6.43 - 1210% −
Table 5.5: Government spending multipliers and mass of firms, N , under distortionary taxation
(φg = 0.5)
Three results are worth mentioning. First, as in Uhlig (2010), distortionary tax-
ation of labor income leads to a strong negative long-run multiplier. This result
also holds when considering distortionary taxes on the unified tax on capital and
dividend income. If the increase in government consumption is however financed
39Remark: Then, Ricardian equivalence naturally does not hold anymore.
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through an increase in consumption taxes, the short- and long-run fiscal multipliers
are approximately zero in both models.40
Second, the quantitative response of the extensive margin does not only depend on
the fiscal shock persistence and on the labor supply elasticity but also on the way
an increase in government consumption is financed. Table 5.5 shows that in all cases
of financing, the fiscal intervention leads to a decline in the mass of firms.
Finally, when comparing the multipliers of the entry model with those of the RBC
model with a fixed mass of firms, we again find strong evidence for an additional
crowding-out effect of the extensive margin. In all cases, the mass of firms reacts
contractionary leading to smaller multipliers. Consequently, when assuming an en-
dogenous mass of firms and fiscal policy financed with distortionary taxation, the
short- and long-run multipliers become significantly smaller, i.e. more negative.
We obtain the strongest decelerating effects in the case of the unified tax to capital
and dividend income since dividend taxation is lump-sum in the RBC model such
that part of the fiscal package is ineffective. Moreover, Table 5.4 reports that the
unified change in this tax rate has in isolation stronger effects than the pure fiscal
demand stimulus.
5.7 Conclusion
Since recent theoretical contributions only analyze the impacts of fiscal stimuli only
on standard economic measures of economic activity (GDP, employment, invest-
ment) but neglect their impact on the extensive margin, this chapter analyzes dif-
ferent fiscal stimuli in an estimated model with endogenous product creation.
We demonstrate that the extensive margin is a crucial dimension for evaluating
fiscal policy since it can accelerate and decelerate the impacts of fiscal stimuli. More
precisely, we find that if in response to a fiscal stimulus the mass of firms increases,
fiscal multipliers are amplified. If, however, the mass of firms declines, the reaction of
the extensive margin dampens the impact on economic activity. This result remains
robust to different fiscal interventions such as tax cuts and fiscal packages financed
by distortionary taxation.
We show that a pure demand stimulus and a consumption tax cut lead to small
multipliers since these interventions result in an additional crowding-out effect of
investment in new firms. By contrast, the multipliers of labor and dividend taxes
are significantly larger since these fiscal interventions both induce a crowding-in of
consumption, of investment in existing capital, and of investment in new product
creation. The latter effect in turn leads to a further amplification via an increase in
the mass of products.
40This result becomes even stronger in the case φg = 1. Then, fiscal policy has no effects, at all.
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Considering the case that the increase in government consumption is financed by
distortionary income taxation, we find that the tax hike causes fiscal multipliers to
become strongly negative which is even amplified by a decreasing mass of firms.
This result is similar to the findings of Uhlig (2010) in the case of distortionary
labor taxation. If the demand stimulus is financed with higher consumption taxes,
the fiscal multiplier is approximately zero.
To highlight the role of an endogenous mass of firms for the impacts of different
fiscal packages on real economic activity, we employ a Real Business Cycle model
with firm entry. Thus, our framework does not allow for any role of monetary policy
which, however, plays an important role as a policy response to economic downturns.
The interplay of monetary and fiscal policy in a model with firm entry may thus be a
promising area for future research. Moreover, the simplicity of our model precludes
a thorough quantitative examination of the impacts of the ARRA fiscal stimulus
packages. Future research should be to conduct a Bayesian estimation of a DSGE
model with several nominal and real frictions as well as endogenous firm entry to
quantify the fiscal accelerator discussed in the chapter at hand.
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Appendix A
Definition of data variables
Demeaned growth rates
data GDP= (output/output(-1)-mean(output/output(-1)))*100
data CONS=(consumption/consumption(-1)-mean(consumption/consumption(-1)))*100
data HOURS= (hours/hours(-1)-mean(hours/hours(-1)))*100
data WAGE=(real wage/real wage(-1)-mean(real wage/real wage(-1)))*100
data NBF=(NBF/NBF(-1)-mean(NBF/NBF(-1)))*100
Absolute values
consumption = ( PCEC / GDPDEF ) / LNSindex
output = ( GDPC96 / LNSindex )
hours = ( PRS85006023 * CE16OV /100 ) / LNSindex
real wage = ( PRS85006103 / GDPDEF )
Source of the original data
GDPC96 : Real Gross Domestic Product - Billions of Chained 1996 Dollars, Season-
ally Adjusted Annual Rate
Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
GDPDEF : Gross Domestic Product - Implicit Price Deflator - 1996=100, Seasonally
Adjusted
Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
PCEC : Personal Consumption Expenditures - Billions of Dollars, Seasonally Ad-
justed Annual Rate
Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
CE16OV : Civilian Employment: Sixteen Years & Over, Thousands, Seasonally Ad-
justed
Source: US Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics
CE16OV index : CE16OV (1992:3)=1
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LNS10000000 : Labor Force Status : Civilian noninstitutional population - Age : 16
years and over - Seasonally Adjusted - Number in thousands
(Before 1976: LFU800000000 : Population level - 16 Years and Older)
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
LNSindex : LNS10000000(1992:3)=1 PRS85006023 - Nonfarm Business, All Persons,
Average Weekly Hours Duration : index, 1992 = 100, Seasonally Adjusted
Source : US Department of Labor
PRS85006103 - Nonfarm Business, All Persons, Hourly Compensation Duration :
index, 1992 = 100, Seasonally Adjusted
Source : US Department of Labor
NBF: Net Business Formation: index, 1967=100
Source: Survey of Current Business available at Fraser St. Louis Fed
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Appendix B
Figure 5.11 shows the multipliers of the firm entry model and the baseline RBC
model in response to a temporary increase in government consumption financed by
lump-sum taxation for different combinations of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
and the shock persistence. The figure moreover shows the corresponding reactions
of the mass of firms in the firm entry model.
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Figure 5.11: Multipliers and the reaction of the mass of firms for different combination of η and
ρg
Figure 5.11 indicates that in all cases where the mass of firms increases in response
to the fiscal demand stimulus, the multiplier of the entry model is larger than the
multiplier in the standard RBC model with a constant extensive margin.
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Appendix C
Derivation of the real marginal costs:
The cost minimization problem of a firm is given by
min
lt,kt−1
Ξ = wtlt + r
k
t kt−1 − ϕt(ztl
α
t k
1−α
t−1 − yt) (A.5.1)
where ϕt is the shadow price of production.
The resulting first-order conditions are given by
∂Ξ
∂lt
= wt − ϕtαztl
α−1
t k
1−α
t−1 = 0 (A.5.2)
⇔
lt
kt−1
=
(
ϕtαzt
wt
) 1
1−α
(A.5.3)
∂Ξ
∂kt−1
= rkt − ϕt(1− α)ztl
α
t k
−α
t−1 = 0 (A.5.4)
⇔
lt
kt−1
=
(
rkt
ϕt(1− α)zt
) 1
α
(A.5.5)
Aligning (A.5.3) and (A.5.5) yields(
rkt
ϕt(1− α)zt
) 1
α
=
(
ϕtαzt
wt
) 1
1−α
⇔ ϕt =
wαt (r
k
t )
1−α
αα(1− α)1−αzt
= mct (A.5.6)
Alternatively, one can express the marginal costs simply by re-arranging (A.5.2)
wt = ̺t︸︷︷︸
mct
α ztl
α−1
t k
1−α
t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
yt/lt
= αmct
yt
lt
(A.5.7)
or by re-arranging (A.5.4)
rkt = ̺t︸︷︷︸
mct
(1− α) ztl
α
t k
−α
t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
yt/kt−1
= (1− α)mct
yt
kt−1
(A.5.8)
Inserting Y Ct = N
ζt
ζt−1
t yt, Lt = Ntlt, and Kt−1 = Ntkt−1 in (A.5.7) and (A.5.8) yields
wt = αmct
N
ζt
1−ζt
t Y
C
t
N−1t Lt
= αmct
Y Ct
Lt
N
1
1−ζt
t (A.5.9)
rkt = (1− α)mct
N
ζt
1−ζt
t Y
C
t
N−1t Kt−1
= (1− α)mct
Y Ct
Kt−1
N
1
1−ζt
t (A.5.10)
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Using the optimal real price setting equation (5.3) and ρt = N
1
ζt−1
t , we obtain (5.4)
and (5.5)
wt = α
ζt
ζt − 1
ρt︸ ︷︷ ︸
mct
Y Ct
Lt
N
1
1−ζt
t = α
ζt
ζt − 1
N
1
ζt−1
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρt
Y Ct
Lt
N
1
1−ζt
t = α
ζt
ζt − 1
Y Ct
Lt
(A.5.11)
rkt = (1− α)
ζt
ζt − 1
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mct
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ζt
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t
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Y Ct
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(A.5.12)
Appendix D
Steady State Values
ρ 1.25 mc 0.92 d 0.07 Y C 0.48 N 1.86 v 0.38
I 1.04 C 0.35 rk 0.04 NE 0.19 w 1.07 Y 0.55
Z 1.00 LE 0.07 L 0.33 G 0.09 TI 0.12 IE 0.07
τC 0.05 τd 0.36 τK 0.36 τL 0.28 K 1.74 R 1.01
Table 5.6: Numerically computed steady state values
6 Summary and Outlook
In this chapter, we will summarize the main results of this thesis and its contribu-
tion to the literature. Moreover, we will shortly discuss potential extensions of the
presented models as well as fields for future research.
6.1 Summary
Part One: Extensions of the baseline New Keyesian model
In Chapter 1 we describe the baseline New Keynesian model. This thesis contributes
to the literature by providing potential solutions for the described weaknesses. There-
fore, we provide – to our mind – important model extensions of the baseline New
Keynesian model in Part One and analyze new aspects of monetary and fiscal policy
in Part Two.
More precisely, we develop a New Keynesian model incorporating an oligopolistic
banking sector with endogenous bank entry in Chapter 2. Within this framework,
we conduct an impulse response analysis and evaluate the model by comparing the
generated second moments with the data. The impulse response analysis shows that
the bank entry model can depict the empirically observed counter-cyclical nature of
mark-ups in the loan market as well as the positive co-movement between GDP and
the number of banks. We moreover find that the resulting mark-up movements in the
banking sector leads to large amplification and persistence effects for the economy.1
More precisely, we obtain accelerating effects which are significantly larger than
those generated by the famous financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999). In contrast to the latter approach, our financial accelerator does
not nest from the demand side of credits but from the supply side of credits.
The evaluation of the generated second moments in comparison with those observed
in US data shows that the bank entry model performs remarkable well. More pre-
cisely, the model does not only appropriately depict the properties of key macroeco-
nomic variables but also those of financial variables including the number of banks,
the amount of aggregate loans, and the amount of loans per bank. Finally, we show
that a financial activity tax and a financial transaction tax are both appropriate
tools to stabilize the volatility in financial and thus in macroeconomic variables.
In Chapter 3 we provide a further contribution to the literature by developing a
1In particular, we obtain very large accelerating effects in the case of a monetary policy shock.
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microfounded framework allowing for simultaneous entry and exit of heterogeneous
firms. This chapter includes the investigation of the resulting impulse response, a
second moment analysis, and an empirical part concerning a Phillips curve esti-
mation. The impulse response analysis shows that the resulting model has several
advantages in comparison with the workhorse firm entry model of Bilbiie, Ghironi,
and Melitz (2007a,b). When considering a government spending shock, our model
delivers more robust reactions of the mass of firms than the model of Bilbiie, Ghironi
and Melitz (2007a,b) where the mass of firms only increases for small ranges of pa-
rameter values. Furthermore, Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007b) show that in their
framework an expansionary shock to monetary policy causes the mass of producers
to decline.2 In our model a decrease in the interest rate encourages entry. Moreover,
the RBC specification of our model can depict both a pro-cyclical and a counter-
cyclical reaction of total hours worked when varying the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. Standard RBC models can only depict a positive co-movement.3
The second moment analysis shows that in contrast to Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz
(2007a,b), our model performs better than the standard RBC model. In particular,
the standard deviation of hours worked relative to GDP is very close to the empiri-
cally observed ones and that of consumption is even larger in our model.4 Moreover,
all variables do not behave too pro-cyclical. In comparison with the RBC version
of our model, the introduction of sticky prices delivers slightly better results. When
assuming exits to be exogenous the results become worse. An endogenous counter-
cyclical tendency of firms to leave the market should thus not be neglected.
Finally, we estimate the resulting CPI Phillips curve with the generalized method of
moments. It turns out to be a function not only of expected future inflation and the
labor share but also of the change in the mass of producers. The estimation shows
that the impact of the change in the mass of producers on CPI inflation is highly sig-
nificant and reacts in line with our theoretical findings. Moreover, we show that the
CPI Phillips curve becomes flatter in an inflation/labor share-space in comparison
with the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve. This implies that the introduc-
tion of an endogenous mass of producers causes the impact of the labor share on
inflation to decrease as there occur additional effects from changes in product variety.
Part Two: Monetary and Fiscal Policy Analyses
In Part Two consisting of Chapter 4 and 5, we contribute to the literature by pro-
viding new aspects of monetary and fiscal policy. More precisely, the aim of Chapter
2This however conflicts with the empirical findings of Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Lewis (2009).
3A positive co-movement between total hours worked and TFP is however ad odds with the widespread
agreement in the empirical literature that there exists a negative correlation between hours worked and
GDP.
4In the standard RBC model hours worked and consumption behaves too smooth relative to output [see King
and Rebelo (1999)]. This problem remains in the firm entry model of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a,b).
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4 is to solve the inconsistency problem a` la Barro and Gordon within a standard
New Keynesian model and to derive time-consistent interest rate rules of Taylor-
type. More precisely, we implement the famous Kydland/Prescott - Barro/Gordon
approach in a static approximation of the canonical New Keynesian model. We
thus consider a positive output gap target in the social loss function. Within this
framework, we are able to discuss both the commitment vs. discretion debate of the
New Keynesian literature and the time-inconsistency problem of Barro and Gordon
(1983a,b) in a unified framework.
We first show that in line with conventional wisdom, commitment strategies can be
advantageous to discretionary monetary policy. Second, we show that these policy
rules cause the monetary authority to deviate from their announcements since the
re-optimization yields a welfare gain. By assuming a long-run planning horizon of
the central bank and that the monetary authority looses its reputation for a cer-
tain period of time when switching over to inconsistent policy, we find a continuum
of stable interest rate rules of Taylor-type. In contrast to the Kydland/Prescott-
Barro/Gordon approach, implementing a monetary rule such that the cost and ben-
efit resulting from inconsistent policy coincide, is however not optimal. Instead, the
solution can be enhanced by moving into the stable area where the net gain of in-
consistent monetary policy behavior is negative. By introducing an additional term
in the social loss function concerning interest rate stabilization, the continuum of
stable Taylor rules becomes larger. This implies that the reputation of the monetary
authority naturally improves when it is also concerned about stabilizing the interest
rate. Third, we find that under a standard calibration including a time preference
rate equal to the long-run interest rate, the standard Taylor rule is time-consistent
for the cost-push shock as well as for simultaneous supply and demand shocks.
Fourth, in the mass of stable Taylor rules, there does not exist a specific rule which
minimizes the social loss.
In Chapter 5 we estimate an RBC model with capital in production and endogenous
firm entry using Bayesian techniques. Within this framework, we investigate the
macroeconomic effects of different fiscal interventions. This is our last contribution
since the recent theoretical literature only analyzes the impacts of fiscal stimuli on
standard economic measures of economic activity (GDP, employment, capital in-
vestment) but neglects their impact on the development of the extensive margin,
i.e. the mass of firms. We demonstrate that the extensive margin is a crucial dimen-
sion for evaluating fiscal policy since it can significantly accelerate and decelerate
the impacts of fiscal stimuli. More precisely, we find that if in response to a fiscal
stimulus the mass of firms increases, fiscal multipliers are amplified. If, however, the
mass of firms declines, the reaction of the extensive margin dampens the impact on
economic activity. This result remains robust to different fiscal interventions such as
tax cuts and fiscal packages financed by distortionary taxation.
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We show that a pure demand stimulus and a consumption tax cut financed by lump-
sum taxation lead to small fiscal multipliers since these interventions result in an
additional crowding-out effect of investment in new firms. By contrast, labor and
dividend tax cuts generate significantly larger multipliers since these fiscal interven-
tions both induce a crowding-in of consumption, of investment in existing capital,
and of investment in new product creation. The latter effect in turn leads to a further
amplification via an increase in the mass of products.
Considering the case that the increase in government consumption is financed by
distortionary income taxation, we find that the tax hike causes fiscal multipliers
to become strongly negative which is even amplified by a decreasing mass of firms.
This result is consistent with the findings of Uhlig (2010) in the case of distortionary
labor taxation. If the demand stimulus is financed with higher consumption taxes,
the fiscal multiplier is approximately zero.
6.2 Outlook
In our opinion, the contributions of this thesis especially give rise to four blocks of
future research: monetary policy issues, frictional labor markets, combinations of
the presented approaches, and a closer examination of financial markets.
Monetary Policy Issues
To highlight the role of an endogenous mass of firms for the impacts of different fiscal
packages on real economic activity, we employ a Real Business Cycle model with
firm entry in Chapter 5. Thus, the applied framework does not allow for any role of
monetary policy. The interplay of monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian
model with firm entry may thus be a promising area for future research.5 Moreover,
the simplicity of our model precludes a thorough quantitative examination of the
impacts of the ARRA (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act) fiscal stimulus
packages. Future research should be to conduct a Bayesian estimation of a DSGE
model with several nominal and real frictions as in Cogan et al. (2010) as well as
endogenous firm entry to quantify the fiscal accelerator discussed in the chapter at
hand. In particular, this analysis should include rule-of-thumb consumers as outlined
in Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle`s (2007) to increase the size of the fiscal multiplier.
Frictional Labor Markets
Throughout this thesis, we assumed labor markets to be complete as in the base-
line New Keynesian and RBC model. Naturally, this is a simplifying assumption
5See Linnemann and Schabert (2003) for the corresponding investigation within the baseline New Keynesian
model.
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but it implies that there does not exist any involuntary unemployment in the econ-
omy. However, the recent literature highlights the role of frictional labor markets for
describing macroeconomic phenomena. In our opinion, four approaches are worth
mentioning in this context. First, the theory of efficiency wages where due to moral
hazard and a principal-agent problem, employers keep the wage above the corre-
sponding market clearing level. Seminal work reaches back to Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984). Second, the insider-outsider theory initiated by Lindbeck and Snower (1986,
1988) where insiders, i.e. employees, are protected by the existence of hiring and
firing costs. The third approach is the famous search and matching theory. Basi-
cally, this theory was initiated by Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1984), although
it actually originates from the pioneering work of Stigler (1962), Friedman (1968),
and Phelps (1968). The search and matching theory has become the workhorse
model for analyzing (un)employment dynamics in DSGE models [see e.g. Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999), Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005), Trigari (2006, 2009),
or Krause and Lubik (2007)]. However, a major problem of this class of models
is that it cannot appropriately depict the empirically observed volatilities in la-
bor markets [see Shimer (2005) or Barnichon (2009)].6 Therefore, Brown, Merkl,
and Snower (2010) provide an alternative framework where the employment deci-
sion is ”incentive-based”. This is the fourth approach we would like to mention.
Beside a complete microfoundation, this framework offers an approach which can
appropriately depict the empirically observed volatilities of the unemployment rate,
vacancies, the job finding rate, and the separation rate.
Combinations of the Derived Approaches
A further interesting extension would be to combine the frameworks with an endoge-
nous mass of firms as developed in Chapter 3 or as sketched in Chapter 5 with the
bank entry model derived in Chapter 2. This gives rise to further amplification and
persistence effects. For instance, we show in Chapter 2 and 3 that an expansionary
technology shock in insolation leads to an increase in the mass of banks and in the
mass of firms, respectively. Since the increase in the mass of banks causes the mar-
ginal costs of firms to decrease this would offer additional profit opportunities for
potential firms leading to an increase in the mass of firms in a combined approach
with simultaneous firm and bank entry. This in turn would lead to additional profit
opportunities for banks since new firms also ask for loans leading to an increase in
the mass of banks, etc. This mechanism would generate a strong amplification effect.
Moreover, this framework could depict an interesting interplay between the exten-
sive margins in the real and the financial sector. Additionally, this framework would
6In addition, the assumption of the existence of a matching function is totally ad hoc and seems naturally to
be dubious in light of the Lucas Critique. Moreover, the search and matching framework does only depict
search unemployment.
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allow for a closer investigation of investment decisions since it would offer a dis-
tinction between investment in real and financial assets and – by including capital
in production – investment in physical capital as well. In Chapter 5 we show that
there can exist a substitution relation between investment in physical capital and
investment in new firms. When additionally considering investment in new banks,
there would occur a further substitution opportunity for households. It would be
interesting to investigate how shocks in the real or financial sector affect these in-
vestment decisions in such a framework.
More Complex Financial Frictions
Moreover, the assumed banking sector in Chapter 2 is kept very simple to depict
the pure effects of the non-stationary price-cost margins of banks. It seems to be
a fruitful extension of our analysis to incorporate a more complex and realistic
banking sector. A possible extension would be for instance to follow Angeloni and
Faia (2010) and integrate a banking market as outlined in Diamond and Rajan
(2000, 2006). In particular, this framework allows for uncertainty in project outcomes
and consequently introduces risk in the bank’s balance sheet decisions. Within this
framework Angeloni and Faia (2010) study monetary policy transmissions and the
interplay between monetary policy and bank capital regulations.
For the sake of simplicity, our bank entry model moreover does not incorporate an
interbanking market, i.e. banks only provide credits to firms and not to other banks.
A framework considering interbank lending in a DSGE model is for instance provided
by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007). However, the authors assume – for the sake
of simplicity – that banks act under perfect competition and that the number of
banks is constant. Therefore, it would be an interesting approach to incorporate
oligopolistic banks in their framework to investigate how the development of non-
stationary oligopolistic mark-ups affects interbank lending.
”In recent decades, asset booms and busts have been important factors in macro-
economic fluctuations” [Bernanke and Gertler (2001, p. 253)]. After the appearance
of the current financial crisis in 2007, this claim has become even more important.
In order to depict booms and busts in a monetary model, Bernanke and Gertler
(1999) extend the BGG framework by adding exogenous asset price bubbles and in-
vestigate interesting monetary policy issues in this environment. In the last decade,
this framework naturally has become very popular [see amongst others Gilchrist and
Leahy (2002)]. In particular, we want to dignify the work of Lengnick and Wohlt-
mann (2010) who extend the BGG framework by a high-frequency asset market in
the spirit of Dieci and Westerhoff (2004) to allow for endogenous asset price bubbles.
In our opinion, this is a very promising field for future research.
We do not know how monetary macroeconomic models will evolute in the next
6.2 Outlook 151
decades. However, we claim that events as the current financial crisis call for models
with endogenous asset booms and busts in combination with the developed frame-
works of this thesis – especially endogenous bank or/and firm entry and exit.
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